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ABSTRACT 
Humans depend on ecosystems and their services. Human well-being also 
relies on sound policy intervention in ecosystem management. However, we are 
faced with the degradation of ecosystems because of excessive demands from 
humans, demographic changes, and poor individual choices. Limitation of budgets 
is another important reason to explain why the government has not able to 
conserve ecosystem properly. To offset this last factor, the Payment for 
Environment Services (PES) mechanism for conservation through incentive-based 
means that has promise in helping to sustain our ecosystem and human wellbeing. 
PES is as a type of Pigouvian subsidy to internalize positive externalities through 
the creation of a parallel environmental-service market with non-market policies 
such as command-and-control measures. The idea of PES is based on the 
Beneficiary-Pay-Principle (BPP), the reverse of Polluter-Pay-Principle (PPP), 
where subsidies are financed directly and voluntarily by beneficiaries of 
environmental services. The logic of the PES approach is that those who provide 
environmental services should be compensated or rewarded for their services and 
that those who obtain the services should pay for their benefits. 
This study set out to determine what policy options could be chosen for 
human-elephant conflict (HEC) reduction in the Khao Ang Rue Nai (KARN) 
wildlife sanctuary, with a focus on payments for environmental services (PES) as 
a policy instrument. The impacts of HEC are not only crop raiding by elephants, 
but also loss of lives for both human and elephants. This study conducted a cost-
benefit analysis (CBA) of HEC mitigation options to select the highest net 
benefits option compared with the status quo over a 20-year period. The options 
were as follows: 1) habitat improvement and female elephant contraception; 2) 
habitat improvement, female elephant contraception and land-use change; and 3) 
habitat improvement, female elephant contraception, and electric fences. The 
results of the CBA were used as an input to select which policy option to 
implement in the pilot PES scheme. The results of the CBA show the highest net 
present values (NPVs) are in option 3 (habitat improvement, female elephant 
xiv 
 
 
contraception, and electric fences). Furthermore, the cost-effectiveness analysis 
(CEA) was also analysed to provide the unit costs of effectiveness on each policy 
intervention. The results of CEA accord with the CBA results. 
This study also analyses the PES mechanism with respect to several of its 
facets, such as proposed environmental services, the potential service providers 
and buyers, the intermediaries, and monitoring and evaluation. Also, this study 
discusses the potential limitations of PES implementation, which are limited 
demand for environmental services, legal issues, transaction costs, economic 
leakage, and the likely permanence of the scheme. However, it should be noted 
that this study does not suggest that the PES scheme proposed should replace 
other conservation measures, but rather be considered as a parallel environmental 
market with other conservation policies. Furthermore, some of the lessons learned 
and policy recommendations made are seen to be very heavily influenced by how 
political change influenced the required legal amendments for environmental 
management and fundraising by initiating an incentive for service buyers based on 
their contribution to the scheme or by creating tangible incentives for the private 
sector to participate through institutions such as the Federation of Thai Industries 
and the Thai Chamber of Commerce rather than individual private companies. 
The information from the household survey can also be used to create incentive 
compatible and cost-saving strategies for villagers to work in the sanctuary. In 
summary, the PES system has the potential to turn human-elephant-conflict into 
human-elephant-harmony as it helps convert elephants from a pest to a valuable 
resource to be protected.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1  Background 
Payment for environmental service (PES) is an innovation which uses 
financial markets to provide incentives for improving environmental management 
(Smith, 2008; Wunder et al., 2008). There is a growing interest in using the PES 
approach in conservation, especially in the classical case of watershed protection. 
It arose when it was becoming obvious that, as a result of budget constraints in 
many jurisdictions, the usual approaches (e.g. command-and-control measures) 
could not provide enough funds for conservation from government sources. PES 
can provide new source of funding especially if the private sector and service-
provider communities can improve their livelihoods from investing their funds 
this way (Wunder, 2008).  
The scheme of PES is as an incentive-based approach to conservation that 
has been applied increasingly in both developed and developing countries 
(Wunder et al., 2008; Corbera et al., 2009; Perrot-Maître, 2006). The goal of a 
PES scheme is to change behaviours that damage natural resources and 
environment (Smith et al., 2006), or to enhance the quality of the environment by 
providing an economic incentive to beneficiaries to adopt management practices 
favorable to environmental conservation. The logic of the PES approach is that 
those who provide environmental services (ES) should be compensated for this 
and that those who receive the services should pay for their benefits (Pagiola et 
al., 2005). In theory, the PES as a new type of subsidy financed directly and 
voluntarily by the beneficiaries of environmental services should be able to be 
better maintained over time compared to state budgets for environmental 
conservation or traditional subsidies which are financed by taxpayers (Perrot-
Maître, 2006). The major types of environmental services that have been 
purchased up to now under PES schemes include: 1) carbon storage and 
sequestration; 2) wetlands conservation; 3) watershed protection (including soil 
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protection); and 4) species, habitat, and biodiversity protection (Forest Trends et 
al., 2008). 
In Thailand, PES is a new concept and no formal PES scheme has been 
implemented (NESDB, 2011); however, there are some pilot projects using the 
concept of PES which have been applied, for example, the Inpang Carbon Bank 
project in the Inpang community network in three provinces, namely Kalasin 
province, Nakhon Phanom province and Sakhon Nakon province (Samek et al., 
2011). The Inpang Carbon Bank project created markets in Thailand for local 
farmers who act as a service provider to adopt agroforestry for selling carbon to 
the Chicago Climate Exchange which acts as a beneficiary for carbon offset. The 
CATSPA (Catalysing Sustainability of Thailand Protected Area System) is 
another example of a pilot project using the PES concept in Thailand (DNP, 
IUCN and GEF 2011). The CATSPA was initially given financial support by the 
IUCN (United Nations Development Program) and the GEF (Global Environment 
Facility). There are five pilot areas that focus on different environmental services: 
1) Doi Inthanon National Park for watershed protection; 2) Klong Lan for tourism 
services; 3) Hauy Kha Khaeng for biodiversity protection;4) Khao Cha Mao 
National Park for water supply service; and 5) Tarutao National Marine Park for 
coastal resource services. The CATSPA is an incentive-based mechanism through 
providing a monetary incentive to beneficiaries to adopt management practices 
favourable to environmental conservation. 
This study explores the potential and feasibility of establishing a PES 
scheme in Khao Ang Rue Nai Wildlife Sanctuary (KARN) in the Eastern Region 
of Thailand, where villagers who are living in the areas surrounding KARN are 
affected by a human-elephant conflict problem. KARN is a lowland rainforest 
covering an area of 1,079 km
2
 of lowland rainforest in five provinces in the east of 
Thailand (Chachoengsao, Chonburi, Rayong, Chanthaburi, and Sakaew provinces 
- Figure 1.1).KARN is also the watershed of the Bang Pakong River and the 
Prasae River, which are the main sources of surface water supply for residential 
areas, industries and agricultural production in these provinces.  
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However KARN is also one of the 7 protected areas in the Country 
harboring more than 100 elephants.  With no natural predators such as fresh water 
crocodiles and tigers in the KARN the population of elephants has been increasing 
at a high rate compared to other areas. A study by Wanghongsa et al. (2008b) 
reported that the wild elephant population was estimated at 136 in 200 and 
accelerating at the rate of 9.83% per annum. Currently, only 36.61% of the 
sanctuary is appropriate as elephant habitat. Therefore, because of the shortage of 
food and water in the sanctuary, elephants often come out of the sanctuary 
resulting in KARN being one of the areas where the level of Human Elephant 
Conflict (HEC) is high in Thailand (Wanghongsa et al., 2008a).  
Figure 1.1: The KARN Wildlife Sanctuary 
 
Source: The author 
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The main impact from HEC in KARN is crop losses, but there have been 
human deaths, another impact that is considered unacceptable. The Human-
elephant conflict in KARN is the most severe in the country due to the deaths of 
people and elephants. Between 1995 and 2009, 20 elephants were found dead. 
Five of them died of natural causes, 13 died of human-induced causes and 2 died 
of unknown causes (Table 1.1). Deaths from human-induced causes can be 
elaborated through three sub-categories of causes, which are 1) human-elephant 
conflict due to conflict on crop-raiding by elephants (9 elephants), 2) poaching for 
tusks (1 elephant), and 3) traffic accidents (3 elephants). Unfortunately, no 
systematic data of all human injury/death due to the HEC has been recorded. 
There are only data on the number of injuries and death of humans caused by 
traffic accidents (Table 1.2).  
Nevertheless, the KARN Wildlife Sanctuary reported that two men have 
been found dead and one man injured due to the conflict between human and 
crop-raiding by elephants during period from October 2009 to August 2010. In 
addition, Srisuk et al. (2010) reported that crop damage in the Sub Wua Daeng 
(SWD) village, which is one of 90 villages surrounding the KARN sanctuary,  
was estimated at approximately 100,000 baht during the 11 months of their survey 
or approximately 109,000 baht (or USD3633) per year. Unfortunately, the SWD 
project did not collect household income data that could be used to identify the 
magnitude of such damage by comparing the crop damage to household income. 
However, the research in the SWD project has emphasized that even though the 
crop damage is not large in absolute terms, it is a large compared to average 
household income.As well, there is another concern to individual households 
where crop damage could be devastating if an entire crop is damaged by the 
elephant.  Families also incur a loss of income and wellbeing due to the 
opportunity cost of devoting time to deterring elephants, rather than producing 
crops or earning income in other activities. 
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Table 1.1: The Death of Wild Elephants in the KARN Sanctuary during  
1995 – 2009 
Causes of death No. of death 
1. Conflict from crop-raiding 9 
2. Natural death 5 
3. Traffic accident 3 
4. Poaching 1 
5. Unknown reason 2 
Total 20 
Source: The Chachoengsao Wildlife Research Station 
Table 1.2: No. of Injuries and Deaths of Humans and Elephants from 
Traffic Accidents during 2000-2008 
 No. of injury/death 
Human Elephant 
Injuries 11 4 
Death  4 3 
Source: The Chachoengsao Wildlife Research Station 
While some measures have been implemented by government agencies to 
improve the degraded ecosystems and thus reduce the conflicts described above, 
these efforts fell short of the scope and scale of measures needed. Evidence from 
KARN and its surrounding villages suggests the current measures by the public 
sector cannot do much to make a difference. Hence, the idea of PES was 
considered as a possible solution. The proposed environmental service in the case 
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of KARN is forest habitat improvement and HEC mitigation measures 
corresponding to the category of species, habitat, and biodiversity classified by 
Forest Trends et al (2008). 
As mentioned above, this study explores the feasibility and potential of 
investment by the private sector and general public for forest habitat improvement 
and HEC reduction through the mechanism of payments for environmental 
services. In addition to the potential use values that can be generated from private 
sector involvement and investment in eco-tourism activities, there are also the 
intangible benefits in the form of indirect use values from the rehabilitation of the 
ecosystem as well as the non-use value
1
 of wild elephants, which has historical 
and cultural significance in Thai society. Furthermore, the benefits of habitat 
improvement will not only reduce the HEC problem, but also restore the 
ecosystem which is the source of surface water supply for downstream areas. The 
private sector can in this way act as both a service buyer and the beneficiary of 
environmental services. Some firms may like to contribute to the environmental 
program to generate goodwill or improved reputation by using their corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) budget to provide the reward for farmers to generate a 
positive externality for habitat improvement and HEC reduction. Furthermore, 
another potential source of demand can come from the general public who value 
wildlife conservation. 
 
1. 2 Research Objectives 
The overall research question for this study was to test the potential of the 
concept of Payments for Environmental Services (PES) as a policy instrument in 
reducing human-elephant conflict (HEC) where this occurs.  The KARN wildlife 
sanctuary, Thailand was chosen as the test location and case study of HEC for 
PES development. The specific research questions were: 
                                               
1 Non-use values refer to the benefits that individuals receive from the knowledge that the 
natural resources exist (existence values) and their wish to ensure the natural resources is 
passed on to future generations (bequest values) (OECD, 2010 page 23) 
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1. To identify the options and analyse the highest net-benefit mitigation 
option for the alleviation of  HEC in the KARN Sanctuary; 
2. To estimate the unit cost of each HEC mitigation option; 
3. To design a model PES mechanism to reduce HEC in protected areas 
based on this analysis;  
4. To identify the financial needs and options for mobilizing the financial 
resources of such a PES scheme; and 
5. To discuss what limitations there are to the implementation of PES in 
practice using data from the KARN sanctuary. 
1.3 Description of the Study Area 
Khao Ang Rue Nai Wildlife Sanctuary (KARN) is a part of Kwae-Rabom-
Seeyat National Reserved Forest in Chachoensao province, next to the borders of 
Sakaew, Chantaburi, Rayong and Chonburi provinces, its territory was 67,562.50 
rai (108 km
2
), according to Royal Decree B.E.2520 promulgated to protect forests 
and wildlife from increasingly and completely destroyed by growing demands for 
additional land use, both for working and speculating (The Government Gazette 
Issue 94 Chapter 95, October 11
th
 1977).  
Some 20 years later it was suggested to promulgate a Royal Decree to 
expand the area by an additional 500,000 rai (800 km
2
) in order to preserve the 
fertile forests, wildlife and river sources in this 5 provinces joint area. As a result 
KARN then had a total of643,750 rai (1,030 km
2
), within which are gathered the 
joint area of Sakaew, Chantaburi, Rayong and Chonburi preserved forests 
(Government Gazette Issue 109 Chapter 126, December 30
th
 1992). Thereafter, 
more than 300,000 rai (480 km
2
) in the Khao Wong – Khao Wai area, which is a 
part of Kwae-Rabom – Seeyat Preserved Forest, was combined with KARN 
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Wildlife Sanctuary making its total area 674,352 rai (1077 km
2
), according to 
Government Gazette Issue 118 Chapter 75 September 5
th
 2001). 
At Present, KARN Wildlife Sanctuary is located in 5 provinces as follows; 
1. 38,375 rai (61 km2) in Chonburi province 
2. 32,875 rai (53 km2) in Rayong province 
3. 179,375 rai (287 km2) in Chantaburi province 
4. 29,375 rai (47 km2) in Sakaew province 
5. 394,352 rai (582 km2) in Chachoensao province 
KARN’s upper and middle area is mostly ridged plain, which is 
moderately steep, and is the source of many brooks and waterways that lead to 
main rivers, such as the Rabom-Seeyat steam that runs to Bang Pakong River at 
Bangklao district in Chachoensao province, the Lum Phra Peung Yai and Phra 
Sateung canals that run from Khao Sibhachan mountain to join Prajeenburi River, 
the Tanod canal that runs to Tamai district in Chantaburi province, and the Prasae 
canel that runs through Botong district in Chonburi provinceand into the sea at 
Rayong province. 
The floristic nature of this area is mostly semi-evergreen forest, suited for 
wildlife habitats, such as, wild elephants, gaurs and bantengs, birds, insects and 
reptiles. The area consists of Khao Chamao National Park, Khao Kichakood 
National Park, Khao Soidao Wildlife Sanctuary and KARN Wildlife Sanctuary, 
and includes government sectors that are in charge of the area, both inner and 
outer, to preserve these fertile forests, to rehabilitate and reforest, to improve 
people’s lives and build collective consciousness in natural resources 
preservation. 
KARN Wildlife Sanctuary has high biodiversity; there are 132 kinds of 
mammals, such as, black giant squirrel, variable squirrel, crown gibbon, sambar, 
barking deer, wild elephant, gaur, and banteng etc. 107 kinds of reptiles are also 
found in the area and 22 kinds of amphibian, 105 kinds of insects and 23 kinds of 
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freshwater fish. KARN Wildlife Sanctuary is the nearest low and evergreen forest 
to Bangkok and also the transition zone between Central and Northeast region’s 
ecological communities.As mentioned above, the Khao Ang Rue Nai Wildlife 
(KARN) Sanctuary is an area where human-elephant conflicts have become the 
worst in Thailand. The details of HEC impacts and mitigation measures can be 
described as follows: 
 
1.3.1  Impacts of HEC in KARN 
Human-elephant conflicts are presently found in 24 protected areas in 
Thailand, ranging in size between 84-2915 km
2
 and 5-350 elephants 
(Wanghongsa et al. 2008b). Using a severity index of human-elephant conflicts, 
KARN is one of the two sanctuary that are ranked at level 15
2
, which is the most 
severe level. Surrounded by farmlands and the geography of KARN that is a 
lowland rainforest are the factors that enable elephants to go out of the sanctuary 
easily to eat agricultural products, such as cassavas and paddy rice. Some farmers 
spend their money to turn on the electric light for their cassava farms for the 
whole night. They hope that it can help them to protect their farms from elephants. 
Also, some households use electric wire to electrocute elephants. The appropriate 
area that can be a habitat of wild elephant in KARN accounts for only 36.63% of 
the sanctuary. Therefore, the increasing number of elephants living at the corridor 
between KARN and farmlands will complicate the problem of HEC for both crop-
raiding and elephant/human deaths in the near future.  
 
  
                                               
2 The severity index at the level no. 15 equals to losses of property and life of human and 
elephant.  
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1.3.2  Current HEC Mitigation Measures (Status quo) 
Local people and related government agencies have applied some 
mitigation measures to alleviate the impacts of HEC, however, the level of these 
mitigation options are still not enough to reduce the HEC. The details are: 
(a)  Traditional measures by households 
Local people who have been affected by crop-raiding by elephants have 
applied traditional crop protection measures. The aim of the traditional measures 
is to chase the elephants away. Examples of traditional measures are firecracker, 
plastic-bag flag, lighting fire, elevating hut to observe the farm, and electric fence 
(Figure 1.2).  
Figure 1.2: Traditional mitigation measures by households 
Fire cracker 
Plastic-bag flag 
Handmade 
lamp 
Elevating 
hut 
Electric fence 
Source: the author 
(b) Existing HEC mitigation measures by government agencies 
The government agencies have some measures to alleviate the HEC 
problem, such as artificial water ponds (Figure 1.3), artificial salt lick (Figure 
1.4), pilot ditch (Figure 1.5), road closure in front of KARN at night time during 
9PM – 5AM (Figure 1.6), and compensation for crop damages (Table 1.3).With 
9.83% of growth rate of wild elephants in KARN, the habitat improvement to 
create supplementary feeding for elephants should be the first priority measure; 
however, the current measures are still not adequate compared to growth rate of 
wild elephants. The salt/mineral lick is another source of nutrients for wild 
elephants and other wildlife. The salt lick is a salt deposit that animals regularly 
lick. In an ecosystem, salt/mineral licks often occur naturally, providing the 
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sodium, calcium, iron, phosphorus and zinc required in the early stage for bone, 
muscle and other growth
3
. 
The pilot ditch was built to act as an elephant barrier to prevent elephants 
coming into farm areas. The length of the pilot ditch is approximately 16 
kilometres, which costs about 2 million baht or USD62500. The main problem of 
ditches is erosion of the side walls. The likelihood of erosion depends on soil 
conditions and rainfall (WWF, 2008). Therefore, effective of ditches after 
construction period depends on environmental factors (e.g. soil erosion) and good 
maintenance. However, it was now known that the pilot ditch cannot prevent 
elephants from crossing (Figure 1.5). Furthermore, since the road in front of the 
office of KARN has cut through the sanctuary as in Figure 1.6, it has caused the 
loss of human and wildlife. Wanghongsa et al. (2007a) reported that the road 
closure saved approximately 60% of wildlife compared to without the road 
closure. The government agency also provided the compensation for crop losses 
(Table 1.3) but the compensation rate is very low compared to the income loss of 
households due to crop-raiding by elephants. 
Figure 1.3: the location of natural and existing artificial water ponds in 
KARN 
Natural water ponds 
 
Existing artificial water ponds 
 
 
Source: The Chachoensao Wildlife Research Station 
  
                                               
3 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salt_lick  (13 August 2010) 
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Figure 1.4: The location of existing artificial salt licks in KARN 
 
 
 
Source: The Chachoensao Wildlife Research Station 
Figure 1.5: The location of pilot ditches 
  
 
 
 
Source: The Chachoensao Wildlife Research Station 
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Figure 1.6: The location of road closure in front of the KARN office 
  
Source: The Chachoensao Wildlife Research Station 
 
Table 1.3: Compensation rates for crop damage 
Crop type 
Totally damaged 
(USD/hectare) 
Rice 126 
Dry crop (e.g. sugarcane) 174 
Horticulture (e.g. papaya) 190 
Source: The Chachoensao Wildlife Research Station 
Note:  
(1) 1 hectare = 6.25 rai and 1USD = 30 baht 
(2) Compensation rate for partially damages of all crops is 
approximately USD60 per hectare 
1.3.3 Other organizations 
There are other organizations that are working on forest rehabilitation and 
HEC mitigation measures in the KARN sanctuary, namely the Five-Provinces 
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Forest Foundation and the Banpo Conservation Network. The details of each 
organization are described as follows: 
The Five-Provinces Forest Foundation 
The Five-Provinces Forest Foundation is one of the outstanding natural 
resources conservation and restoration foundations in Thailand. This transition 
zone forest, which is low-landed and evergreen, is 30-150 meters above the mean 
sea level, was abundant and had high biodiversity. But when the east region was 
developed, cities and industrial settlements were built along the coastline, the 
forest is not only altered to be water sources for expanding industrial section, but 
also its pollution purification sources.  
At present, the forest cover of the Five-Provinces Forest is being 
decreased, from forest encroachment. As a result, the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives has established the Five-Provinces Forest Protection Administration 
and appointed officers of Royal Forest Department and 13
th
 united ranger to 
cooperatively patrol the area, in order to defend against encroachers. In 1993, Her 
Majesty the Queen appointed the project to be a Royal Project, and the Royal Thai 
Army has supported all operations. Her Majesty the Queen has suggested to the 
East Forest’s administration that: 
1. Everybody should cooperatively protect the forest and the army 
should be leading; 
2. Acquire solutions to make man live with forest sustainably; 
3. Use the least but worthiest of agricultural land; 
4. Increase urban reforestation, start with wastelands; 
5. Dredge the water sources, reservoirs, brooks, canals and swamp; 
6. On account of forest’s biodiversity, ecotourism should be promoted to 
educated people and children and to control numbers of tourists; 
7. Provide more food and water sources for animals, in order to keep the 
wildlife in the territorial forest; and that the 
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8. The Royal Thai Army co-ordinate operations, including the public, in 
order to preserve the forest. 
The Five-Provinces Forest Fund was established to sponsor all the above 
activities, and later became “The Five-Provinces Forest Foundation” on February 
28
th
 2001, to support forest and wildlife preservation royal projects in the Five-
Provinces Forest, in order to campaign for forest and wildlife preservation by 
arranging activities people can participate in, and to cooperate with other Charity 
Organizations in politics-free public interest. The Foundation has operated more 
than 100 projects, for instance, the ditch project which is also an impact 
assessment project, the group insurance project and scholarships for children of 
offices. In 2011, the Foundation’s operation strategy has been assigned to be 
“provide and support career, improve all water sources, respond to the Queen’s 8 
suggestions; find the way man, forest and wildlife can live mutually and 
sustainably.”  
Roles of the Public Sector 
The leaders who generate KARN’s ecology restoration are Provost 
Vinaithorn Boonyachai Jittapalo and Mr. Sompob Wongpayak, live in Banpo 
district which is a plain surrounded by the Bang Pakong river. They are interested 
in the environmental, ecological and natural resources issues. Mr. Sompob used to 
farm shrimps but the shrimps were unfortunately dead, then he tried to find out 
the cause and discovered that it was mainly caused by a change in water quality. 
As a result, he gathered Banpo people and did the field visit at Khao Ang Rue Nai 
Wildlife Sanctuary. They found out that some part of forest has been encroached 
and turned into cassava fields, thereupon they unitedly reforested at the 
Tapkamnan forest by growing bananas; which is elephant’s food, and held 
environmental activities continually.  
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The Banpo Conservation Network is to keep the Khao Ang Rue Nai 
Wildlife Sanctuary as the water source, natural education area, ecological and 
biodiversity area and subsistence area for 5 groups of people: 
1) Youth Network which has 25 school students; 
2) Local Entrepreneurs, such as,  Toyota Motor Thailand Company 
Limited and Duck King Company; 
3) Local people; 
4) Government officers; and 
5) Local Administration 
1.4 Methodology and Data Collection Methods 
The study is in two stages: 1) identify the highest net benefit mitigation 
option for the HEC problem (Research Questions 1 & 2), and 2) design a PES 
mechanism for HEC reduction (Research Questions 3, 4 & 5; Figure 1.7). The 
objective of the first stage is the analysis of appropriate mitigation options to 
alleviate HEC. The methodologies used in this stage were cost-benefit analysis 
(CBA) and cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA). The CBA was conducted to help 
decision-making relating to more efficient allocation of society’s resources to 
select the appropriate option. The CEA was performed to provide further 
information on the average cost per unit of effectiveness of each policy option. 
The second stage was to design a PES scheme for HEC mitigation in KARN 
Sanctuary. 
The data collection methods for the analysis leading to the construction of 
the model PES scheme were comprised of household surveys, key-informant 
interviews, expert interviews, focus-group discussions, workshops and related 
document reviews. The wildlife expert/key-informant interviews were arranged to 
get information on appropriate mitigation measures to deal with human-elephant 
conflict mitigation (HEC) measures and the costs of each mitigation option. Also, 
the PES and wildlife experts were interviewed for their suggestions to develop the 
17 
 
 
PES scheme. Focus-group discussion and workshops were arranged to get 
information on constraint and supporting factors to develop the PES scheme. The 
household survey was used to get information on attitude of households on HEC 
impacts, damage of crop raiding by elephant, and also mitigation measures by 
households. The household survey contacted 200 households in 6 affected 
villages. Information was also obtained from reviews of documents from both 
HEC and PES literature. These four sources of information were used in the cost-
benefit analysis (CBA), cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) and PES design. Also, 
the results of CBA on the highest net benefit of policy option were used as an 
input to design the PES mechanism. Also, the results of CEA provided the unit 
costs of HEC mitigation measures. Information on the highest benefit option from 
the first stage was used as the input for the second stage to design the PES 
schemes for HEC mitigation which is the main research of this thesis. 
Figure 1.7: Methodologies and data collection methods in this study 
 
Note: KI interviews = Key informant interviews 
          FGD = Focus group discussion 
Source: the author 
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1.5 Structure of the Dissertation 
The dissertation consists of eight chapters. The first chapter introduces the 
HEC problem, briefly describes the HEC situation and proposed HEC mitigation 
strategies. The methodologies and data collection methods are presented in brief. 
The second chapter discusses the theoretical underpinnings of PES including the 
theory of externality and Pigouvian welfare theorem and discusses how PES 
increases in economic welfare would move the economy toward Potential Pareto 
Improvement (PPI). The third chapter reviews the related literature on HEC 
mitigation strategies and experiences of PES schemes from developed and 
developing countries that can be used as lessons learned to develop a PES scheme. 
The fourth chapter presents the survey results of affected households from the 
HEC that reveals the impacts from HEC, household mitigation measures and 
households’ attitudes toward the HEC problem. The fifth chapter analyzes the 
appropriate policy options to alleviate HEC using PES as the tool. The sixth 
chapter provides case studies by discussing the experiences in legal and 
institutional frameworks for PES from Vietnam and Costa Rica and also the 
challenges for Thailand. The seventh chapter assesses the potential PES scheme 
for HEC in KARN. The design of the PES program is discussed, assessing the 
means to deal with the issues of baseline, additionality, monitoring, evaluation, 
permanence, leakage and limitations of PES implementation. The last chapter 
provides discussion, conclusions and lessons learned from the study.   
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CHAPTER 2 
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE CONCEPT OF PAYMENT FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES 
This chapter discusses with the theoretical framework for the concept of 
Payment for Environmental Services, which comprised of four components. The 
first section provides a background to the theoretical underpinnings of Payment 
for Environmental Services (PES), which come from the Theory of Externality 
and the Pigouvian Welfare Theorem, in which market failures are described as the 
main cause of environmental degradation. The second debates on the Coase 
theorem towards PES approach as discussed widely in the PES literature. The 
third section outlines the debates between environmental service and ecosystem 
service that are frequently found in the PES literature. The fourth section 
discusses the definition of PES and the fifth assesses the logic of PES and 
discusses how PES increases in economic welfare can move the economy toward 
Potential Pareto Improvement (PPI) for both environmental service buyers and 
providers. The sixth section presents the preconditions to implement a PES. The 
last section outlines how to analyze the efficiency of a PES schemes and discusses 
some features that have an effect on the efficiency of PES schemes in practice. 
2.1 The Theoretical Underpinnings of PES 
The theoretical underpinnings of PES can be explained by the Theory of 
Externality and by the Pigouvian Welfare Theorem. The root source of 
externalities in the environmental area is “market failure”. Market failures are 
determined as a main cause of environmental degradation (Van Hecken and 
Bastiaensen, 2010), as can be explained as follows. Human well-being with regard 
to sustainable development depends on the sound policies or interventions in 
ecosystem management to response a dynamic interaction between human and 
other parts of ecosystem (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). 
Furthermore, the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment reported that there was 
increasing degradation in capability of ecosystem to provide their service, which 
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caused by the excessive demand for ecosystem service, demographic changes and 
choices of individuals. The resulting market failure is one important reason that 
causes the excessive demand and inappropriate price signals (for externalities) for 
ecosystem services resulted in irrational resource uses and environmental 
degradation (Van Hecken and Bastiaensen, 2010). Market failure is the situation 
that the free market does not generate the optimal welfare compared to a perfect 
market economy (Sterner, 2003). Bator (1958) defines the market failure as “the 
failure of a more or less idealized system of price-market institutions to sustain 
desirable activities or to stop undesirable activities”. The market failure occurs 
when the differences between private values and social values occur or called 
“externality” (Field and Olewiler, 2002). Baumol and Oates (1988) provide the 
definition of the externality that depends on two conditions as follows: 
Condition 1:   An externality is occurred when the values of individual’s 
utility (say A’s) including nonmonetary factors are chosen by others with no 
attention to the effects on A’s welfare.  
The example for the condition 1, regarding the negative externality, firms 
normally take into account only on what they will produce and what costs they 
have to pay (e.g. labor, raw materials etc.). Firms do not factor into their decisions 
(assuming no regulations to force them to) the negative impacts of their 
production – their external costs (e.g. air pollution, water pollution etc.), even 
though these costs represent the total costs of production to society. The external 
costs are borne by someone who does not make a decision about the production 
level resulted in oversupplied and under-price levels compared to the social 
optimal level (Field and Olewiler, 2002). The costs from the negative impacts 
from the production are called external costs or negative externality costs.  
On the other hand, a positive externality or external benefit is a benefit that 
occurs to someone other than the decision maker from the actions of an unrelated 
party. It is important to note that not only is there less willingness to pay for a 
positive externality, the loss of social welfare is due to the under-supply of the 
21 
 
 
public good regarding positive externality activity compared to the optimum. For 
example, if farmers in the upstream watershed conserve the forest habitat they 
may receive some of their own agricultural benefits; however, their activities also 
create the external benefits for downstream water users in the form of flood 
protection, cleaner water, and other benefits. The market mechanism can 
relatively work well when the benefits of environmental services occur to those 
who make management decision as in the production of agricultural activities, 
however, when the benefits of environmental services flow to others (e.g. water 
purification), the interest of the resource manager may be not incorporate these 
impacts (Jack et al., 2008). The positive externality leads to a market willingness-
to-pay for the good or resource that is less than the social willingness-to-pay 
(Field and Field, 2002). Therefore, in the presence of negative or positive 
externalities, the market mechanism does not produce the optimal social welfare. 
Condition 2: The decision maker whose activity has an effect on others’ 
utility levels does not receive (in case of positive externalities) or pay (in case of 
negative externalities) compensation as equal to benefits (or costs) to others. 
The second condition is needed if the externality creates inefficiencies or 
resource misallocation because of condition 1. Therefore, when externalities exist, 
it typically calls for public intervention to make the markets work more efficiently 
(Field and Field, 2002). In many cases of natural resources and environmental 
context, when environmental services are non-excludable
4
 such as biodiversity 
and watershed services, there is an incentive for the beneficiaries to be a “free-
rider”, however, many government interventions have been taken to control 
externalities by using command-and-control regulations and incentive-based 
instruments (e.g. taxes, user fees, subsidies, tradable permits) (Jack et al., 2008). 
In terms of Pigouvian welfare theorem, one can encourage the generation of 
positive externalities by subsidizing the marginal social benefits they provide 
(Baumol and Oates, 1988). Such subsidy can be called as Pigouvian subsidy. In 
                                               
4
 It is impossible to prevent anyone to consume it (Thampapillai, 2002). 
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the absence of the subsidy, there would be too few of the actions that generate 
positive externalities compared to the social optimal level. The Pigouvian subsidy 
internalizes the positive externalities to the agents who produce them by providing 
incentives to produce more. The motivation for the subsidies is the attempt to 
reach efficient resource allocation.   
PES is another form of incentive-based policy intervention that acts like a 
Pigouvian subsidy to internalize positive externalities, but works through the 
creation of a market rather than direct government payment.  The beneficiaries of 
the positive externality pay the producers of that externality through some form of 
organized exchange process. The exchange process is typically set up by 
government, and may be run by it or through private intermediaries. In the case of 
human-elephant conflict mitigation, PES can be another policy option that can be 
compatible with existing measures (e.g. regulations on wildlife conservation). The 
PES scheme will be discussed in more detail later in Chapter 7 by using the 
theoretical framework of PES as mentioned above.  
2.2 The Coase Theorem towards PES 
The Coase theorem can provide a theoretical underpinning of PES 
mechanism where an optimum outcome can be achieved through negotiation 
among stakeholders with well-defined property rights to facilitate efficient market 
regulation of environmental problems (Engel et al., 2010; Gómez-Baggethun et 
al., 2010). The Coase theorem states that independent of who holds the property 
rights, an efficient allocation of resources can be achieved through voluntary 
exchange in cases of bilateral externalities if private property rights are clearly 
defined by enforceable contracts and there is no transaction cost (Coase, 1960). 
However, in practice, the Coase theorem is difficult to apply to the PES 
mechanism due to the high transaction costs that delay the agreement between the 
stakeholders to achieve the social optimum (Pirard et al., 2010). Furthermore, 
allocation of property rights is another concern, because property rights in many 
cases of PES are the de facto rights that it is not quite clear when establishing 
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negotiation process between those who own or manage the natural resources 
Muradian et al., 2010; Tocconi, 2012). However, the Coase theorem may be 
suitable for PES scheme when the market transactions are not too complex 
(Muradian et al., 2010) such as there are only few parties on negotiation but the 
Coase theorem might not be applicable when there are multiple stakeholders 
involved. This study also argued that a Pigouvian subsidy would be more 
appropriate for the theoretical framework underpinning of PES as explained in 
earlier section. It can be explained that PES is a form of incentive-based policy 
intervention to internalize positive externalities through creation of a parallel 
environmental-service market with conventional conservation approach such as 
command and control measures. Whether full efficiency is achieved depends on 
the design and operation of the PES system.  This research shows that there are 
gains to be made in moving from the status quo to a PES-type system and hence 
this is the potential for a Pareto improvement that would be more efficient than 
the current situation where externalities persist due to HEC as shown below. 
2.3 Environmental Services vs. Ecosystem Services 
Environmental and ecosystem services are often used synonymously in 
environmental policy literature (Muradian et al., 2010; Greiner, 2010). The 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) defines that “ecosystem services as the 
benefits people obtain from ecosystems” including provisioning, regulating, 
supporting, and cultural services (MA, 2005). Greiner (2010) categorized that the 
ecosystem service is outcome-based focusing on the wellbeing benefits of society 
from natural capital provision, whereas environmental service is input-based 
focusing on the efforts to provide natural capital improvement. In addition, 
Wunder (2005) explained that ecosystem service represents multiple services that 
are undivided into additive components; in contrast, environmental service refers 
to a separable nature of different services. This research focus on service 
provisions or input-based services where their nature of services is divisible, 
therefore, the term of “environmental service” would be properly used in this 
context. 
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2.4 Definition of Payments for Environmental Services (PES) 
Environmental services are a growing concern for decision makers 
because of the market failures described above and the concern with 
environmental degradation. In the past, environmental degradation was addressed 
more through command and control policies – direct regulations, emission and 
technology standards, and so on. While the theoretical literature has long 
discussed the role of market creation to address environmental degradation, 
governments have only come to implement this type of policy in the last 10 to 20 
years.   The creation of a market is called a “Payment for Environmental (or 
Ecosystem) Service” and is based on the beneficiary-pay-principle (BPP), 
reversing the polluter-pay-principle (PPP) (Engel et al., 2008; Pirard et al., 2010, 
Gómez-Baggethun et al., 2010).The core principles of PES are straightforward: 
the ones who provide environmental services should be compensated and the ones 
who receive environmental services should pay for their provision (Pagiola and 
Platais, 2002). PES is another type of incentive-based or market-based 
mechanisms (Pagiola and Platais, 2002;Wunder, 2005; Jack et al., 2008; Engle et 
al., 2008; Adhikari, 2009; Forest Trend et al., 2008). The important advantage of 
incentive-base instruments compared to a command-and-control measure is their 
potential cost-effectiveness (Jack et al., 2008). This is because a PES is more 
flexible, for example, PES can be implemented in specific forest areas that higher 
values of ecosystem services but lower cost for conservation, whereas a 
command-and-control regulation would apply for the whole forest area and its 
transaction costs are too high (Engel et al., 2008). 
A formal definition of PES is found in Wunder (2005) as “(1) a voluntary 
transaction where (2) a well-defined environmental service (ES) or a land use 
likely to secure that service (3) is being ‘bought’ by a minimum one service buyer 
(4) from a minimum one service provider (5) if and only if the service provider 
secures service provision (conditionality)”. Firstly, PES is voluntary and 
negotiated basis which is different from command-and-control approach (e.g. 
regulation). Secondly, a well-defined ES that links ES and land use is needed to 
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make sure that buyers know what they are getting and would not question it. For 
instance, if it is not proven that forest cover can increase water availability, there 
will be no demand for forest protection to increase water supplies. Thirdly, every 
market transaction needs a buyer and a seller to make the exchange. Lastly, 
buyers only pay if the service is actually delivered, which is the most innovative 
characteristic of PES. Some PES programs were initiated before the name of 
“Payment for environment services” came to common usage, for example, the 
U.S. Conservation Reserve Program has compensated farmers for planting 
vegetation on environmentally sensitive cropland since the mid-1980s (Jack et al., 
2008). In addition, Wunder (2008) described that PES is a promising thought 
because of the two innovative aspects, namely supply-side innovation, integrating 
supply and demand sides. Firstly, the idea of supply-side innovation on 
conservation providers assures to use the current conservation funds more 
efficiently with strong compliance with the agreement. Secondly, PES is a tool for 
buying conservation and creates sustainable financial supports for conservation by 
integrating supply and demand sides.  
2.5 The Logic of the Classical PES Case on Watershed Services 
The logic of the classical PES case on watershed services was developed 
as shown in Figure 2.1 (Pagiola and Platais, 2002; FAME, 2011). The figure 
illustrates the potential for a PES system.  In Scenario I, the business as usual 
case, the land managers or upstream communities only view their benefits from 
conversion to farmland because there is no means to secure any of the benefits 
conservation might provide to the downstream users.  The blue area under 
scenario 1 is the private benefit to the landowner and the red area represents to 
costs to the downstream parties.  If a PES system could be introduced, the seller 
of the conservation benefits (the upstream landowner) would express its 
willingness to accept compensation for protecting nature (by, for example, 
converting less land to pasture) and the buyer (the downstream parties) will 
express their willingness to pay (WTP) for that amount of conservation.  If the 
WTP is large enough to offset the losses to the upstream landowner (its foregone 
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income from land conversion), it will be no worse off and the downstream parties 
will be better off.  The actual amount of money changing hands will depend upon 
a number of factors such as bargaining power, information, number of buyers and 
sellers and so on. The above relationship can be written as in following equation 
(FAME, 2011).  
                
when  A = Forgone income or minimum willingness-to-accept (WTA) of 
land managers or upstream communities = net opportunity 
cost of conservation 
  B = External costs to downstream communities or maximum 
willingness-to-pay (WTP) of downstream communities or 
service buyers 
  PES = The payment level of the watershed conservation scheme 
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Figure 2.1: The Logic of PES for Watershed Services 
 
Source: Adapted from Pagiola and Platais (2002) and FAME (2011). 
In welfare economics theory, the Pareto criterion refers to a technique for 
ranking alternatives of the economy (Just et al., 2004). According to this criterion, 
if it is possible to make at least one person better off from state A1 to state A2 
without making anyone else worse off, therefore, state A2 is ranked higher than 
state A1. Hence, the movement from state A1 to state A2 is defined as a “Pareto 
criterion”. However, in fact, it is almost impossible to implement any social 
policy without making at least one person worse off. Therefore, Kaldor–Hicks 
principle provides a more efficient outcome for those who are better off from the 
policy could compensate those who are made worse off, so that a Pareto 
improving outcome results or called Potential Pareto Improvement (PPI) (Varian, 
1992). Figure 2.2 shows utility levels of the two members in the economy, 
upstream and downstream communities. The upstream community represents the 
land user or service provider, whereas the downstream community acts as the 
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service buyer of watershed services. The resources are limited; therefore, only 
inside of the DOU area is achievable. The DOU area is a bundle of environmental 
services for each of two members of society which is feasible to allocate for 
achieving a Pareto improvement. In principle, any allocation to the upper-right 
location that improves both upstream and downstream communities is a Pareto 
preferred.  
At E, C and P represent the allocations of the scenario of business as usual 
(status quo situation), the scenario of watershed conservation without PES and the 
scenario of PES scheme respectively. Moving from point E (business as usual) to 
C (conservation), the downstream community saves their external costs of 
environmental degradation from watershed conservation (equal to B), whereas the 
upstream community losses their income due to conservation or less 
deforestation/conversion to pasture (equal to A). However, the upstream 
community may not want conservation (moving from point E to C) because their 
net benefit is negative (equal to “A” level). The PES scenario is the second-best 
option. With PES scenario, the downstream community (the beneficiary or service 
buyer) can compensate a part of welfare gains (less than “B” level but higher than 
“A” level) to upstream community (the service provider) who losses in welfare 
from conservation (equal to “A” level) through PES. Therefore, a movement from 
point E to P represents a Pareto improvement. For that reason, PES creates a 
Potential Pareto improvement or increase in economic welfare for both actors 
(FAME, 2011) and this notion can be applied to the Human-Elephant conflict 
situation. 
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Figure 2.2: Potential Pareto Improvement of a PES Scheme 
 
Source: Adapted from FAME (2011). 
2.6 Precondition for a PES scheme 
Wunder (2008) described that there were five preconditions for PES 
implementation, namely economic, competitive, cultural, institutional and 
informational preconditions. The details of each component can be described as 
follows: 
A. Economic precondition 
Firstly, the “externality” should exist, for example, the benefits of 
environmental services from the landowner can provide the external beneficiaries. 
Secondly, the value of environmental services (service user’s willingness to pay 
for PES) should be higher than the opportunity costs of service providers, for 
example, income foregone for giving up the first-best land-use plan (service 
provider’s wiliness to pay plus transaction costs).  
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B. Competitive precondition 
Ideally, a PES system should have enough buyers and sellers to be 
‘competitive’ in that no one can dictate the price. Examples of competitive market 
systems for PES are difficult to find. Most PES schemes are monopsonies 
(transactions with one single buyer) or oligopsonies (transactions with only few 
large buyers who can influence on the negotiations). According to market 
precondition with supply and demand condition, most PES schemes never take 
place because of the high transaction costs. Nevertheless, market and competitive 
conditions are not necessary and sufficient preconditions for PES, therefore, the 
design of PES scheme should be focused on the contract theory rather than the 
market concept.   
C. Cultural precondition 
If service providers feel that the payment from PES is not an incentive for 
them or PES scheme is considered to be socially inappropriate, then PES cannot 
be used. When non-economic value systems are significant and functioning, there 
may be strong resistance for PES initiative and using non-monetary payments 
might be preferable. Hence, the design of PES would be adaptive to harmonize 
with pre-existing values and systems of natural resource management.  
D. Institutional precondition 
Most PES schemes have been developed at the local level, therefore, trust 
between service users (buyers) and providers is needed. However, there is a 
conflict of interests between service users and providers by nature. In addition, in 
many PES initiatives are the idea from external intermediaries. Hence, trust 
between users and providers are difficult to develop naturally. PES cannot be 
applied, especially if there is a great conflict and property rights for land are not 
clear. In contrast, PES is appropriate for the case of institutional ineffectiveness, 
such as when it is difficult to implement the command-and-control measures. 
Furthermore, the effectiveness of PES also depends on whether the legal system is 
able to enforce the PES contract effectively. Therefore, it would be preferable to 
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have contracts that are independent or not fully dependent on the legal system, 
and then the contract can be stopped or suspended in case of non-compliance. 
E. Informational precondition 
PES schemes are comparatively information-intensive, which has an effect 
on transaction costs. Moreover, transaction costs mostly are high at the beginning 
of the scheme (e.g. for negotiation, baseline assessment of environmental services, 
design of the system etc.) than at the operational stage (e.g. monitoring, 
administration etc.). Transaction costs can be a significant obstacle for PES 
scheme, particularly when several environmental-service buyers and sellers from 
different social norms involve or the targeted environmental service is complex.  
2.7 The Efficiency of PES Schemes 
One important question of PES schemes is whether the schemes are 
efficient or not. Efficiency is achieved when environmental services are conserved 
in the long term with the lowest usage of resources (Pirard et al., 2010). To 
analyze the efficiency of PES schemes, one needs a framework as well as an 
understanding on how the choice of baseline and duration of PES contracts can 
affect the efficiency of the scheme.  
(A) Framework to analyze the efficiency of PES schemes 
Engel et al. (2008) analyzed the framework to examine the efficiency of 
PES as showed in Figure 3.3. The horizon and vertical axis represent net private 
profits from the land users and the net value of environmental services they 
generate to others or positive externalities respectively. The top-right quadrant is 
“win-win” area where profits of land users and positive externalities take place, 
whereas the bottom-left quadrant is “lose-lose” area where profits of land users 
and positive externalities are in deficit. At bottom-right quadrant, the land users 
receive profits from their practices but create negative externalities. In contrast, 
land-use practices in the top-left quadrant are privately unprofitable but generate 
positive externalities. Furthermore, the 45
o
 diagonal divides between the area 
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whose total value to society is positive (above) and the area whose it is negative 
(below).  
The case A in Figure 2.3 demonstrates the goal of PES where the PES 
scheme tries to make from individually unprofitable but positive externalities to 
privately profitable of land users, therefore, it can be an incentive for them to 
adopt the conservative practices. However, there are several cases of inefficient 
PES schemes. Firstly, the case B is the situation that payments are not adequate to 
encourage land-user to adopt socially-desirable practices, hence conventional 
land-use practices remain in use resulted in the failure to adopt preservative 
practice, although social benefits is higher than their costs.   Secondly, the case C 
is where the costs of the payment to supply environmental services in socially-
undesirable land uses are higher than the value of environmental services. This 
case is also socially inefficient because the benefits of land-use practices are lower 
than their costs. Lastly, the case D is the situation that there are no payments 
because land users would adopt the preservative practices anyway. However, the 
case D is not socially inefficient since the practices adopted provide socially 
efficiency but may represent financial inefficiency of the scheme where the 
scheme creates environmental services less than their unit cost. Moreover, it also 
can be socially inefficient when funds for the scheme are limited and reduce fund 
available that affects socially-efficient practices in other cases.  
Another two concerns that have been discussed in many studies on 
efficiency of these schemes are leakage
5
 and the permanence of PES schemes. If 
the scheme cannot prevent leakage, the environmental services from the scheme 
may be overestimated (Engel et al., 2008). Furthermore, the PES scheme should 
aim towards a long-term contract called permanence but also be able to adapt to 
changing conditions according to financial mechanisms and the circumstances of 
stakeholders (Smith et al., 2006; Engel et al., 2008). However, Engel et al. (2008) 
argued that in the case that the condition has changed so much, the agreement 
                                               
5
 The conservation in one area may cause degradation in another area (Smith et al., 2006). 
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between the buyer and seller might not be achievable, resulting in continuing a 
scheme that would not be socially efficient. Therefore, the short-term contract 
might be sufficient in this case to cause a change from environmental degradation 
activities to environmental conservation practices.  
Figure 2.3: A Framework to Analyze the Efficiency of PES 
 
Source: Engel et al. (2008). 
(B) Baselines of the PES scheme 
The key question that service buyers ask is whether the PES scheme has 
an adequately additionality (Wunder, 2007). To evaluate the efficiency of PES, 
the baseline needs to be set properly to measure how much more real 
improvement the scheme generates compared to a situation without the scheme.  
This is called additionality. The baseline scenarios (the difference in service 
provision between the with-PES scenario and the without-PES scenario) can be 
categorized to be three types (Figure 2.4), namely static, deteriorating, and 
improving baselines (Wunder, 2005). For example, in case of carbon credits, the 
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static baseline scenario would be the case when forest carbon stock is assumed to 
be constant in business as usual. The deteriorating baseline scenario presents the 
case that forest cover will be decreased even without PES, whereas the improving 
baseline scenario is the case that forest cover will be increase even without PES. 
Applying the wrong baseline can lower PES financial efficiency or even waste all 
money if no additionality environmental service will be provided (Wunder, 2007). 
Figure 2.4: Three baseline scenarios 
 
 
 
Note:        additionality; Source: Wunder (2005) 
(C) Duration of the PES contract 
The choice of PES contract is also important for the costs of PES 
implementation. The duration of the PES contract is another debate on PES design 
between permanent compensations versus temporary investments depending on 
the environmental service is delivered by the service provider (Pirard et al., 
(a) Static baseline scenario 
(b) Deteriorating baseline scenario 
(c) Improving baseline scenario 
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2010b). Some more clarification on these two types of PES scheme, the 
permanent compensation is the providers who receive money need to stop some 
rights over the natural resources (e.g. the conservation agency buys logging right 
to public forest from the government or cessation of logging), whereas the 
temporary investment is the providers who receive payments conditional to 
investing in alternative conservation activities (e.g. planting trees in degraded 
lands with low productive alternatives). Wunder (2005) named the permanent 
compensation and temporary investment as “use-restricting” scheme and “asset-
building” scheme respectively.  
Pirard et al. (2010) suggested that costs of an asset-building PES scheme 
are generally cost-decreasing over time (Figure 2.5); in contrast, costs of the use-
restricting PES scheme are growing over time (Figure 2.6). The advantages of the 
use-restricting PES scheme is its simplicity and lower costs in the short-term 
compared to the asset-building PES scheme (see red curve in Figure 2.5 and 2.6). 
It is easier to offer farmers money and monitor the cessation of farming close to 
the KARN border for example than to provide training to set up sustainable 
management programs for the Human-Elephant interface, however, the use-
restricting PES scheme might be costly (continued payments) and ineffective 
(demand for agricultural land still exists). Therefore, while the use-restricting PES 
scheme may be effective at project level, which is likely to provide quick 
ecosystem benefits, it may create a “leakage” effect somewhere else. Furthermore, 
the freezing of rights over natural resources resulting in potentially relative 
scarcity of basic commodities is expected to increase the price of these 
commodities and therefore the cost of the PES scheme (through the increasing of 
opportunity costs). Therefore, while the costs of the asset-building PES scheme 
are more expensive in the short term because it includes investment and 
transaction costs that are expected to be high (fencing, food supplies in the 
sanctuary, etc), its benefits are clearer in the long-run than the use-restricting PES 
scheme.  
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Figure 2.5: Costs of the Use-restricting PES scheme 
 
Source: Pirard et al. (2010). 
Figure 2.6: Costs of the Asset-building PES scheme 
 
Source: Pirard et al. (2010). 
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2.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has described the theoretical framework for PES. The 
theoretical underpinnings of PES can be explained by the theory of externality and 
the Pigouvian welfare theorem. Under the theory of externality, the main sources 
can be explained by the concept of market failure. However, the externalities can 
be either negative or positive. In the case of positive externalities, beneficiaries 
can encourage the generators of positive externalities by subsidizing them for 
marginal social benefits they provide (Baumol and Oates, 1988). Such subsidies 
can be called Pigouvian. Therefore, PES is an incentive-based policy intervention 
as a Pigouvian subsidy in order to internalize positive externalities through 
creation of an environmental-service market. Furthermore, PES also can create a 
Potential Pareto Improvement (PPI), or increase in economic welfare for both 
service providers and beneficiaries (service sellers). However, the preconditions 
(namely economic, competitive, cultural, institutional and informational) before 
PES implementation need to be considered. To measure the efficiency of a PES 
scheme, several aspects should be considered, such as how to set the baseline 
properly to measure additionalities or the choices of a PES contract that has an 
effect on costs of the scheme.   
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CHAPTER 3 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE  
The review of literature can be separated into two parts. First, the reviews 
of PES and PES-like
6
 programs that relate the problem of paying for 
environmental services to this study (wildlife conservation and watershed 
protection) are presented. Second, the chapter reviews the experience of human-
elephant conflict (HEC) mitigation strategies from South Asia and Africa and 
experiences from two selected HEC cases in Thailand. Also, the conclusion of this 
chapter is presented. 
3.1 Payment for Environmental Services (PES) 
There is a growing interest in using PES approach in conservation because 
the current approaches (e.g. command-and-control measures to isolate elephants 
from human interaction) that require significant funds and budgets for 
conservation are typically too small to implement all the measures.  The payment 
scheme is an innovation using markets to provide incentives for improving 
environmental management (Smith, 2008; Wunder et al., 2008). The logic of the 
PES approach is that those who provide environmental services (ES) should be 
compensated for their services and that those who receive the services should pay 
for their benefits (Pagiola et al., 2005).   
Furthermore, Wunder (2005) has argued that PES can be distinguished 
from other conservation approaches in terms of the degree of reliance on 
economic incentives and the context that targets directly to conservation rather 
than integrate into development approach. For example, the purpose of command-
and-control regulations is to conserve the natural resources and environment 
without any incentive and voluntary features as PES.  
                                               
6
 A PES-like program refers to the programs that match most criteria of PES definition but not 
all (Wunder, 2007). 
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There are two reasons to make PES a promising idea (Wunder et al., 
2008). First, PES is an important supply-side innovation of the direct buyers of 
conservation. The conservation activities frequently are seen as unattractive to the 
service providers such as farmers and fishers. PES approach can be the way to 
deal directly with social and private benefits where service providers are paid 
directly regarding measured ES units are delivered. Second, PES can be viewed as 
a demand-side innovation. In many cases, conservation is viewed as the 
responsibility of the government and most conservation funding relies only on the 
government budget, but PES puts buyers and sellers of conservation together, so 
those who benefit from environmental services have a more direct means of 
paying for these benefits. Furthermore, conservation funding must battle with 
other requirements of scare budgetary resources (e.g. poverty alleviation and 
economic development). PES can provide new funding for conservation by 
matching the users (or service buyers) directly with service providers. 
The reviews of PES and PES-like programs in this section were selected 
based on environmental services related to this study, which are wildlife 
conservation and ecosystem restoration. In term of demand-side management, 
PES/PES-like programs can be categorized to be two types, namely government-
finance and user-financed PES programs. The service buyers of government-
financed programs are a third party (especially the government) and voluntary 
only on provider sides, whereas the service buyers and service providers of user-
financed programs are voluntary (Wunder et al., 2008). There is a growing 
number of PES/PES-like programs of government-financed PES programs 
including the Costa Rican payments for environmental services (PSA) (Pagiola, 
2008), Working for Water (WfW) in South Africa (Turpie et al., 2008) and 
Sloping Land Conversion Program (SLCP) in China(Bennett, 2008). In addition, 
the user-financed program of several PES/PES-like schemes have been 
established, such as watershed services between downstream users and upstream 
landowners in Bolivia (Asquith et al. 2008), hunting and eco-tourism in 
Zimbabwe (Frost and Bond, 2008) and eco-tourism in India (Wangchuk et al., 
2010), wildlife-friendly rice in Cambodia (Clements et al., 2010), habitat credits 
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for federal governments or private companies in United States who want to offset 
impacts on habitat and gopher tortoise populations (Gartner, 2010), and the New 
South Wales Biodiversity Banking and Offsets Scheme (BioBanking Scheme) for 
developers who want to offset the negative impact of their development (DECC, 
2007). However, the habitat-credit-trading system in United States would be 
classified to be a user-financed program, even service buyers can be the 
government sectors because the service buyers in this case is not the third party as 
in other schemes. 
3.1.1 Environmental service (ES) provision 
This section aims to review the major key components of PES design as 
mentioned in the literature, namely environmental services, baselines, 
additionality, leakage and permanence. Table 3.1 gives the definitions and how 
significant each effectiveness indicator is likely to be. These are aspects of all PES 
schemes that must be addressed in their design and operation. 
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Table 3.1: Definitions and their significances of each effectiveness 
indicators for a PES scheme 
Indicators Definition 
The significance of each effective 
indicator 
Baselines Baselines are the current 
status of environmental 
services in any area. 
We need to consider what would 
hypothetically happen without the PES 
scheme, therefore, to construct a 
counterfactual ES baselines are required 
to track the delivery of these services to 
benefit users. These baselines must be 
chosen carefully and should account for 
changes over time that are expected to 
occur without a PES scheme being in 
place. 
Additionalities Additionalities are 
additional environmental 
services in the PES scheme 
compared to a baseline, and 
can be called the “marginal 
benefit services” provided 
by service providers. 
Additionalities are the goal of the 
scheme. Additionalities are the effects 
that would not have occurred without the 
scheme. If there is no additionality, it 
means we pay for the activities that 
happen anyway. 
Leakage The results when activity in 
one location causes 
degradation to shift to 
another area. 
The PES scheme should prevent 
“leakage” or make sure that 
environmentally-damaging impacts are 
not displaced elsewhere. 
Permanence The PES scheme should try 
to establish a long-term 
basis or “permanence”. 
The PES scheme should be designed on a 
long-term basis because the service 
provision will be ended when the 
payments are terminated. Consequently, 
the PES scheme cannot be sustained. 
Note: ES = Environmental services 
Sources: Smith et al. (2006), Forest Trends et al. (2008); Wunder (2005). 
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Table 3.2 summarizes the main characteristics of PES programs in 
selected cases. Among these cases, most schemes, except Sloping Land 
Conversion Program (SLCP), include multiple ES. According to government-
financed programs, the Working for Water (WfW) program responded to the 
effect of the threat that invasive alien plants posted to water supplies (Turpie et 
al., 2008). The SLCP was initiated by the central government in China that tried 
to reduce soil erosion and desertification and increase forest cover by retiring 
steeply sloping and marginal lands from agricultural production (Bennett, 2008). 
The Payment for Environmental Service (PSA) in Costa Rica was introduced to 
provide ES for watershed protection, forest conservation and timber plantation 
managed by FONAFIFO, a semi-autonomous agency with independent legal 
status (Pagiola, 2008).  
Regarding user-financed programs, The Communal Areas Management 
Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) is a program initiative to 
alleviate the conflict between farmers and wildlife that were treated as pests (Frost 
and Bond, 2008).The Rural District Councils (RDCs) were chosen to serve as the 
intermediaries to manage wildlife revenues on behalf of communities. Safari 
operators are the ones who buy the rights through the contracts with the RDCs for 
bringing sport hunters and eco-tourists to their concession areas to hunt (a set 
quota of animals), track, observe and take pictures of wildlife under some 
conditions for communities; not to disturb or hunt wildlife in concession areas, to 
limit expansion of crops and livestock and to restrict human settlement to agreed 
zones. Similarly in the case of CAMPFIRE, the Snow Leopard Conservancy 
(SLC) in India, as one of intermediaries, proposed a program to mitigate the snow 
leopard-human conflict and snow leopard conservation by providing non-
monetary incentives that enhanced income from ecotourism for rural households 
(Wangchuk et al., 2010). The non-monetary incentives can be in the form of 
assistance in setting up ecotourism/homestays/protecting livestock corrals under a 
conservation condition according to the contract with SLC-India and the local 
Village Management Committee. In Bolivia, the PES scheme was introduced to 
supply the conservation of bird and watershed protection via annual contracts for 
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tree-cutting and hunting bans on enrolled areas (Asquith et al., 2008). The agri-
environment payment program in Cambodia is the payment scheme in the 
premium prices to wildlife friendly products for farmers those who are carrying 
out with compliance with land-use plan and no-hunting rule (Clements et al., 
2010). Furthermore, the voluntary Sandhill (gopher tortoise) habitat credit trading 
system is quite different from the previous cases. In this system, the eligible forest 
owners within specific areas will be issued credits for verifiable gopher tortoise 
habitat and/or agreed upon management activities (Gartner, 2010). Each credit is a 
unit of trade on habitat conservation/restoration and can be voluntarily purchased 
by the government or private sectors to offset impacts on Sandhill habitat and 
gopher tortoise populations. Similarly, the product of the New South Wales 
(Australia) BioBanking Scheme being bought and sold is called biodiversity 
credits, which are assessed from biodiversity condition or population of threaten 
species (DECC, 2007).  The BioBanking Scheme launched in July 2008. In 
principle, Biobanking is a voluntary market-based instrument (MBI).  Three main 
groups of stakeholders are involved; namely the landowners, developers and 
conservationists.   The suppliers of credits are landowners who agree to reserve all 
or part of their land as a BioBank site and manage this site for conservation. 
Biodiversity credits can be bought by developers, by conservationists and even by 
individuals (e.g. for their charity reasons). 
3.1.2 Baselines and Additionality 
Table 3.3 presents the effectiveness indicators of the PES/PES-like 
schemes as described above. The PES scheme will be accomplished when it can 
provide additionality to current status, therefore, the goals of the payment scheme 
need to be identified as baselines (Smith et al., 2006; Forest Trends et al., 2008). 
This baseline must be chosen carefully because if ES would increase without the 
payment scheme, it means we pay for action that would have happened anyhow, 
which may lead to a loss of credibility (Smith et al., 2006; Wunder, 2005). 
However, additionality is difficult to measure in practice because it requires 
comparing “with-PES-intervention” scenario with “business-as-usual” 
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counterfactual scenario (Wunder et al., 2008). Moreover, every case attempted to 
measure additionality according to ES provision.  
In these sample cases, an indicator used for measuring additionality for 
watershed protection is a change of stream flows and land uses, whereas 
indicators for wildlife conservation are additional wildlife population and 
reduction of economic and mortality losses due to human-wildlife-conflict. For 
watershed service provision, an increase of clearing invasive alien species and 
stream flow were used as proxies for additionality in the case of Working for 
Water (WfW) (Turpie et al., 2008). They claimed that the program has cleared 
more than one million of invasive alien species during 1997 - 2006 that can 
increase stream flow by nearly 46 million cubic meters annually. Total land areas 
for retirement were used as a measure of the Sloping Land Conversion Program 
(SLCP), however, no explicit baseline that can be evaluated what would happen 
without SLCP scheme (Bennett, 2008). Nevertheless, it was claimed that SLCP 
provide additionality because farmers would not retire their lands without the 
scheme. For PSA case, the forest-cover was used as the baseline of the scheme, 
however, the indicators for additionality were not clear since the lack of data on 
each activity was (Pagiola, 2008).  
According to the indicators of environmental services on wildlife 
conservation, three indicators to measure additionality of the CAMPFIRE 
program are 1) the populations of elephants, buffalo and other large species in 
CAMPFIRE areas, compared to change in other areas in Zimbabwe; 2) a change 
in wildlife habitat in CAMPFIRE areas using remote sensing; and 3) total wildlife 
revenue in CAMPFIRE areas as a proxy of wildlife production (Frost and Bond, 
2008).Similarly, a reduction in livestock depredation and additional tourism 
revenues of the snow-leopard conservation scheme were applied as indicators for 
additionality of the scheme (Wangchuk et al., 2010; Jackson and Wangchuk, 
2004). A change of land use compared to the baseline was applied to be an 
indicator to measure additionality of bird habitat and watershed protection in 
Bolivia (Asquith et al., 2008). Nevertheless, additionality might be low since the 
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land under the conservation contract is not the most threatened by agricultural 
clearing. This is because the lands that have clear ownership are at low risk of 
deforestation. Regarding market-based habitat credit trading system, habitat 
condition and gopher tortoise population were employed as indicators to measure 
additionality of habitat improvement and gopher tortoise conservation (Gartner, 
2010). According to a BioBank scheme in New South Wales, the assessment of 
biodiversity values and threaten species is required to determine the number of 
biodiversity credits that can be created at a BioBank site or required at a 
development site (DECC, 2008); therefore, the additional biodiversity credits can 
be a proxy of additionality.  
3.1.3 Leakage and Permanence 
Another element to convince service buyers that PES scheme will be 
effective is to prevent “leakage” or conservation actions in one area will not shift 
degradation to another area (Smith et al., 2006; Forest Trend et al., 2008; Wunder 
et al., 2008). Leakage is occurred when the scope or level of interventions (e.g. 
whether the scheme includes the entire watershed or only part of watershed) is 
lower than the required services (Wunder et al., 2008). In case of the scheme 
including only a part of watershed, if the soil erosion displaces elsewhere, the 
leakage would occur. All these sample schemes tried to design carefully to 
prevent the leakage. For example, the WfW scheme in South Africa may argue 
that there was no leakage since clearing alien species in specific areas by 
employing unemployed workers might not lead to degrade other forest areas. In 
case of CAMPFIRE, most communal areas where contain the wildlife population 
are part of the program, therefore, the leakage problem would be less significant 
(Frost and Bond, 2008). The case of snow leopard conservation would be similar 
because prime wildlife areas are targeted. Unfortunately, initial credit transactions 
were expected to occur in 2010; therefore, there is no information on monitoring 
and leakage in the scheme of habitat credit trading system. Also, there is no 
information provided on leakage in the BioBanking scheme in New South Wales. 
Pagiola (2008) claimed that leakage in Payments for Environmental Service 
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(PSA) in Costa Rica was limit because there was no report on impact to other 
areas.  
The question on whether the scheme would be on a long-term basis or 
called “permanence” is another concern about the design of PES/PES-like 
schemes (Smith et al, 2006; Wunder et al., 2008). In all sample cases, the length 
of the scheme depends on the contract period; therefore, it can say that the 
permanence of each scheme may not be secured. In user-financed programs, the 
schemes depend on the satisfaction of the users whether they receive the service 
they desire, whereas the government-financed programs depend on continued 
budget allocations (Wunder et al., 2008). Furthermore, the permanence of the 
scheme also depends on other economic factors, for example, the permanence of 
CAMPFIRE program also depends on the relative market prices of wildlife and 
agricultural commodities, which could impact the land-use practices (Frost and 
Bond, 2008). Moreover, there was an effort to design the scheme to encourage 
permanence in the supply side of ES in the SLCP program by introducing tax 
exemption given to farmers on income earned from trees and grasslands planted 
under the program (Bennett, 2008). Although the BioBanking scheme period 
depends on the contract period, it can likely be a long-term scheme as long as the 
development generates the negative impacts to the environment and the laws 
allow developers to offset them. The demand for biodiversity credits is still 
remain. Hence, the scheme should be adaptively designed to ensure that ES is 
responsive to the changing needs of service buyers (Smith et al., 2006) and market 
conditions (OECD, 2010). 
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Table 3.2: Design of selected PES and PES-like case studies 
Country Environmental services Service buyers Service providers Intermediaries 
Government-financed programs 
1) Working for Water (WfW), 
South Africa (Turpie et al., 
2008) 
Watershed protection and 
biodiversity by clearing 
alien species 
Central government 
(85%) and water users 
(15%) 
Working for Water 
(WfW) by employing 
workers 
WfW 
2) Sloping Land Conversion 
 Program (SLCP), China 
 (Bennett, 2008) 
Watershed protection Central government Rural 
households 
Village, township and 
county governments 
3) Payments for Environmental 
Services (PSA), Costa Rica 
(Pagiola, 2008) 
Water and forest 
conservation and timber 
plantations 
FONAFIFO 
(autonomous state 
agency) 
Private landholders, 
indigenous 
communities 
FONAFIFO (autonomous 
state agency) 
User-financed programs 
4) CAMPFIRE, Zimbabwe 
(Frost and Bond, 2008) 
Human-wildlife conflict 
mitigation and landscape 
beauty 
Private safari operators 
and international donors 
Communities through 
Rural District Councils 
(RDCs) 
RDCs (in part 
representing 
communities) 
5) Bolivia (Asquith et al., 
2008) 
Bird habitat and watershed 
protection 
Pampagrande 
Municipality, US 
Fish and Wildlife Service 
Santa Rosa farmers (64 
landowners) 
Fundación Natura (NGO) 
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Table 3.2: Cont. 
Country Environmental services Service buyers Service providers Intermediaries 
6) Agri-environment payment, 
Cambodia (Clements et al., 
2010) 
Wildlife conservation by 
hunting ban of key species 
Tourists who buy 
wildlife-friendly rice 
Rural 
households 
(1) village committees: 
management of tourism 
services, (2) PA 
authorities: legally 
approve tourism 
agreements and 
enforcement, (3) External 
agency: certification & 
marketing, (4) Private 
sectors: sales of rice 
7) Snow leopard conservation, 
India (Wangchuk et al., 
2010; Jackson and 
Wangchuk, 2004) 
Snow leopard conservation 
and Leopard-human 
conflict mitigation 
Tourists Rural 
households 
the Snow Leopard 
Conservancy (SLC-India) 
and the local Village 
Management Committee 
8) Market-based habitat credit 
trading system, USA 
(Gartner, 2010) 
Habitat improvement and 
gopher tortoise 
conservation 
Government /private 
sectors who want to 
offset impacts on gopher 
tortoise habitat 
Landowners the American Forest 
Foundation and Longleaf 
Alliance 
9) BioBanking NSW (DECC, 
2007) 
Biodiversity offsets to 
improve biodiversity 
condition 
Private companies who 
want to offset impacts on 
their development 
Landowners New South Wales 
Department of 
Environment and Climate 
Change (DECC) 
Source: 1. (1) – (5) were adapted from Wunder et al. (2008), 2. Sources of (6) – (8) were indicated in the table  
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Table 3.3: Factors affecting effectiveness and efficiency of selected PES and PES-like case studies 
Countries Baselines Additionality Leakage Permanence 
Government-financed programs 
1) South Africa (Turpie et al., 
2008) 
Baseline of stream flows Increased water runoff None Not secured beyond 
contract period 
2) Sloping Land Conversion 
Program (SLCP), 
China(Bennett, 2008) 
No explicit baseline Total land areas for 
retirement 
Only one survey 
suggests leakage does 
occur 
Not secured beyond 
contract period 
3) Payments for Environmental 
Services (PSA), Costa Rica 
(Pagiola, 2008) 
Static forest-cover 
baseline 
Unclear 
 
Low Not secured beyond 
contract period 
User-financed programs 
4) CAMPFIRE, Zimbabwe 
(Frost and Bond, 2008) 
Baselines of key species’ 
population, wildlife 
habitat, and wildlife 
revenue  
Additional number of 
wildlife population and 
hunting revenues 
Limited, since prime 
Wildlife areas are 
targeted 
Not secured, but changed 
local attitudes to wildlife 
5) Bolivia (Asquith et al. 2008) Baselines of vegetation 
cover and land uses 
Probably low, as low-
threat areas are enrolled 
Low; some at on-farm 
level 
Not secured beyond 
contract period 
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Table 3.3: Cont. 
Countries Baselines Additionality Leakage Permanence 
6) Agri-environment payment, 
Cambodia (Clements et al., 
2010) 
Unclear on key species 
population 
Unclear on key species 
protection but farmers 
got benefits from higher 
prices of rice 
No information Not secured beyond 
contract period 
7) Snow leopard conservation, 
India (Wangchuk et al., 
2010; Jackson and 
Wangchuk, 2004) 
Baseline of livestock loss Reduction in livestock 
depredation and 
additional tourism 
revenue 
Limited, since prime 
Wildlife areas are 
targeted 
Not secured beyond 
contract period 
8) Market-based habitat credit 
trading system, USA 
(Gartner, 2010) 
Baseline of habitat 
conditions and gopher 
tortoise population 
Additional number of 
gopher tortoise 
population 
No information Not secured beyond 
contract period 
9) BioBanking NSW (DECC, 
2007) 
Baselines of biodiversity 
values and threaten species 
An increase in the habitat 
or population of a 
threatened species 
No information Not secured beyond 
contract period 
Source: 1. (1) – (5) were adapted from Wunder et al. (2008), 2. Sources of (6) – (8) were indicated in the table 
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3.2 Human-Elephant Conflict (HEC) Mitigation Strategies 
3.2.1 Experiences from South Asia and Africa 
Human-Elephant Conflict (HEC) measures are often called as “mitigation” 
because most HEC could never be completely eliminated; therefore, conflict 
reduction should aim to reach the local “tolerance level” toward elephants rather 
than expect to eliminate the problem (Dublin and Hoare, 2004).The main factors 
causing the increasing confrontation between human and elephants are expansion 
of agricultural and human settlement into the forest, loss of elephant habitats and 
blocking of elephant migration routes, and human activities that attract elephant 
(e.g. crop planting and building water reservoirs for irrigation or power generation 
near elephant habitats, Perera, 2009). The reviews in this section focus on the 
current HEC mitigation and also innovative measures to alleviate the conflicts. 
Many studies (e.g. O’Connell-Rodwell et al., 2000; Osborn & Parker, 2003; 
Fernando et al., 2008; Gunaratne & Premarathne, 2006) try to look at the 
effectiveness of current mitigation measures, whereas some studies (e.g. Zhang & 
Wang, 2003) attempt to test the new methods to alleviate the impacts of the 
conflict. However, no one method can be standalone solution (Fernando et al., 
2008; Gunaratne & Premarathne, 2006).A review of mitigation measures is 
discussed in the literature that follows. 
In many cases of HEC in Asia and Africa, main damage is caused by 
elephant males who turn into habitual crop-raiders (Hoare, 1995).  There are a few 
studies on economic losses from crop-raiding. Zhang and Wang (2003) reported 
that the main impact of HEC in Simao, China was crop loses and property 
damages in which total economic losses between1996-1999 were approximately 
2,600,000 yuan RMB or USD314600. Amwata et al. (2006) reported that 
economic losses of crop production due to elephant raiding in the areas adjacent 
to Mochongoi Forest, Baringo, Kenya ranged from between USD 75 to 2,000 or a 
mean of USD 450 per farmer annually. Ngene and Omondi (2009) estimated the 
economic losses of crop raiding by elephants in the areas adjacent to Marsabi 
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National Park and Reserve in Kenya between August 2004 and July 2005 
(excluding December 2004 and April 2005 due to rains). The crop losses of 414 
farms were approximately USD208814 during that period. Furthermore, factors 
that influenced the risk of crop raiding are also important. Barnes et al. (2005) 
found that a major influence to a farm’s risk of crop raiding depending on distance 
to boundary, size of cultivated areas, number of crops planted on the farm, and 
degree of farm’s isolation. Farm adjacent to park boundary were most at risk and 
larger farms tended to more attractive to elephants. More food crops would also 
likely increase the probabilities of crop raiding. Finally, the isolated farms were 
more vulnerable than those in the clusters because farms in the clusters might help 
each other to guard the crop, while isolated farms are more likely to leave their 
crops unprotected for a long period.  
The HEC mitigation measures analyzed can be broadly categorized into 10 
types, the details in each measure can be described as follows: 
(A) Traditional Methods 
The traditional methods are usually made from low-tech materials that are 
found in rural areas (Parker, 2007; Nelson et al., 2003). These measures range 
from making fire or a noise with firecrackers and yelling to the erection of human 
effigies (scarecrows), in which the main propose of these measures is to chase 
elephant away (Nelson et al., 2003; Fernando et al., 2008; Parker, 2007).The 
reason that traditional methods are still widely used is they are easy to use and 
have low costs (Nelson, 2003; Fernando et al., 2008). The problem with all 
traditional measures is that they tend to become ineffective overtime because 
elephants become habituated
7
 once they learn there is no real harm (Parker, 2007; 
Nelson, 2003; Hoare 2001; Zhang & Wang, 2003) and elephant behavior is 
adaptable (Osborn & Parker, 2003) and trainable. Other disadvantages of 
traditional measures are the need to be used in combination and the danger of 
using methods near elephants that lead to psychological stresses on households 
                                               
7 Habituated means elephants can learn that method is serious no harm to them, then after period 
of exposure, they just ignore it (Hoare, 2001).   
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and communities (Nelson, 2003).In addition, these confrontational methods raise 
the risk of injury and death to local people from elephants as the aggression levels 
increase on both sides (Fernando et al., 2008). 
Moreover, there are other supplementary methods to traditional measures 
such as olfactory and auditory methods. The example of olfactory is chilli ropes 
where chilli paste is mixed with grease and applied on ropes strung along the 
boundary to drive elephants away (Fernando et al., 2008). Regarding auditory 
methods e.g. alarm and elephant distress calls
8
, these are in the experimental 
stage. An alarm by itself can be ineffective as elephants habituate to the lack of 
serious threat, however, when elephants are near the boundary, alarms can help 
farmers detect elephants before they enter fields (Fernando et al., 2008). In 
O’Connell-Rodwell et al. (2000)’ experiments in Namibia, they found that the 
alarms were good for short trip-alarms (maximum 1 km) because the sound of the 
siren seemed to be effective within approximately 500 meter. The major problem 
of alarms is that many farm areas are too large to protect solely by the alarms. 
Another problem is the negative externality to neighbouring unprotected farms. 
They also tried to test elephant distress calls by using natural air-borne elephant 
distress calls to chase elephants away from farms, however, the study found that it 
was ineffective because elephants may be capable to recognize individual 
identities from calls. Nevertheless, the main obstacle to elephant distress calls is 
the equipment to record and play back is complicated and expensive (Nelson et 
al., 2003; Osborn and Parker, 2003). In addition, the GPS satellite radio is another 
supplementary option to traditional methods by monitoring the movement of 
individual problem elephant, and then it can warn villagers of their presence in a 
particular location, however, the barrier to apply this method is because this 
technology is very expensive (around USD5000-8000 per collar) but has a life-
time only 1-2 years (Fernando et al., 2008). 
                                               
8 It is a range of elephant calls that humans can be either audible or not (infrasound). The aim of 
this experiment is to search for a call that they might be an elephant deterrent, then such calls 
will be recorded and played back to elephants (Fernando et al., 2008). 
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(B) Elephant Barriers 
An elephant barrier or physical barrier is an obstruction constructed to 
prevent elephants from coming into crop fields or villages or to contain elephants 
in a particular area (e.g. protected area) (Fernando et al., 2008).Elephant barriers 
are often seen as the enduring solution in HEC, and is likely built where the 
conflict is severe (Nelson et al., 2003). There are several elephant barriers, for 
example, ditches, un-electrified fences, stone wall, buffer crops, and electric 
fences. The details in each measure are as follow: 
Fernando et al. (2008) explain that in theory, the structure of elephant 
proof ditches should be too wide for an elephant to step across and too narrow for 
an elephant to get into, or 3m wide at the top, 1m wide at the bottom, and 2-m 
deep. They also argued that ditched with concrete site walls were dangerous 
because elephants were unable to climb up if they fell in. The effectiveness of 
ditches was increased by erosion-resistant soil, vegetative ground-cover and 
regular maintenance (Nelson et al. 2003). However, another problem of ditches is 
that elephants may fill them by kicking in the sides, and then they can walk 
through (Perera, 2009).The investment cost of digging a ditch is estimated to be 
around USD2,160 per km in India and around USD4000 per km in Sri Lanka 
(Fernando et al., 2008). 
Un-electrified or standard fences regular fencing material (wire and 
concrete or wooden posts) will be sufficient if elephants are not persistent raiders 
(Nelson et al., 2003). Hoare (1995) suggested that the use of small individually-
owned fence projects surrounding the farm areas by one or two households might 
be efficient because of some reasons; locally-made components are not expensive; 
the component robbery could be eliminated; the deficiencies of maintenance costs 
would be decreased. For elephant proof wire fences, built with steel cables and 
iron girder, are expensive option that made this option was not applicable 
(Fernando et al., 2008). Stone wall is another option that is relatively expensive 
construction costs, for example, the cost of stone wall construction in Kenya is 
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approximately USD3500 per km (Nelson et al., 2003). Then, stone walls are not 
widely used and have a few practical applications (Fernando et al., 2008). 
Buffer crops or unpalatable crops (e.g. tea, coffee, tobacco, chilli, and 
citrus) are another elephant barrier that is in experimental stage. Fernando et al. 
(2008) described that an idea of buffer crops is to decrease the attractiveness of 
areas to elephants by substituting crops consumed by elephants with those they do 
not. However, the obstacles to apply this method are that this measure needs many 
hundreds of km
2
 switch to unpalatable crops and also requires adopting 
agricultural practices different to traditional practices. Additionally, the returns on 
unpalatable crops may be not good as the cultivated crops; therefore, farmers may 
hesitate to do plant them. 
Electric fences are perceived to be the most successful barrier against 
elephant raiding if they are maintain properly accompanied with punishing 
elephant measures such as shooting repeated problem elephants (Fernando et al., 
2008; Nelson et al., 2003; O’Connell-Rodwell et al., 2000). The location of the 
electric fences should be cautiously chosen and the design should be in accord 
with the characteristic of the problem (de Silva, 1998). Nelson et al. (2003) 
classified a fence design to be three types; 1) surrounding agricultural land and/or 
houses and people, 2) surrounding the elephants and their range, 3) a straight line 
barrier along a park boundary between elephants and farmland. They argued that 
the first design would be most effective because elephants are likely walking 
along the length of the fence to search a way to enter the farm; therefore the latter 
two designs would be less effective compared to the first one. Also, they 
summarized that the fence maintenance problem were associated with power 
supply and vegetation growth that causes power leakages.  
In addition, the effectiveness of electric fences did not only depend on 
how to maintain the fences, but also number of problem elephants (O’Connell-
Rodwell et al., 2000; Osborn and Parker, 2003). Nelson et al. (2003) suggested 
that the unpalatable buffer crops might be enhance the success of electric fences. 
Gunaratne and Premarathne (2006) assess the effective of five electric fences 
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projects in Sri Lanka. The effectiveness of electric fences was evaluated in terms 
of how the fences reduce incidents of HEC thorough household attitudes. The 
study found that electric fences could alleviate the conflicts but did not completely 
eliminate the problem. Therefore, the electric fences do not offer a “stand alone” 
solution but are only part of the solution. The main factors for success of electric 
fences are appropriate design of fences, geographical variation, elephant 
migration patterns and community support for fence maintenance. Fernando et al. 
(2008) cited that individual owned fences were effective in reducing crop 
damages from 80% to 20% in India. 
Regarding the construction costs of electric fence, Nelson et al. (2003) 
quoted the construction costs of electric fences in five areas; 1) Kenya, the 
construction cost was about USD2000 per km, and maintenance costs roughly 
USD150 per km in 1995, 2) Tsavo, the construction cost was about USD10800 
per km in 1996, 3) Zimbabwe, the construction and maintenance costs for 
community enclosure type were about USD1350 per km and USD88 per km 
respectively and for low specification household enclosure type were 
approximately USD 170 per km and USD11 respectively, 4) Mozambique, the 
construction costs were about USD1081 per km, 5) Ghana, the construction cost 
was approximately USD2500 per km. O’Connell-Rodwell et al. (2000) reported 
that the construction costs at Lianshulu in Namibia was roughly USD621 per km. 
Fernando et al. (2008) quoted that construction costs of electric fences in Indira 
Gandhi Wildlife Sanctuary, India in 2007 cost around USD2829 per km, whereas 
the construction cost in Sri Lanka is around USD3500-5000 per km. Even though 
fence construction is not economically viable compared to crop losses, fences also 
have extra benefits (e.g. controlling cultivating and exploiting natural resources) 
that are not included in the calculation (de Boer & Ntumi, 2001). 
(C) Supplementary Feeding 
The idea of this measure is to deposit elephant foods, such as sugarcane, in 
the areas where crop-raiding is the trouble; therefore, it can attract elephants and 
keep them in designated areas, however, the problem will be occurred if the 
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method is discontinued or the supplementary feeding is not sufficient for them 
(Fernando et al., 2008). 
(D) Killing elephants 
In India and Sri Lanka, hundreds of raiding elephants, which are mostly 
adult males, were killed annually by farmers is a normal occurrence, even though 
killing elephants is a highly controversial, emotive issue, and unacceptable in 
cultural context of Asian countries (Fernando et al., 2008; Perera, 2009). The 
killing of problem elephants is also used in Africa (Hoare, 1995). Moreover, the 
advantage of this method is that it is relative cheap as a quick-fix solution with 
extra supply of free meat for local people (Nelson et al., 2003; Hoare, 2001). 
Nevertheless, the problem elephant behavior still exists, even when culprit 
individuals are eliminated from these populations for decades, because others 
replace them (Hoare, 2001; de Boer & Ntumi, 2001; Perera, 2009).  This method 
assumes that individual elephant causes the problem; however, this argument may 
be biased because of (Hoare, 1999): 1) the difficulty in recognizing individual 
elephants at night in forests; 2) the likely rapid killing of repeat elephants by 
authorities; 4) most research projects are focused on high conflict areas; and 5) 
local people support this method to force wildlife authorities to eliminate a 
problem animal. Nelson et al. (2003) suggests that killing elephants to decrease 
population density hoping to alleviate the level of crop-raiding is doubtful. The 
reasons of this argument are 1) there is replacement hypothesis; and 2) there is 
evidence to support the idea that problem elephant activity depends on elephant 
behavior rather than elephant density. Hoare (2001) proposed the “problem 
component” theory to explain whether the same individual elephants are the cause 
of the conflict incidents. The problem component idea believes that even 
individual problem elephants are removed; others will naturally imitate them 
without having to be taught, therefore, the problem will remain.  
(E) Translocation 
There are two criteria used to select elephants for translocation: 1) habitual 
fence breakers and 2) discrete family groups in small units that could be relocated 
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all at once (Omondi et al., 2002). Theoretically, translocation seems provide the 
straightforward solution, however, in fact the implementation demands high 
degree of expertise and logistics  (Perera, 2009) such as preliminary studies of the 
social structure of the elephants whether the whole herds should be moved or only 
problem males moved (Nelson et al., 2003). Furthermore, capture and transport 
require several activities that include identification of a particular individual, 
capture, restraint, transport and release (Fernando et al., 2008). Nelson et al. 
(2003) summarized a number of disadvantages for this measure, which were: 1) 
there is possible replacement of these problem elephants with another one within 
the population, 2) it is no guarantee that these elephants will not continue their 
problems in the new place, or just move back, 3) the welfare of elephants during 
capture and translocation needs to be concerned, for example, the elephant 
translocation in Kenya, elephants have had to endure stressful period of 
imprisonment in vehicles because of logistical problems during transportation 
(Hoare, 2001). In several cases, elephants died from injuries during capture, for 
example, translocation from Sweetwaters Rhino Sanctuary to Meru National Park 
in Kenya (Omondi et al., 2002), 56 elephants (9 individual bulls and 9 family 
groups) were translocated in 12 capture operations within 22 days. Five elephants 
died during the capture process, whereas four died during transportation. 
Nevertheless, the typical case of translocation is to restock of elephants to tourism 
purposes such as transit to tourism areas or for hunting concession. 
Nelson et al. (2003) quoted that the translocation costs in Uganda were 
about USD100000 and operation cost for vehicle alone in Kenya was about 
USD140000. Fernando et al. (2008) reported that the operation cost for 
translocation in Sri Lanka was roughly USD2000. 
(F) Compensation 
In theory, compensation should be possible to completely eliminate the 
economic loss through proper level, however, in practice farmers tend to over-
claim compensation (Fernando et al., 2008) and decrease in efforts to prevent 
damages (called “perverse incentive”). In practice, compensation is viewed as 
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inadequate by farmers (de Silva, 1998; Zhang and Wang, 2003; Perera, 2009).de 
Silva reported that villagers who affected from HEC in Sri Lanka complained that 
their payments were deferred for the two or three years with unrevealed reasons 
but they needed it to pay back the loans they took for production cost. However, 
an advantage of compensation scheme is that incidents of crop-raiding were 
reported, allowing the serious HEC areas to be identified (Nelson et al., 2003) and 
this may increase tolerance levels of farmers towards elephants (Fernando et al., 
2008).Conversely, de Boer and Ntumi (2001) claimed that compensation did not 
reduce the HEC conflict. In addition, Hoare (2003) did not recommend employing 
compensation for elephant damages due to a number of reasons: compensation is 
unable to decrease the level of the problem; compensation reduces the incentive 
for self-defence of farmers; compensation cannot address the unquantifiable social 
opportunity costs borne by affected people from HEC; schemes are burdensome 
and expensive for administration; compensation opens to broadly cheating 
happens on over-claims; funding is never sufficient; fair evaluation is impossible. 
Nelson et al. (2003) argued that most compensation schemes have been 
unsuccessful because they tried to address the effect, rather than the causes of the 
conflict. They raised some disadvantages of compensation schemes, which were 
1) compensation cannot lead to reduce the conflict and there is no end point for 
compensation; 2) an increase in claims may lead to either corruption or a decrease 
in crop-guarding, 3) complaints of low payments compared to the actual losses; 4) 
unequal disbursement may cause social conflict; 5) compensation is complicate, 
expensive and slow to administers because it needs to train assessors, and cover 
large areas; 6) compensation have no effect on the relationship between local 
people and wildlife authorities. 
(G) Wildlife Utilization Schemes 
The wildlife utilization scheme aims to the use of wildlife for revenue 
generation through community based natural resource management known by 
acronym CBNRM (Nelson et al., 2003). Benefits from tourism or hunting 
problem elephants were returned to the local community fund; therefore, both 
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income generation and HEC alleviation can change local communities’ 
perceptions of elephant from burdens to revenue generation assets, at the same 
time reduction level for HEC (Hoare, 2001). However, Hoare (2001) showed that 
there are many barriers to implement this scheme to overcome: requiring complex 
and long-term partnerships among wildlife authorities, local authorities, private 
sectors and local communities; requiring a pre-requisite of policy on legal and 
illegal use of wildlife that has to be formulated at national level.  
(H) Land Use Planning 
The land use planning to deal with HEC is the long-term process that 
needs government support, especially legislative and/or policy changes would be 
expensive option but its long-term benefit is not only HEC alleviation, but also 
habitat improvement for other species and improving a positive relationship 
between elephant and local people (Nelson et al., 2003). Hoare (2001) suggested 
the general guiding principle of land use planning by doing the following: 
1) Reducing the conflict interface between human and elephants, for 
example, reducing human settlement encroachment into elephant ranges and 
relocating agricultural activity out of elephant ranges; 
2) Facilitating defence against problem elephant, for example, reducing 
the size of crop farms, changing the cropping systems (e.g. changing from 
traditional crops into unpalatable crops or changing timing of harvest, diversifying 
into more crop types to reduce the exposure); 
3) Increasing agricultural production more efficient, for example, 
reducing the dependency of local economy on agriculture; and 
4) Modifying some movement of problem elephants, for example, 
creating or securing elephant movement routes or corridors, securing elephant and 
human access to water sources (e.g. manipulating the water resources or mineral 
licks to change elephant distribution), reposition protected area boundary, and 
expanding protected area. 
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(I) Proposed new methods 
The HEC mitigation measures have to be based on adaptive management 
by combining traditional and new measures with support from proper research 
studies (Hoare, 1995). Also, the HEC problem should be included as a part of 
broader issues of elephant conservation, not viewed as an isolated problem 
(Hoare, 2001). There are several measures proposed to deal with HEC problem, 
which most of them are in experimental stages. 
Osborn and Parker (2003) suggested that the appropriate strategy is to 
bring farmers into the mitigation process. The authors argue that when more 
responsibility of farmers for crop protection is held, the more successful 
mitigation will be. By developing the low-technique methods, such as 
modification of the crops, farm location in relation to movement pattern of the 
crop raiding, system of rotating guard duty etc, will be most sustainable solution. 
Innovative methods also were proposed, for instance, elephants may be emitting 
low frequency distress calls when they are culled. These elephant vocalizations 
can be a repellent but the equipment to record and playback is expensive. 
Furthermore, the role of external agencies can provide technical assistances to 
develop techniques for crop protection. In addition, the GPS satellite radio is 
another option by monitoring the movement of individual problem elephant, and 
then it can warn villagers of their presence in a particular location. However, the 
barrier in applying this method is that it is again costly (around USD5000-8000 
per collar) but has a life-time only 1-2 years.  
Nevertheless, continuous monitoring and adaptive management is a key 
success of HEC mitigation. Four suggestions on HEC mitigation were 
recommended. Firstly, one reason to escalate HEC is infrastructure development; 
therefore, incorporating HEC in infrastructure project at the planning stage is 
needed. Secondly, HEC mitigation should be considered at the elephant 
population level rather than at the site level. Thirdly, quantitative data on the 
monitoring scheme of mitigation program across several countries is an urgent 
need. Lastly, the “cookbook” of HEC mitigation techniques is also needed to help 
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individual project do not spend a lot of time to learn from failures at their project 
site but can learn from other experience in other areas (Fernando et al., 2008). 
The pilot project named “living with the elephant” was initiated that 
comprised of three parts: a community development fund, environmental 
education program, and elephant habitat preservation. By providing USD100 for 
each family who involved the project, farmers need to follow the management 
regulations of the fund such as no threat to elephants and no deforestation. The 
study argued that the attitude of farmers to elephant changed from hatred to 
attempting to coexist with elephants (Zhang and Wang, 2003). 
Biological technologies are another alternative to mitigation HEC, there 
are some trails of these kinds of measure in the experiment stage (Perera, 2009): 
(a) trials of temporary infertility in female elephants was applied in Africa using 
glycoproteins of the Zona Pellucide (ZP) of pig oocytes as a vaccine injected into 
horses and elephants, it found that three doses injected during three weeks using 
drop-out darts prevented pregnancies for more than  one year; (b) vaccinating 
male elephants to manipulate aggression showed that vaccination of bull elephant 
reduced the aggression for periods of 6-9 months.  
Habitat enrichment of protected areas has also been proposed as a 
mitigation measure for HEC (de Silva, 1998). There are several measures for 
habitat enrichment: 1) restoration of ancient reservoirs or construction of new 
reservoirs in protected areas because water is very scarce during the dry season in 
most forest areas; 2) growing of vegetation (e.g. grass) that can be food for 
elephants; replacement of existing teak and eucalypt plantations with natural 
forests in protected areas; periodic manipulation of the vegetation to increase 
elephant foods in the forest e.g. pruning the trees so that it will have more new 
growth that can be made available for elephants. 
Finally, an environmental education program, namely the Elephant 
Outreach Program, was proposed as part of the HEC mitigation measure in 
Botswana in 2001 (Marchais et al., 2009). This program is designed to raise 
awareness about wildlife protection for pupils in town and villagers who are living 
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near wildlife habitats. The expected benefits of this program are that it can 
generate the positive attitude of people to elephants.  
3.2.2 Selected HEC cases in Thailand 
In this part, the two areas, Kui Buri National Park and Salakpra Wildlife 
Sanctuary of HEC mitigation in Thailand were reviewed. The details of each area 
can be described as follows: 
(A) Kui Buri National Park 
The Kui Buri Nation Park is located in Prachuap Khiri Khan province. The 
human-elephant conflict in Kui Buri national park began in 1994 (Chumnankid, 
2007). In 2006, World Wildlife Fund (WWF) staff conducted a household survey 
of the 25 local communities living within three kilometers of the boundary of Kui 
Buri national park. The total sample was 758 interviewed households (Parr et al., 
2008). Under this project, it was calculated that there were 268 km
2
 (167,551 rai) 
of pineapple plantations located within three kilometers of the Kui Buri National 
Park boundary based on satellite imagery. For the pineapple fields located in 
immediate proximity to the National Park, villagers had land ownership 
documents for 205 fields covering 661.12 ha (4,132 rai); 179 fields encompassing 
442.24 ha (2,764 rai) had no land title, while 78 fields were rented. The total 
sample was 543 agricultural fields, and 217 fields (40%) had been recently raided 
by elephants. For the farmers who were affected by crop damage, 66 farmers 
reported that elephants came out of the forest more than 50 nights a year, while 22 
farmers stated that elephants were in their fields between 200–365 nights per year. 
The peak months for intrusions were April, followed by February and then May. 
Most farmers observed elephants between 16.00–18.00 hr (34.3%). The thirty four 
farmers were interviewed on the level of damage occurred, 27 farmers estimated 
the impacted crop at less than 1.6 ha (10 rai). 15 farmers estimated the damage at 
less than USD250 (10,000 baht); 25 farmers estimated the damage between 
USD250–1250 (10,000–50,000 baht), 11 estimated damage at USD1250–2500 
(50,000–100,000 baht), while seven farmers estimated damage at over USD2500 
(100,000 baht). Sixty-eight farmers reported that fireworks were the most 
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effective to deter the wild elephants, while others used spot lights and gas lamps. 
Also, electric fencing was erected and some villagers burned tires to chase 
elephant away. 
For mitigation at government level, under the royal project of forest 
restoration and conservation in Kui Buri reserve forest, the 20,000-rai pineapple 
crops that was surrounding the protected area was expropriated to improve habitat 
for wildlife. The examples of habitat improvement are water resource 
improvement, forest restoration, and provision of supplementary feeding for 
elephants (WWF, 2009). The supplementary feeding for elephants was provided 
by villagers who received the payments from the project fund. This activity would 
attract the raiding elephants, thereby preventing raiding and reducing HEC.  
(B) Salakpra Wildlife Sanctuary 
The Salakpra wildlife sanctuary is located in Kanchanaburi province. The 
crop raiding incident was first recorded in 1982 (Sitati, 2007).  The measures such 
as bamboo fences or home-made alarm systems were applied by households. 
However, when crop raiding became more frequent and more intense, households 
tried to apply more effective measures such as simple electric fences, non-electric 
fences, watchtowers in tall trees, planting unpalatable crops, torches and reflecting 
CDs, catapults and firecrackers and guarding crops at night (Sitati, 2007).   
In 2007, the Elephant Conservation Network (ECN) started a crop 
protection trial, including a ditch and electric fences (Ritthirat, forthcoming). In 
this project, the total length of the ditch is 3,867 meters and the construction 
budget was about 300,000 baht (USD 100000), excluding the rent of the heavy 
machine lend by the Kanchanaburi-based army. ECN staff collected crop damages 
of crop raiding by elephants in two periods,  one year before and after the ditch 
construction (October 2006- September 2007 vs. October 2007-September 2008). 
The result showed that the crop loss caused by raiding before the ditch 
construction was 111,099 baht (USD3703), as compared to 13,190 baht 
(USD440) during the post-ditch period, or it has decreased by 88%. Regarding to 
electric fences, experimental sites selected for the trial comprise both private 
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farms/houses and elephant enter/exit routes of the park. An electric fence was 
erected around a 20-rai sugarcane field. The trial was monitored for 12 months 
(from March 2007-February 2008). The result of monitoring showed that a 
reduction of crop damage, from 29,742 baht (USD991) to 5,316 baht (USD177) 
after the trial, or about 82%.   
3.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the reviews of PES and PES-like programs that 
are related to the environmental services analyzed in this study (wildlife 
conservation and ecosystem restoration). Secondly, it reviewed human-elephant 
conflict (HEC) mitigation strategies covering HEC experiences from South Asia 
and Africa and experiences from two selected HEC cases in Thailand. These 
reviews form the basis for the research questions outlined in the next chapters, and 
the research field work undertaken. 
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CHAPTER 4 
HOUSEHOLD SURVEY
9
 
This chapter is comprised of three sections. The first section describes the 
study areas. The second section demonstrates the results of the household survey 
and the last section is the conclusion of this chapter.  The household survey of 
affected households from HEC was conducted to gain information for a cost-
benefit analysis (CBA), cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) and to aid the design of 
payment for environmental service (PES) criteria for ecosystem restoration and 
HEC reduction. However, before the survey, information from focus group 
discussions and key informant interviews, such as from wildlife experts and the 
headmen in study areas, was used to design the draft household questionnaire. A 
pretest was conducted to check whether the questionnaire was workable; 30 
samples were pretested in total. After the pretest, the questionnaire was revised.  
The household questionnaire consists of three sections. The first section 
covered socioeconomic characteristics. The second dealt with the situation and 
impacts from HEC, including frequency of crop-damage incidents and damage 
costs. The last section investigated what households individually and collectively 
have done to deal with HEC, including assistance from external sources. This 
section also explored whether the affected people had planned to deal with HEC. 
The total sample size of 200 was randomly obtained in the six selected villages 
which are the most affected villages from HEC. The survey was conducted by the 
face-to-face interview during March 2011. 
4.1 The Study Areas 
The villagers in the six study areas migrated from other provinces in the 
northeast region of Thailand to these areas around 30 years ago. This reason can 
explain why most of them have dealt with the HEC problem individually.  The 
                                               
9
 The household survey was financially supported by the Economy and Environment Program 
for Southeast Asia (EEPSEA) under the project on “Analysis of Policy Options to make From 
Human-Elephant-Conflict to Human-Elephant-Harmony” and reported in the EEPSEA report. 
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socio-characteristics of households and crop types in each area are as in Table 4.1. 
The six villages adjacent to KARN, namely Na Yao village, Na Isan village, Lum 
Tha Sang village, Tha Ten village, Na Ngam village, and Klong Toey village, 
were selected to be the study areas. The reason for choosing these six villages was 
that they have the most severe problems of HEC. However, only in Lum Tha Sang 
village have all households been affected from crop raiding, whereas only some 
households in the other study areas have been affected. Most crop types in the 
study areas, e.g. cassava, rice and corn, are cash crops that can be food for 
elephants. The detail of each study area follows. 
Table 4.1: Socio-characteristics of households and damage information in 
each area 
Characteristics 
The Study Areas 
Na Yao Na Isan 
Lum Tha 
Sang 
Tha 
Ten 
Na 
Ngam 
Klong 
Toey 
No. of total 
households 
1,001 252 24 220 545 205 
No. of affected 
HH from HEC 
450 30 24 32 30 150 
Crop type cassavas, 
rice, and 
rubber tree 
cassavas 
rice, and 
sugarcane 
cassavas 
and corn 
cassavas, 
rice, 
rubber 
tree, and 
eucalyptus 
cassavas 
and 
rubber 
tree 
cassavas, 
rubber 
tree and 
rice 
No. of sample 
sizes 
50 47 13 32 20 38 
Source: interviews with the headmen in each study area 
4.1.1 The Na Yao Village 
Na Yao village is located at Village no. 15, Tha Kra Darn sub-district, 
Sanamchai district, Chachoengsao province. The total households in Na Yao 
68 
 
 
village are approximately 1,001 (2010). According to official records, there were 
50 households who registered for compensation from crop-raiding problem in 
2010. The crop types in this area are cassava, rice and rubber tree. According to 
in-depth interviews with the villagers, crop fields adjacent to the park were more 
impacted than the ones located further away from the park. They also mentioned 
that elephants were quite clever. Before elephants enter the field, they will make a 
noise first to make sure there is no response from human, and then they will enter 
the field. Sometimes, elephants did not eat crops but just play (also resulting in 
crop damage). In some households, dogs tried to protect crops by barking at 
elephants, however, this made things worse because it frightened the elephants. 
Consequently, elephants caused more damage by tramping crops as in Figure 4.1. 
Another impact of HEC in this area that can outweigh the economic costs of crop 
damage is human death. During the survey, there was one case of human death 
due to HEC in this village. Mrs. Malee Panongped (Figure 4.2) lost her 30-years-
old son in 2010 when he was guarding crops at night. Another example of the 
impact due to HEC is the case of Mr. Sopa Klongsin. He and his two brothers 
have to move to live in the crop, even though they have their own houses in the 
village. He said that guarding the crop at night leads to loss of sleep. 
In the past, only traditional techniques such as shouting, drum-beating, 
noise-making, firecracker and light were applied to chase elephants away, 
however, an elephant is a highly adaptable animal. They are habituated to such 
measures, once they learn there is no real harm. At present, electrified fences are 
employed in some areas but also cannot completely eliminate the crop loss. The 
main damage due to HEC is crop losses, especially rice and cassava. Moreover, 
there is also property damage such as damages of guarding huts (Figure 4.3). This 
impact puts households under stress because some households have to get loan 
money to build a new hut.  
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Figure 4.1: Crop raiding by elephants in Na Yao village 
 
Source: Mr. Rueangyot Thongsopin 
 
Figure 4.2: Mrs. Malee (left) and Mr. Sopa (right) 
  
Source: Ms. Wisanee Oumjank 
 
Figure 4.3: The hut in the field was damaged by elephants 
 
Source: Mr. Rueangyot Thongsopin 
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4.1.2 The Na Isan Village 
Na Isan village is located at village no. 16, Tha Kra Darn sub-district, 
Sanamchai district, Chachoengsao province. The total households in Na Yao 
village are approximately 252 households in 2010. According to official record, 
there were 30 households who registered for compensation from crop-raiding 
problem in 2010.  The crop types in this area are cassava, rice and sugarcane. 
Besides applying mitigation measures individually, households also have 
employed collective action to guard crops at night together (Figure 4.4). Using 
radio communication to contact each other when they observe elephants entering 
the fields, they will act as a team to chase away elephants by using firelock and 
shooting it into the air to scare elephants. 
Figure 4.4: Collective action to guard crops at night 
 
Source: Mr. Rueangyot Thongsopin 
4.1.3 The Lum Tha Sang Village 
Lum Tha Sang village is located at village no. 25, Klong Thra Kao sub-
district, Tha Ta Kiap district, Chachoengsao province. The total households in 
Lum Tha Sang village were approximately 24 households in 2010. According to 
official record, there were 24 households who registered for compensation from 
crop-raiding problem in 2010 or total households in this village were affected 
from crop raiding. The crop types in this area are cassava and corn. During focus 
group discussion, villagers in Lum Tha Sang village mentioned that human 
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behavior can also be a pull factor of crop raiding by elephants. For example 
papaya vendors would like to make merit by providing ripe papayas that could not 
be sold out at roadside for elephants. Even though, in the past, elephants did not 
eat papayas, when they tasted it and knew that they could eat it, they started to 
raid papaya crops thereafter.  
According to an in-depth interview of an ex-headman of Lum Tha Sang 
village, his 20-rai corn crop was totally destroyed by elephants in 1980. After that 
event, he changed to grow unpalatable crops that elephants do not eat it instead 
(e.g. chilli, eggplant, and sesame). Even though elephants do not eat that kind of 
plant, the crop also was damaged because elephants walk through this route to 
search for water and food. Mr. Ma Seedam is another villager who was stabbed by 
an elephant’s tusk during guarding his crop in 1995. He showed his scars at his 
stomach, finger, and ear (Figure 4.5). Furthermore, the villagers reported that 
there were two culprit elephants that were always persistent crop raiders and 
sometimes they blocked the truck which was carrying sugarcane in order to eat it. 
The villagers called these kinds of elephants “a sugarcane robber”. During the 
household survey, the research team also found that one of that two culprit 
elephants. He was searching for the food on the road (Figure 4.6).  
Figure 4.5: Mr. Ma who showed his scars injured by an elephant’s tusk in 
1995 
  
 
Source: Mr. Rueangyot Thongsopin 
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Figure 4.6: The one of the two culprit elephants in Lum Tha Sang village 
 
Source: Mr. Rueangyot Thongsopin 
4.1.4 Tha Ten Village 
Tha Ten village is located at village no. 9, Pra Phloeng sub-district, Kao 
Chakan district, Sakaew province. The total households in Tha Ten village were 
approximately 220 households in 2010. According to official record, there were 
30 households who registered for compensation from crop-raiding problem in 
2010. The crop types in this area are cassava, rice, eucalyptus and rubber tree. 
Even though the government agency already built the pilot ditches in this area, the 
damage of crop-raiding have not been lessened because the ditch could not 
prevent elephants to cross it (Figure 4.7). Some wildlife expert claimed that the 
ditch was not constructed to an appropriate specification.  
Figure 4.7: Elephants could cross the ditch into the crop fields 
 
Source: the author 
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4.1.5 The Klong Toey Village 
The Klong Toey village is located at village no. 21, Tha Kra Darn sub-
district, Sanamchai district, Chachoengsao province.  The total households in 
Klong Toey village were approximately 205 households in 2010. According to 
official record, there were 150 households who registered for compensation from 
crop-raiding problem in 2010. The crop types in this area are cassava, rice and 
rubber tree. Villagers in this area claimed that there were approximately 30 – 40 
elephants entering the crop field simultaneously in 2011. Furthermore, there was 
collective action initiated by the headman and supported by provincial 
administration organization and sub-district administrative organization to grow 
elephant’s food (e.g. banana and sugarcane) in the 50-rai area of the park (Figure 
4.8). The villagers and students in the village collectively contributed their labor 
force, and some villagers not only contributed their labor forces, but also provided 
their banana or sugarcane sprouts to plant in the park. This activity has been 
employing once a year since 2009, however, villagers think the level of this 
activity is still not enough.  
Figure 4.8: Collective action of Klong Toey villagers to plant elephant’ foods 
 
Source: A headman of Klong Toey village 
4.1.6 The Na Ngam Village 
Na Ngam village is located at village no. 19, Tha Kra Darn sub-district, 
Sanamchai district, Chachoengsao province.  The total households in Na Ngam 
village were approximately 545 households in 2010. According to official record, 
there were 30 households who registered for compensation from crop-raiding 
problem in 2010. The crop types in this area are cassava and rubber tree. The 
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villager explained that there were a lot of elephants that entered the crop field 
simultaneously which are the same herd (approximately 30-40 elephants) that 
entered to crop field in Klong Toey village. This is because Klong Toey village is 
its neighboring village.  
4.2 Results of the household survey 
4.2.1 Socioeconomic of the households 
Table 4.2 summarized the general characteristics of households in study 
areas.  The average family members are approximately 4 persons per family. The 
average agricultural area is roughly 33.6 rai or 5.4 hectare per household, which 
the total agricultural area in Lum Tha Sang village is quite small (7.6 rai or 0.012 
km
2
 per household) compared to other areas. Households in all study areas are not 
local people but they migrated from the northern region to this area, which 
average year households have lived in the study area approximately 21.6 years. 
The average of annual agricultural income is roughly 151,067 baht per household 
or USD5036 per household. The average of total household income is 
approximately 183,950 baht per household or USD6132. However, the household 
incomes of Lum Tha Sang village (80,398 baht per household or USD2680 per 
household) and Tha Ten village (81,943 baht per household or USD2731per 
household) are relatively low compared to other areas. 
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Table 4.2: General characteristics of households in study areas 
Socioeconomics 
characteristics 
Study Areas 
Na Isan 
Lum Tha 
Sang 
Na Yao Tha Ten 
Klong 
Toey 
Na Ngam Total 
No. of household members 
(persons) 
4.2 3.2 4.5 3.9 3.9 4.8 4.2 
Agricultural area (rai) 28.2 
(.045 km
2
) 
7.6 
(.012 km
2
) 
44.3 
(.071 km
2
) 
28.7 
(.046 km
2
) 
41.1 
(.066 km
2
) 
28.9 
(.046 km
2
) 
33.6 
(.054km
2
) 
No. of years households has 
lived in study area (years) 
20.5 26.5 23.5 23.1 18.2 19.9 21.6 
Annual agricultural income 
(baht/HH) 
157,143 
(USD20692) 
44,797 
(USD1493) 
199,926 
(USD6664) 
58,415 
(USD1947) 
203,954 
(USD6798) 
123,872 
(USD4129) 
151,067 
(USD5036) 
Annual non-agricultural 
income (baht/HH) 
20,692 
(USD690) 
35,601 
(USD1187) 
46,097 
(USD1537) 
23,529 
(USD784) 
28,579 
(USD953) 
50,288 
(USD1676) 
32,882 
(USD1096) 
Annual household income 
(baht/HH) 
177,835 
(USD5928) 
80,398 
(USD2680) 
246,023 
(USD8201) 
81,943 
(USD2731) 
232,533 
(USD7751) 
174,161 
(USD5805) 
183,950 
(USD6132) 
Source: Household Survey, 2011 
Note:  
(1) USD1 =THB30 
(2) 1 square kilometer = 6.25 rai 
(3) All values are in 2010 prices 
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4.2.2 Situation and impacts from HEC 
Households were asked when they were first affected by crop raiding. The 
information in Table 4.3 indicated elephant crop raids have been more frequent 
over time. Furthermore, when asked which month the crop-raiding incident is 
high, most households revealed the incident of crop raiding was high frequency 
during August through December (Figure 4.9), which is the harvesting period. 
The harvesting period for rice production is between October and December, 
whereas the harvesting period for cassava crop is between September and 
December.  The crop-raiding incident is gradually increasing in August and 
reaches the peak in November, afterwards the incident of crop-raiding declines in 
December. The incidents of crop raiding have happened as a seasonal pattern in 
every year. Because all study areas are not irrigated lands, therefore, the 
agricultural practices depend only on the rainfall. This reason explains why 
farmers did not change their crop calendar, even they know the crop-raiding 
period each year.  The average number of crop-raiding incidents for all six study 
areas is approximately 25 incidents per month during high frequency period of 
crop raiding (Table 4.4). Moreover, there is no difference among average 
incidents of crop raiding in each study area. On the other hand, the average 
incident during low frequency period of crop raiding is approximately 6 incidents 
per month. Therefore, the overall average incident of crop raiding is roughly 15 
incidents per month. In addition, average nights to guard crop for all study areas is 
approximately 212 nights per year (Table 4.5). While farmers have to guard 
rubber trees, some farmers mentioned that while elephants did not eat rubber trees 
but they play and damage them when they walk through the fields. Furthermore, 
some households reported that they dare not to guard their crops at night because 
they are afraid that elephants might hurt them. 
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Table 4.3: The first incident of crop raiding by elephants 
Time period No. of affected households from crop raiding % 
Before 1988 6 3.0 
1988 – 1992 13 6.5 
1993 – 1997 12 6.0 
1998 – 2002 36 18.0 
2003 - 2007 83 41.5 
After 2007 50 25.0 
Total 200 100.0 
Source: Household Survey, 2011 
 
Figure 4.9: Number of crop-raiding incidents per month 
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Source: Household Survey, 2011. 
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Table 4.4: High frequency period of crop-raiding incidents by elephants 
Villages 
No. of crop-incidents of high frequency period per 
month 
Min Max Mean 
1. Na Isan 1 30 23.4 
2. Lum Tha Sang 20 30 29.2 
3. Na Yao 1 30 23.5 
4. Tha Ten 1 30 22.7 
5. Klong Toey 3 30 26.2 
6. Na Ngam 3 30 27.4 
Total 1 30 24.6 
Source: Household Survey, 2011. 
 
Table 4.5: No. of nights for crop-guarding per year 
Study Area No. of night for crop-guarding per year 
Na Isan 224 
Lum Tha Sang 214 
Na Yao 270 
Tha Ten 234 
Klong Toey 167 
Na Ngam 165 
Total 212 
Source: Household Survey, 2011. 
79 
 
 
An average crop-damaged area due to HEC in 2010 is approximately 6 
rai/household/year or 0.0096 km
2
/household/year (Table 4.6), which accounted 
for nearly 18% of the total crop area. An average total damage cost due to HEC in 
2010 is approximately 34,825 baht/household/year or USD1161/household/year, 
which accounted for roughly 19% of the average household income. The average 
crop-damaged cost is accounted for 99% of the total damage cost. In absolute 
term of damage cost in 2010, the total damage cost in Klong Toey village was the 
highest one. However, the damage cost in Lum Tha Sang village is the highest 
rank in term of the share of household income, which accounted for roughly 34% 
of the average household income. Furthermore, as mentioned in previous section, 
the HEC caused not only the direct costs such as crop and property damages, but 
also a loss of life (that reported by one respondent in Na Yao village) and 2 
injuries. Additionally, when asked whether households are worried about HEC, 
89% of respondents reported that they were anxious that elephants might raid their 
crops/property or harm them. 
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Table 4.6: Damage costs due to HEC in 2010 classified by study areas 
Categories 
Damage costs due to HEC in 2010 (baht/HH) 
Na Isan 
Lum Tha 
Sang 
Na Yao Tha Ten 
Klong 
Toey 
Na Ngam Total 
Crop-damaged area (rai) 4 
(.0064 km
2
) 
3 
(.0048 km
2
) 
6 
(.0096 km
2
) 
3 
(.0048 km
2
) 
10 
(.016 km
2
) 
9 
(.0144 km
2
) 
6 
(.0096km
2
) 
Crop-damage cost  
24,357 
(USD812) 
27,677 
(USD922) 
34,293 
(USD1143) 
17,709 
(USD590) 
57,805 
(USD1927
) 
48,074 
(USD1620) 
34,582 
(USD1153) 
Property damage cost 221 
(USD7) 
46 
(USD2) 
679 
(USD23) 
- 
59 
(USD2) 
- 
243 
(USD8) 
Treatment cost due to injuries 10 - 38 - - - 12 
Total damage cost due to 
HEC in 2010 
24,578 
(USD819) 
27,723 
(USD924) 
34,971 
(USD1166) 
17,709 
(USD590) 
57,864 
(USD1929) 
48,074 
(USD1602) 
34,825 
(USD1161) 
Total annual HH income 177,835 
(USD5928) 
80,398 
(USD2680) 
246,023 
(USD8201) 
81,943 
(USD2731) 
232,533 
(USD7751) 
174,161 
(USD5805) 
183,950 
(USD6132) 
Damage costs as a share 
of income (%) 
14 34 14 22 25 28 19 
Source: Household Survey, 2011. 
Note:  
(1) USD1 =THB30 
(2) 1 km
2
= 625 rai 
(3) All values are in 2010 prices 
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4.2.3 Mitigation strategies to deal with HEC 
Table 4.7 presents the existing mitigation options to deal with HEC. The 
existing mitigation measures are complementary options; therefore, this can 
explain why every household applied more than one option. All study areas are 
quite new communities; households have been living in these areas around 30 
years ago. This is a reason why most households have individually dealt with 
crop-raiding problem.  A catapults and fire crackers (Figure 4.10) are the most 
popular measure (55.2%). Almost one-third of respondents (29%) also built the 
hut to guard their crops at night; however, this option consists of co-benefits such 
as households can take a rest in a hut after doing farm work. Unlike a normal hut 
(Figure 4.11), the main reason for building elevated huts is to guard crops from 
crop raiding by elephants but only five households (1.8%) built such a hut for 
crop guarding. The reason for the ones who did not apply this option is because 
they think that it is dangerous to climb up and down the tree. Some households 
(6.5%) applied un-electrified or electrified fences surrounding their crops (Figure 
4.12). Some households use the light to protect their crops by supplying the 
electricity to the field (1.8%) or using a hand-made lamp (Figure 4.13) to produce 
light in the crops (4.3%). When asked the effectiveness of mitigation measures, all 
respondents think that the measures cannot eliminate the impact but can lessen 
some impacts.  
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Table 4.7: HEC mitigation measures by households 
Mitigation measures No. of respondents* % 
1. Fire cracker 154 55.2 
2. Un-electrified or electrified fences 18 6.5 
3. Building a hut to guard crops 81 29.0 
4. Light: Supplying the electricity to the 
crops 
9 3.2 
5. Building an elevating hut on the tree to 
guard crops 
5 1.8 
6. Light: lamps in the crop 12 4.3 
Source: Household Survey, 2011. 
Note: * respondents indicated more than one choice 
Figure 4.10: Catapults and fire crackers 
 
 
Source: Mr. Rueangyot Thongsopin 
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Figure 4.11: A hut and an elevated hut in the field 
   
Source: Mr. Rueangyot Thongsopin 
Figure 4.12: The electrified (left) and un-electrified (right) fences by 
households 
 
 
Source: the author 
Figure 4.13: Hand-made lamps in the field 
 
 
Source: Mr. Rueangyot Thongsopin 
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Table 4.8 illustrates the mitigation costs of crop raiding borne by 
households. The most expensive method is the electrified or un-electrified fence, 
which average cost is about 7,285 baht or USD243 per household. The second 
most-expensive option is lamp (5,353 baht or USD178 per household) because 
this method requires kerosene or gasoline as a source of energy. The price of fire 
cracker itself is not expensive, about 5 baht or USD0.17/firecracker but 
households needed to use it every night. According to household survey, 
households use roughly 13 firecrackers per night during high frequency period of 
crop raiding and 3 firecrackers per night during low frequency period. This reason 
explained why the firecracker option is the third most-expensive method; with 
average cost is about 5,227 baht or USD174 per household. Lighting by supplying 
electric to the crop is another method to keep elephants away from crop fields, 
which average cost is about 3,989 baht or USD133 per household. The costs for a 
hut and elevating hut options are cheaper than other options, which are about 
1,941 baht or USD65 per households, and 1,434 baht or USD48 per household 
respectively. Furthermore, the average mitigation cost by households is 
approximately 5,917 baht or USD197 per household per year. 
According to the number of nights households guard their crops, the 
average night to guard crops is approximately 212 nights per year. Average 
household income and family member are 183,950 baht and 4.2 persons per 
household respectively. Therefore, average per-capita income is roughly 43,798 
baht per year or 120 baht per day. If we assume that number of working hours is 
the same as number of crop-guarding hours, then the opportunity cost of time for 
crop guarding would be 120 baht or USD4 per night. In addition, someone may 
claim that it is overestimated if we use the 100 % of income as opportunity cost 
because households just guard their crops, not working as a daytime. Therefore, 
only 30% of household income was used as a proxy of opportunity cost of time 
for crop guarding at night. Consequently, the opportunity cost of time for crop 
guarding cost an estimated 7,632 baht or USD254 per household per year. 
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The total HEC cost borne by households included 1) damage costs (34,825 
baht or USD1161 per household per year), 2) mitigation costs (5,917 baht or 
USD197 per household per year), and 3) opportunity costs to guard crops at night 
(7,632 baht or USD254 per household per year). Therefore, the total household 
cost due to HEC is approximately 48,374 baht or USD1612, which accounts for 
26% of annual household income. 
Table 4.8: HEC Mitigation costs of affected households in 2010 
Mitigation measures 
No. of 
respondents 
Mitigation costs (baht/HH/year) 
Min Max Mean 
1. Catapult and fire 
cracker 
152 
500 
(USD17) 
18,000 
(USD600) 
5,227 
(USD174) 
2. Un-electrified or 
electrified fences 
18 
222 
(USD7) 
32,000 
(USD1,667) 
7,285 
(USD243) 
3. Building hut to 
guard crops 
81 
86 
(USD3) 
21,716 
(USD724) 
1,941 
(USD65) 
4. Light: Supplying 
the electricity to 
the crops 
9 
700 
(USD23) 
12,500 
(USD417) 
3,989 
(USD133) 
5. Building elevating 
hut on tree to 
guard crops 
5 
100 
(USD3) 
4,200 
(USD140) 
1,434 
(USD48) 
6. Light: lamps in the 
crop 
12 
60 
(USD2) 
21,600 
(USD720) 
5,353 
(USD178) 
Average mitigation 
costs for all measures 
200 0 
36,914 
(USD1,230) 
5,917 
(USD197) 
Source: Household Survey, 2011. 
Note:(1) USD1 =THB30 
(2) All values are in 2010 prices 
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When asked whether they have planned to deal with HEC in the future 
(Table 4.9), majority of respondents (90%) have no plan about coping with the 
future impacts of HEC. However, some households (7%) have planned to build 
the fence surrounding their crops. Other mitigation preparations that households 
planned are to change to grow unpalatable crops (2%), change to another 
occupation (0.5%), and making battery lamp in the field (0.5%). 
When asked whether they have collectively coped with HEC (Table 4.10), 
about 28 % of respondents said that there were collective actions to deal with 
HEC, which are working as a team to grow elephant foods, patrol crops at night, 
build a fence or ditch, act as a group to ask for helps from government agencies, 
and have a meeting on how to deal with HEC problem. On the other hand, 72% of 
respondents said that there was no collective action. The reason that they cannot 
work collectively because they think it is better to work individually and it is 
difficult to work together. 
Table 4.9: Mitigation plan to deal with HEC by households in the future 
Mitigation plan No. of respondents % 
No plan 180 90.0 
Plan to change to grow unpalatable crops 4 2.0 
Plan to build un-electrified or electrified fences 14 7.0 
Plan to change an occupation 1 0.5 
Plan to make a battery lamp in the crop 1 0.5 
Total 200 100.0 
Source: Household Survey, 2011 
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Table 4.10: Collective action to deal with HEC 
Collective action to deal with HEC No. of respondents 
Collective action 55(27.5%) 
 Work as a team to chase elephants away (e.g. by using 
firecracker) 
34 
 Work as a team to build the fence 2 
 Work as a team to build a ditch 1 
 Act as a group to ask for helps from related 
government agencies 
2 
 Work as a team to patrol crops 3 
 Work as a team to grow elephant foods 11 
 Have a meeting on HEC mitigation 2 
No collective action 145(72.5%) 
Reasons to have no collective action 
 Working individually is better 
143 
 Difficult to work together 2 
Source: Household Survey, 2011 
Most households (66%) did not get any assistance from external sources 
(Table 4.11). Only approximately 34% of respondents received assistance from 
both central and local government agencies in term of financial assistance and 
compensation from crop loss. Furthermore, one respondent from Na Yao village 
who lost her son during crop guarding at night reported that she got financial 
assistance from her neighbors to help her for her son’s funeral ceremony. 
Table 4.12 presents the proposed mitigation measures by households to 
deal with crop raiding problem, most respondents suggested the elephant barrier 
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such as electrified or un-electrified fences (32%) and ditch (15%). Some 
respondents recommended habitat improvement such as planting more foods and 
increasing water resources for elephants (15%). Other measures were also 
proposed; for example, supplying electricity in the crop at night (15%), work as a 
team to patrol the crop at night (5%) and translocation (4%). Nevertheless, some 
respondents (4%) believe that there is no effective method to prevent crop raiding, 
whereas some households (9%) have no idea how to deal with this problem. 
Table 4.11: Assistance from external sources 
Assistance from external sources No. of respondents 
Did not get any assistance 131(65.5%) 
Got assistance 69(34.5%) 
1. Central government agencies  16 
 Governor’s office (e.g. necessity bags and financial 
assistance) 
3 
 Khao Ang Rue Nai wildlife sanctuary (e.g. 
compensation) 
4 
 District office (e.g. compensation)  5 
 Five provinces bordering Forest Preservation 
Foundation (e.g. financial assistance) 
3 
2. Local government agency 52 
 Sub-district Administrative Organization (e.g. 
compensation) 
52 
3. Neighbors (e.g. financial assistance for funeral 
ceremony for the one who died from human-elephant 
conflict) 
1 
Source: Household Survey, 2011 
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Table 4.12: Proposed mitigation measures to deal with HEC by households 
Mitigation measures No. of respondents % 
No effective method to deal protect their crops 7 3.5 
Do not know 17 8.5 
Electrified/un-electrified fences 64 32.0 
Ditch 30 15.0 
Translocation 8 4.0 
Planting more foods for elephants/increasing 
water resources for elephants 
30 15.0 
Supplying electricity in the crop at night 29 14.5 
Work as a team to patrol the crop at night 10 5.0 
Other methods (e.g. changing to plant 
unpalatable crops, contraception, and 
elimination)   
5 2.5 
Source: Household Survey, 2011 
The majority (89%) of respondent consider the future impacts of HEC to 
be more severe than the current impact (Table 4.13), which most of them think 
that it is because the increasing population growth of elephants. Some of them 
who think the future impact of HEC would be more severe believe that elephants 
were released into the park by the Queen of Thailand. It is also widely rumoured 
in Salakpra wildlife sanctuary. The Elephant Conservation Network (ECN) staff 
explained that it was a strategy of the park rangers because villagers would not 
dare to harm elephants if elephants were released by the Queen. Consequently, 
some villagers believe that they cannot do anything and the only one solution is to 
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translocate elephants to other areas.  This belief can prevent households to employ 
the mitigation options by themselves. However, some households (8%) believe 
that the impact of HEC would be the same as current situation, whereas few 
households (1%) think the impact of HEC would be less severe in the future 
because they believe the fence built by government agencies is effective.  
When asked respondents whether they are willing to volunteer to work for 
habitat improvement in KARN (Table 4.14), 93% of respondents are willing to 
work in KARN. Some respondents gave a reason whether they will or will not 
volunteer to work in KARN, they still have to pay for their own mitigation costs, 
and therefore, they are willing to work in KARN. Some respondents stated that 
they might be willing to volunteer (1%) or they were not sure about it (5%). The 
reasons for the ones who are not sure to volunteer to work are that they do not 
think this measure would be effective or they are not available/live too far or they 
are too old to work. Nonetheless, only 2 percent of respondents said that they 
were not willing to work in KARN. Their reasons are because they are not 
available or live too far or he is too old to work. Only one respondent stated that it 
should have a payment for working in KARN. 
Table 4.15 shows that households’ attitude toward elephants in KARN, 
more than a half of respondents (60%) stated that they did not hate elephants but 
also did not want them to raid the crops, whereas 27 percent of respondents said 
that they are afraid of elephants to harm them or fear to lose their crops. However, 
14 percent of respondents stated that they dislike or hate or get angry with 
elephants because elephants damage their crops. This information indicates that 
most households still did not hate elephants; even they have been impacted from 
crop losses for many years. This could be a good sign for possible mitigation 
measures through PES involving the local households in the future.  
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Table 4.13: Household’ attitudes toward HEC in the future 
Reasons 
Attitude toward HEC in the future 
Total 
The 
same 
More 
severe 
Less 
severe 
Do not 
know 
Increasing rate of elephant 
growth 
1 155 0 0 156 
Decreasing of food for elephant 
in KARN 
1 5 0 0 6 
Cannot do anything 6 2 0 0 8 
Believe that someone released 
elephants into the park 
1 7 0 0 8 
The government agencies 
already erected the fence 
0 0 2 0 2 
Others (e.g. elephants are more 
clever or elephant do not be 
afraid of human anymore) 
1 5 0 0 6 
Do not know 5 4 0 5 14 
Source: Household Survey, 2011 
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Table 4.14: Household’s volunteers to work in KARN for habitat 
improvement 
Reasons 
Whether you are willing to volunteer to 
work in KARN 
Total 
Not willing 
to volunteer 
Willing to 
volunteer 
Might be 
willing to 
volunteer 
Not 
sure 
If these measures are 
effective, I am 
willing to volunteer 
to work 
- 168 - - 168 
Even we will not 
volunteer to work in 
KARN, we have 
mitigation costs 
- 15 - - 15 
Willing to volunteer 
to work but do not 
think these measures 
are workable 
 3 - 1 4 
Busy/live too far 1 - 2 5 8 
Need to consult with 
neighbors what they 
think 
- - - 2 2 
Too old 1 - - 1 2 
Should have  
payments 
1 - - - 1 
Total 
3 
(1.5%) 
186 
(93.0%) 
2 
(1.0%) 
9 
(4.5%) 
200 
(100.0%) 
Source: household survey, 2011 
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Table 4.15: Household’s attitude to elephants 
Attitude to elephants No. of respondents % 
Do not hate elephants but do not 
want them to raid crops 
119 59.5 
Fear to be hurt by elephants or fear 
to lose their crops 
53 26.5 
Dislike/hate/angry with elephants 
because they damage crops 
27 13.5 
No comment 1 0.5 
Total 200 100.0 
Source: Household Survey, 2011 
4.3 Conclusion 
This chapter describes the survey of the six villages adjacent to KARN 
sanctuary which are the most affected HEC areas, namely Na Yao village, Na Isan 
village, Lum Tha Sang village, Tha Ten village, Na Ngam village and Klong Toey 
village. The total sample size of household survey was 200. The survey was 
conducted by a face-to-face interview. The household survey shows that the 
average crop-damaged area is approximately 6 rai/household/year or 0.0096 
km
2
/household/year, which is almost 18% of total crop area. Average annual 
damage cost is 34,825 baht/household or USD 1,161/household.  
Mitigation measures undertaken by households are complementary options. 
This explains why all households have applied more than one option. Average 
annual mitigation costs are 5,917 baht/household or USD 197/household. Another 
cost borne by households is opportunity cost of time to guard their crops at night. 
This study assumes that opportunity cost of time is accounted for only 30 percent 
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of household income. Therefore, average opportunity cost of time to guard crops 
at night is 7,632 baht/household/year or USD 254/household/year. Consequently, 
the average HEC cost borne by households is 48,374 baht/household/year or USD 
1,612/household/year, which accounts for 26 percent of their annual household 
income.  
Additionally, the result from the household survey on the question 
“whether households are willing to work on mitigation measures, to install water 
holes, remove invasive species and build salt licks, for free” is interesting. It 
found that 93 percent of respondents are willing to work for free. This shows that 
households are rational because if the policy options are workable, the household 
do not have to spend time protecting their crops.  So the opportunity cost of their 
time is effectively the time they would have spent guarding their crops.  The 
opportunity cost of time of households would therefore serve as a lower bound 
estimate of the costs on service providers of a PES scheme. This is an important 
message for future PES schemes.  
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CHAPTER 5 
THE COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS  
OF HEC MITIGATION STRATEGIES
10
 
This chapter is comprised of three sections; 1) cost-benefit analysis (CBA) 
of HEC mitigation strategies, 2) cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) of HEC 
mitigation strategies and 3) conclusion. The CBA and CEA were used as tools to 
compare three policy options over a 20-year period to deal with human-elephant 
conflict in the study area.  
5.1 Cost-Benefit Analysis of HEC Mitigation Strategies 
5.1.1 Steps of Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) 
The cost-benefit analysis (CBA) was used as a tool to compare three 
policy options over a 20-year period to deal with human-elephant conflict in the 
study area. The objective of CBA is to help social decision making to select the 
more efficient allocation of society’s reources (Broadman et al., 2006).  The three 
policy options were examined are 1) habitat improvement activities and 
contraception of female elephants, 2) habitat improvement activities, 
contraception and land-use change, and 3) habitat improvement activities, 
contraception, and electric fences. The seven steps of CBA  adapted from 
Boardman et al. (2001) were conducted: 
Step 1:  Defining the referent groups 
The referent group refers to the group of individuals whose welfare will be 
accounted for when assessing the costs and benefits of the project. The reference 
group of this project is affected households from HEC who their crops locate near 
the KARN.  
                                               
10 The cost-benefit analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis was financially supported by the 
Economy and Environment Program for Southeast Asia (EEPSEA) under the project on 
“Analysis of Policy Options to make From Human-Elephant-Conflict to Human-Elephant-
Harmony” and reported in the EEPSEA report. 
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Step 2: Identify the alternative methods of achieving the objectives 
Even though the local people and related government agencies currently 
have applied some mitigation measures, the level of these existing measures still 
are not enough to eliminate the HEC problem. According to expert opinion, the 
alternative to alleviate the HEC problem is to improve the level of the current 
mitigation activities (habitat improvement) and combine this with other options 
(contraception of female elephants, land-use change and electric fences). The 
details of each policy options are as follows: 
1. Habitat improvement and contraception 
The wildlife expert, who is a former head of the Chachoensao Wildlife 
Research Station, suggested that the best mitigation strategy is to keep elephants 
in the sanctuary by improving habitat for elephants to enable them to sustain life 
without raiding the farm. The proposed measures are to improve the level of the 
mitigation activities for habitat improvement, comprised of 1) increasing water 
ponds, 2) increasing salt/mineral licks, and 3) increasing grassland area. The new 
water resources should be established in a deep jungle to prevent elephants away 
from the sanctuary. The blue plots in Figure 5.1 show the location of additional 
water ponds. Figure 5.2 shows the location of additional salt licks (the yellow 
plots). The widespread of alien species is the important reason that affected the 
size of grassland. In the deep forest, however, when sunlight cannot reach the 
ground, the grass cannot grow as well. To increasing grassland by replacing alien 
species (e.g. the bitter bush) with species of grass (e.g. wild sugarcane) will be 
another option to increase source of food for wildlife. Figure 5.3 shows the 
location of the new proposed grassland. The contraception or birth control of 
female elephants will be introduced when the populations of elephants exceed the 
maximum capacity level (500 elephants). 
 
 
 
97 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Location for proposed artificial water-ponds 
 
Source: The Chachoensao Wildlife Research Station 
 
Figure 5.2: Location for proposed artificial salt-lick 
 
Source: The Chachoensao Wildlife Research Station 
 
  
The blue plots show the 
location of additional 
water ponds 
The yellow plots show the 
location of proposed 
artificial salt lick 
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Figure 5.3: Location of the proposed new grassland 
 
 
Source: The Chachoensao Wildlife Research Station 
2. Habitat improvement, contraception and land-use change 
Habitat improvement activities and contraception of female elephants will 
be introduced at the same level of scenario 1. Furthermore, the area within 0.5 km 
of the boundary of the KARN sanctuary that is considered a high risk zone for 
crop raiding will be changed from existing food crops to unpalatable crops that 
elephants do not consume.  
3. Habitat improvement, contraception and electric fences 
Under this scenario, habitat improvement activities and contraception of 
female elephants will be introduced as the same level of scenario 1. In addition, 
electric fences will be erected in the risky area (220 km of the total 460-km 
boundary of KARN). 
Step 3: Listing of outputs and impacts and potential impacts 
The costs and benefits in each scenario can be listed as in Table 5.1. The 
avoided costs (damage costs, protection cost, and opportunity cost of time) can be 
viewed as the benefits of the project because the existing costs borne by 
households will be alleviated when the mitigation measures are implemented.   
Grass cannot grow because the 
sunlight cannot reach it 
Proposed new 
grassland 
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Step 4: Quantifying and monetization the outputs and impacts 
The Information on costs of mitigation measures will be also obtained 
from reviews of documents, literature, and the expert interviews. The benefits of 
the project are based on field survey findings discussed in Chapter 4. The 
technique for cost and benefit estimation and source of information can be shown 
in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1: Categories of benefit and cost estimation 
Categories 
Technique to 
estimate 
Source of information 
Benefits (Avoided costs) 
1.1 Avoided damage costs of 
affected households from 
crop raiding 
Market value Field survey 
1.2 Avoided protection costs of 
affected households from 
crop raiding 
Market value Field survey 
1.3 Avoided opportunity cost of 
time that spends to guard 
crops at night 
Market value 
(forgone income) 
Field survey 
Cost: Habitat improvement and contraception 
2.1 Investment and maintenance 
costs of mitigation activities 
(water pond, salt lick, 
grassland etc.) to improve 
habitat in KARN 
Market value Expert interview 
2.2 Contraception  
Market value Expert interview 
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Table 5.1: Cont. 
Categories 
Technique to 
estimate 
Source of information 
Cost: Habitat improvement, contraception and land use change 
3.1 Investment and maintenance 
costs of mitigation activities 
(water pond, salt lick, 
grassland etc.) to improve 
habitat in KARN 
Market value Expert interview 
3.2 Contraception  
Market value Expert interview 
3.3 The costs of forgone 
opportunities (the net present 
value of the next-best 
economic use of the 
resources and land) In this 
case, it is forgone income of 
existing food crops to 
unpalatable crops that 
elephants do not consume.  
Market value Field survey 
Cost: Habitat improvement, contraception and electric fences 
4.1 Investment and maintenance 
costs of mitigation activities 
(water pond, salt lick, 
grassland etc.) to improve 
habitat in KARN 
Market value Expert interview 
4.2 Investment and maintenance 
costs of electric fences 
Market value Field survey 
Source: the author 
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Step 5: Calculate Net Present Value (NPV) 
The values of the costs and benefits during the 20 years of the project 
period are discounted to get the present values by using 3%, 5% and 8% discount 
rates, each rate indicating differences in time preferences for consumption now as 
opposed to the choice of delaying consumption to future periods. The NPV of the 
different scenarios are compared. In principle, all projects with NPVs > 0 are 
considered to have passed the NPV test since it is considered as an improvement 
in the social welfare. 
The NPV of a project is equivalent to the present value of the total benefits 
minus the total costs. Therefore, it assumes that at least one NPV is positive. If no 
NPV is positive, however, none of the proposed options are superior to the status 
quo. Then the status quo should be in place. With the project time frame of this 
study being 20 years, the NPV is calculated from the following: 
     
     
      
  
   
 
Step 6: Performing sensitivity analysis 
Sensitivity analyses are an essential stage of CBA to determine the 
sensitivity of the NPV given changes in a key parameter. The sensitivity 
parameters were discount rate, namely 3%, 5% and 8%, and growth rate of crop-
raiding damage, namely 5%, 10% and 15%. 
Step 7: Compare the NPVs and make recommendation based on NPVs 
The recommended option is the scenario with the largest NPV. The policy 
options should be ranked ordered from the largest NPV to the smallest NPV.  
5.1.2 Description of Alternative Scenarios for CBA 
According to key informant interviews, some HEC mitigation strategies 
(e.g. killing elephants and translocation are still unacceptable for Thai society. As 
mention earlier, an elephant in Thailand is not just an animal, but it also a cultural 
heritage species for Thai society and a white elephant was even included in the 
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flag of Thailand, therefore, both translocation and elimination are not currently 
the choice of HEC mitigation measures for Thailand. Furthermore, when the 
problem elephant is translocated, another elephant will replace in the few months 
(de Silva, 1998). Even compensation is a current mitigation measure but 
compensation rates are quite low as indicated in Table 1.3 in Chapter 1. During 
the household survey, the villagers even said that the transportation cost to go to 
the local government office was higher than the compensation they received; 
hence they did not go to claim it. Also, compensation is not suggested as the 
mitigation measure by the experts. This is because farmers tend to over-claim 
compensation (Fernando et al., 2008) and decrease in efforts to prevent damages 
or called “perverse incentive”. While wildlife utilization scheme such as elephant 
hunting is also unacceptable strategies for Thai society.  
From above reasons, Mr. Sawai Wanghongsa, who has been working on 
wildlife conservation in the Khao Ang Rue Nai (KARN) Wildlife Sanctuary for 
almost 30 years and the wildlife expert and former of the head of the 
Chachoengsao wildlife research station, suggested that the first priority measure 
to alleviate HEC problem is habitat improvement activities (e.g. water ponds, 
mineral licks, grassland conversion,  supplementary feeding plantation for 
elephants). He also recommended the mitigation strategies that are applicable for 
Thai society which are habitat improvement, contraception, land-use change, and 
electric fence. Furthermore, these strategies can be complementary measures. 
Therefore, the three recommended policy options to alleviate the HEC problem 
are: 1) habitat improvement and contraception, 2) habitat improvement activities, 
contraception and land use change, 3) habitat improvement activities, 
contraception and electric fences by comparing whether each new policy option is 
preferable to the status quo. These three alternatives were examined by using the 
CBA as a tool to opt for the more efficient allocation of society’s reources.  The 
benefits and costs categories of each scenario can be described in Table 5.2. The 
benefits for all policies are avoided costs from crop-raiding problem borne by 
households, which are damage costs, protection costs, and opportunity costs of 
time for crop guarding at night. The investment cost category depends on 
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mitigation activities of each scenario, which are habitat improvement activities, 
contraception and electric fences. Another cost category is a payment by using 
weighted average crop return for rice and cassava in the study area as a proxy for 
farmers to convert traditional crops to unpalatable crops in the risky zone in 
policy 2. In addition, the residual costs borne by households are incurred in 
options 1 and 2 but not in option 3 where traditional crops in risky zones will be 
convert to unpalatable crops. 
It should be noted that the CBA conducted here underestimates the 
benefits of reducing HEC because the benefit is not valuing the life saved of the 
humans or elephants. The approach to value of life, namely the value of statistical 
life (VSL), by using a wage hedonic approach to estimate the tradeoffs of workers 
between wages and the risk of death on the job is still controversial if the value is 
too high or too low. Taylor (2003) mentioned two controversies on VSL 
estimation. First, when there is a large variation in the VSL estimation it is 
difficult to select which value is best for any specific policy option. Second, a 
concern is whether a VSL estimation derived from studies of fatal workplace risks 
is appropriate for reducing risks of death from illnesses because illnesses may be a 
delayed reduction in the quality of life and/or pain involved. Besides the 
controversy of VSL estimation, another reason to not place the value of life in the 
analysis is that inclusion of these values might have produced higher benefits but 
not change the ranking of the policy options. 
In addition, sensitivity tests were conducted. For each sub-scenario, three 
discount rates were used in the calculation of NPV, namely 3%, 5% and 8%. The 
parameters for conducting sensitivity analysis for this study will also include the 
growth rate of crop-raiding damage, namely 5%, 10% and 15% annually, because 
the crop-raiding damage may increase higher or lower than the growth rate of 
elephants, which is approximately 10% annually. 
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Table 5.2: Benefits and costs categories in each scenario 
Scenarios Benefits Costs 
Status quo - Total costs from crop-raiding problem 
borne by households (damage costs, 
protection costs, and opportunity costs 
of time) 
Habitat 
improvement and 
contraception 
Avoided costs from 
crop-raiding problem 
borne by households 
1) Costs of habitat improvement 
activities and contraception 
2) Residual costs from crop raiding 
problem borne by households 
Habitat 
improvement, 
contraception and 
land use change 
Avoided costs from 
crop-raiding problem 
borne by households 
1) Costs of habitat improvement 
activities and contraception 
2) Payment for farmers to convert 
traditional crops to unpalatable crops 
in the risky zone 
Habitat 
improvement, 
contraception and 
electric fences 
Avoided costs from 
crop-raiding problem 
borne by households 
1) Costs of habitat improvement 
activities and contraception 
2) Costs of electric fences 
3) Residual costs from crop raiding 
problem borne by households 
Source: the author 
5.2.1.1 The Status Quo Scenario 
The Status Quo scenario assumes that nothing will be done in addition to 
the efforts already invested as mentioned in previous section. Costs occurred in 
this scenario are the costs from crop-raiding problem borne by households with no 
more interference from the public sector, which are damage costs, protection costs 
and opportunity costs of time for crop guarding at night. The details of cost 
estimation in each category can be described as follows: 
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1) The crop-raiding damage costs borne by households: assumptions 
based on scientific studies in the KARN and expert interviews to calculate 
damage costs are: 
 The affected area by crop-raiding or a high risk zone is the area within 
0.5 km of the boundary of the KARN sanctuary (the same areas of the 
red line which proposed the electric fences of the policy option 3 in 
Figure 5.4), which is about 220 km from the 460-km total boundary 
(KARN, 2010). The rest of 240-km boundary is the mountainous area 
that the risk of crop raiding by elephants is quite low. Therefore, the 
total area at risk is approximately 110 square kilometer or 68,750 rai
11
;  
 Based on household survey, the unit cost of damage cost is 34,825 baht 
per household per year and average agricultural area is 33.6 rai per 
household. Therefore, an average damaged area borne by household is 
accounted for 18% of the total agricultural areas. This scenario assumes 
that a damage cost is also accounted for 18% of the area in the high risk 
zone;  
 Based on the Wanghongsa et al. (2008b)’s study, the growth rate of 
elephant population in KARN is 9.83 or approximately 10% annually. 
Therefore, this scenario assumes that damage costs are increased as the 
same proportion of the growth rate of an elephant population or 10% 
annually for the whole period of the project. However, crop-raiding 
damages may increase more or less than 10%. Therefore, the sensitivity 
analysis on the growth rate of crop-raiding costs was performed, 
namely 5%, 10% and 15%.  
2) The protection costs by households: assumptions based on household 
survey to calculate protection costs can be described as follows: 
                                               
11
 1 square kilometer = 625 rai 
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 The unit cost of the protection cost borne by household is 
approximately 5,917 baht per household per year or USD197 per 
household per year;  
 This analysis assumes that the protection costs by households are 
constant for the whole period of the project under an assumption that 
households cannot do anything more as they did.  
Figure 5.4: Locations of proposed habitat improvement activities and 
 electric fences 
Source: the author 
3) The opportunity costs of time for crop guarding at night: assumptions 
based on household survey to calculate opportunity costs of time can be described 
as follows: 
 The average household income is approximately 183,950 baht per 
household per year and average household member is 4.2 persons. Then, 
the average per capita income is 43,798 baht per year or 120 baht per 
day per person; 
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 The average night of crop guarding is approximately 212 nights per 
household per year;  
 It is hypothesized that households revealed value of time reflects the 
opportunity costs of time associated with a aspect of working (crop 
guarding) than resting (or sleeping) which measures the trade-off 
between work and leisure. However, households obtain benefits of crop 
guarding by reducing damage costs of crop raiding. Therefore, it might 
be overestimated to apply the full wage rates of households to be a 
proxy of opportunity cost of time. This analysis assumes that the 
opportunity cost of time of households to guard their crops, which leads 
to loss of sleep, is estimated only 30% of the total household income. 
 This analysis assumes that only one family member guards crops at 
night; 
  This analysis assumes that the opportunity costs of time are constant 
for the whole period of the project under an assumption those 
households cannot do anything more as they did and expect no increase 
in their wage or opportunity cost of time because this is subsistence 
farming, not wage income by itself. 
5.1.2.2  Habitat improvement and contraception (HC) 
Under this scenario, habitat improvement activities (construction of water 
ponds and mineral licks, conversion of invasive alien plants toward grassland, 
supplementary feeding plantation) and contraception of female elephants will be 
implemented. The Net Present Value (NPV) of this scenario is calculated from the 
following: 
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where Bt = Avoided costs from the crop-raiding problem in the case of 
the status quo 
- Residual costs from crop-raiding problem borne by 
 households 
 Ct = Costs of habitat improvement activities and contraception 
Avoided costs from crop-raiding problem in the case of status quo 
 = Increase in harvests due to less damage inflicted by elephants 
  + avoided protection costs + avoided opportunity costs of time 
Residual costs from crop-raiding problem borne by households 
 = residual damage costs, protection costs and opportunity costs of time 
Assumptions based on scientific studies in the KARN and expert 
interviews for this scenario can be described as follows: 
 Presently, only 36.61% of the total area or approximately 374 square 
kilometers is currently optimal forest habitat for elephants. To improve 
degraded forest habitat, which is about 63.29% of total area, can 
increase carrying capacity of KARN to support 332-498 elephants 
(Wanghongsa et al., 2008b). Therefore, this analysis assumes that the 
maximum carrying capacity of KARN for elephants is approximately 
500 elephants if the proposed habitat improvement activities are 
employed. 
 The habitat-improvement project by the Chachoensao Wildlife 
Research Station, found that the annual growth rate of elephant 
population within the KARN boundary, surveyed by a dung count 
method during 2001 – 2007, was approximately 2.38%; therefore, the 
rest of additional growth of elephant population or 7.45% annually 
would extend their forging area into the fringe of agriculture lands 
because it was found that the new dung-piles were detected near the 
periphery of the sanctuary (Wanghongsa et al., 2007b). The above 
information reveals that habitat improvement activities can 
109 
 
 
accommodate about 2% of the 10% growth rate of the elephant 
population in KARN. Therefore, we can employ this information as an 
effectiveness indicator of habitat improvement activities that may 
reduce the damage of crop raiding by elephants about 20%; 
 At a 10% growth rate of the current elephant population in KARN, 
which is estimated at 250 in total, the elephant population will exceed 
the sustainable level (500 elephants) in the next 8 years. Therefore, 
contraception or birth control of female elephants is needed for 50 
female elephants each year to control the herd size. Contraception will 
allow the herd size to stabilize at a steady state level.  This means that 
the residual damages will be at a constant level for the years after the 
contraception takes effect, as is discussed below. 
A monitoring procedure should be employed to check whether elephants 
come to use water ponds or mineral lick or not. If not, it needs to find the reasons 
why they did not. It may be because of the inappropriate location of water ponds 
and mineral licks or improper components of mineral licks. Then, necessary 
changes will be required. The details of the costs of each of these activities can be 
described as follows: 
1) Costs of habitat improvement activities and contraception (Table 5.3): 
A) Water ponds: the five water ponds will be constructed in the first year 
of the project period. The construction cost of water ponds is approximately 
50,000 baht (USD 1667) per ponds. No maintenance of water ponds is required. 
B) Mineral licks: the 260 mineral licks will be created in the first year of 
the project period. We need to create 260 mineral licks in the first place because 
we do not know where elephants would utilize the mineral licks. In the second 
year, approximately 130 mineral licks that elephants come to use will be 
deposited. Those 130-mineral licks will be developed to permanent mineral licks 
for elephants and other animals afterward. The construction cost of mineral licks 
and mineral deposit are equal, which is approximately 2,500 baht (USD83) per 
mineral lick. 
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C) Grassland conversion: the 30,000 rai or 48 km2 of invasive alien plants 
toward grassland will be introduced by implementing 3,000 rai or 4.8 km
2
 each 
year, therefore, 30,000 rai or 48 km
2
 of grassland will be established in 10 years. 
In the eleventh year, the first 3,000-rai-plot of conversion will be needed to 
reconvert to grassland again because the invasive alien species will grow and 
cover of most grasslands. The second 3,000-rai-plot of conversion will be needed 
to reconvert to grassland in the twelfth year, and so on. Therefore, the cost of the 
conversion of invasive alien plants to grasslands is roughly 3,180,000 baht or 
USD 106,000 per year. The unit cost of the conversion is 1,060 baht/rai or USD 
22083/km
2
. 
D) Supplementary feeding plantation for elephants: 500 rai or 0.8 km2 of 
supplementary feeding plantation has been proposed. Provision of supplementary 
feeding (e.g. bananas) can attract crop-raiding elephants and keep them in the park. 
The cost of supplementary feeding plantation is 2,500 baht per rai (or USD 
52083/km
2
). Therefore, the annual cost of supplementary feeding plantation is 
approximately 1,250,000 baht per year or USD 41,667 per year. However, the 
supplementary feeding plantation will need to be replanted every two years. 
E) Contraception or birth control: as mentioned before, the maximum 
carrying capacity of KARN for elephants is 500 elephants. The carrying capacity 
of KARN for elephants will be exceeded in the 8
th
 year, therefore, the 
contraception of female elephants will be introduced from the 8
th
 year. The cost of 
contraception is approximately 50,000 baht (USD 1667) per one female elephant. 
According to an expert interview, 50 female elephants need to have contraception 
each year. Therefore, the annual cost of contraception is approximately 2,500,000 
baht (USD83333). Contraception is effective for about 10 years; therefore it needs 
to be introduced every 10 years. 
F) Monitoring process: habitat improvement activities (water ponds and 
mineral licks) need to be monitored to make sure that elephants or other animals 
utilize them. The devices and human resources for the monitoring process can be 
described as follows: 
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F.1) Ten monitoring cameras: the unit cost of a camera at water ponds 
and mineral licks is approximately 12,500 baht (USD 417). Therefore, the cost of 
cameras for the first year will be 125,000 baht (USD 4167). However, cameras 
need to be changed to be the new ones every five year. Furthermore, the battery 
cost of camera is approximately 1,000 baht (USD 33) per year.   
F.2) Five handheld GPS receivers: the unit cost of a handheld GPS 
receiver is approximately 20,000 baht (USD667). Therefore, the total cost for 
handheld GPS receivers is approximately 100,000 baht (USD3333). These five 
handheld GPS receivers can be used for the whole project period. 
F.3) Two notebook computer: the unit cost of a notebook computer is 
approximately 30,000 baht (USD1000). Therefore, the cost of computers for the 
first year will be 60,000 baht (USD2000). However, notebook computers need to 
be changed to be the new ones every five year. 
F.4) Two staff for monitoring activities:  the salary to hire the wildlife 
technicians for monitoring process is approximately 10,000 baht (USD333) per 
month per person. The payment for wildlife technician is approximately 240,000 
baht (USD8000) per year. 
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Table 5.3: Costs of activities to alleviate HEC 
Activities (unit) Costs per unit 
Additional amount 
of activities 
required 
Habitat improvement and contraception 
Water pond (pond) 50,000 baht (USD 1,667) 5 ponds 
Mineral lick (mineral lick) 2,500 baht (USD 83) 260 mineral licks 
Conversion of invasive alien 
plants to grasslands (rai) 
1,060 baht  
(or USD 22083/km
2
) 
30,000 rai or 48 km
2 
Planting supplementary 
feeding for elephants (rai) 
2,500 baht  
(or USD 52083/km
2
) 
500 rai or 0.8 km
2 
Contraception or birth control 
process (elephant) 
50,000 baht  
(USD 1667) 
50 female elephants 
for every 10 years 
Monitoring activities after implementation 
Handheld GPS receiver (piece)  20,000 baht (USD 667) 5 pieces 
Monitoring camera at water 
ponds and mineral licks 
12,500 baht (USD 417) 10 cameras 
Notebook computer (unit)  30,000 baht (USD 1000) 2 units 
Staff for monitoring activities 
(baht/staff/month) 
10,000 baht (USD 333) 2 staff 
Source: an interview with Mr. Sawai Wanghongsa, the former head of Chachoengsao 
wildlife research station, 19 January 2011. Note: USD1 = 30 baht 
2) The residual costs from crop raiding problem borne by households 
Costs from crop-raiding problem borne by households are damage costs, 
protection costs and opportunity costs of time for crop guarding at night. Even the 
habitat-improvement activities and contraception are employed, the residual 
impacts still remain. Such mitigation measures cannot eliminate all impacts from 
HEC but it can alleviate it. Assumptions to calculate protect residual impacts can 
be described as follows: 
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 As mentioned earlier, this analysis assumes that activities of habitat 
improvement reduce the crop-raiding damage is about 20%; 
 Under this scenario, residual damage costs of crop raiding will be 
increased until the 9th year of the project. The contraception is 
introduced in 8th year but it may have a one-year lag to be effective. 
Hence, from 9th year until end of the project, the damage cost of crop 
raiding will be constant; 
 Regarding to protection costs and opportunity costs borne by 
households in this scenario, the estimation of these costs is based on 
assumptions and information as the status quo scenario. Also, both the 
protection and opportunity costs of households is assumed to be 
constant for the whole project under an assumption that households 
cannot do anything more as they did the same as the status quo scenario. 
Furthermore, it is expected no increase in their wage or opportunity cost 
of time because this is subsistence farming, not wage income. 
5.1.2.3  Habitat improvement activities, contraception and land use change (HCL) 
Under this scenario, habitat improvement and contraception of female 
elephants will be set up at the same scale as the second scenario. Furthermore, 
households who are in the area within 0.5 km of the boundary of the KARN 
sanctuary is considered a high risk zone (the same location of the red line which 
proposed the electric fences in Figure 4.1), will be asked to convert their 
traditional crops to unpalatable crops (e.g. rubber trees, teak etc.). Chong et al. 
(2005) recommended for buffer zones that are planted with palatable crops should 
be at least 5 meters in width. However, Mr. Sawai Wanghongsa, the former head 
of Chachengsao wildlife research station, recommended that it should be at least 
0.5 km in width, which would be far enough for elephants not go further to search 
for foods in villages. Also, to implement the habitat improvement activities to 
increase food for elephants would encourage them to turn back to the park rather 
than go further to villages. 
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The NPV of this scenario is calculated from the following: 
     
     
      
  
   
 
where Bt = Avoided costs from crop raiding in case of status quo 
 Ct = (Cost of habitat improvement activities and contraception 
  + Payment for farmers to convert from traditional crops to 
 unpalatable crops) 
Avoided costs from crop raiding in case of status quo 
 = Increase in harvests due to less damage inflicted by elephants 
+ avoided protection costs + avoided opportunity costs of time 
Assumptions used to calculate the payment/compensation rate for land-use 
change can be described as follows: 
 The weighted average crop return in the study area (rice and cassava) is 
used to represent opportunity cost of land use change to unpalatable 
crops, which is about 7,431 baht per rai
12
or USD248 per rai; 
  The total area of land use change is the high risk zone, which is 
approximately 110 square kilometer or 68,750 rai; 
  The average damaged areas of household is accounting for 18% of the 
total areas;  
  In this scenario in the expert view, there is no crop loss from crop 
raiding by elephants because the risky area will be converted to 
unpalatable crops.  
 
  
                                               
12
 The returns of rice and cassava in the study areas in 2010 were about 4,192 baht/rai and 8,820 
baht/rai respectively. The areas of rice and cassava cultivations are 1,671 and 3,897 rai 
respectively. 
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5.1.2.4  Habitat improvement activities, contraception and electric fences (HCE) 
Under this scenario, habitat improvement activities and contraception at 
the same scale as the second scenario will be implemented. In addition, electric 
fences will be erected on the edge of the KARN at the risky areas of crop raiding 
(0.5 km-area surrounding the KARN or the red line in Figure 5.3) in the first year 
of the project period. According to a field trip at the Salakpra Wildlife Sanctuary 
in Kanchanaburi province, one of the most-severe-HEC areas in Thailand, a park 
ranger explained that the fundamental rules to install the fences were needed to 
ensure that the fences were effective to prevent elephants across them. The fence 
is suggested to be about two meters high from the ground, with posts 10-m apart. 
Fences are maintained on a duty cycle of 24 hours. The 3 meters-area surrounding 
the fences for both sides is needed to be clear from the trees (Figure 5.5) to 
prevent elephants put trees on the fences and across them afterward. The voltage 
needs to be maintained at 220 volt to 8,000 volt. The maintenance requires daily 
inspection of fence for wire breaks, loosening, and current leakage from objects or 
plants touching the wires, replacing damaged posts, inspection of powering 
energizer.  
Figure 5.5: Electric fences in the Salakpra Wildlife Sanctuary 
Source: the author 
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The NPV of this scenario is calculated from the following. 
     
     
      
  
   
 
where Bt = Avoided costs from the crop-raiding problem in the case of 
the status quo 
- Residual costs from crop-raiding problem borne by 
 households 
 Ct = Construction and maintenance cost of electric fences 
Avoided costs from crop raiding problem in case of status quo 
 = Increase in harvests due to less damage inflicted by elephants 
+ avoided protection costs + avoided opportunity costs of time 
Residual cost of crop raiding problem borne by households 
 = residual damage costs, protection costs and opportunity costs of 
time 
The assumptions to calculate the costs of electric fences and residual 
impacts can be described as follows: 
 According to the crop-protection trial project by elephant conservation 
network (ECN), the construction and maintenance costs of electric 
fence are approximately 150,000 baht per kilometer and 15,000 baht 
per kilometer respectively (Ritthirat et al. forthcoming);  
 The ECN’s research found that the electric fences could reduce the 
crop-raiding damages by elephant about 80%. Then, the estimation of 
residual cost from crop raiding problem borne by households (damage 
costs, protection costs and opportunity costs of time for crop guarding 
at night) was assumed to be reduced by 80%;  
 Electric fences are needed to reconstruct in some parts of the fence 
during the project period because it might be possible the fence will be 
stolen or destroyed by villagers who want to enter the park. Therefore, 
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this analysis assumed that the villagers will need to reconstruct 40%, 
30%, and 20% of the total fence at the 5th year, 10th year, and 15th 
years respectively. Assuming a decreasing rate of fence damages is 
under the hypothesis that villagers will learn the benefit of the fence, 
therefore, they would less damage the fences. 
5.1.3 The Results of the Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Table 5.4 illustrates the results of HEC mitigation options. For each sub-
scenario, the three discount rates are used in the calculation of NPV, namely 3%, 
5% and 8%.  Also, three different growth rate of crop-raiding damage, namely 
5%, 10% and 15%, were used because crop-raiding damage may increase at a rate 
higher or less than the growth rate of the elephant population. The NPVs in each 
policy option will be used as a proxy to rank the preferable policy option. The 
NPVs for the Status Quo option are negative, and that means the “to do nothing” 
option would be the case that households will bear the increasing levels of costs to 
agriculture from a rising elephant population. The NPVs in each policy option are 
sensitive to the rate of crop-raiding damage, especially Policy 1 (habitat 
improvement and contraception). At 5% growth rate of crop-raiding damage, the 
NPVs of Policy 1 for all discount rates are negative. This is because a lower rate 
of crop-raiding damage results, but there are also lower benefits from crop-raiding 
saved, whereas the activity costs of mitigation measures are unchanged. It can be 
interpreted that Policy 1 might be the only appropriate option at certain levels of 
crop-raiding damage.  
Sensitivity tests were performed for the changes of the discount rate and 
growth rate of crop-raiding damage.  The NPVs of Policy 3 (habitat improvement, 
contraception and electric fences) are highest amongst all the options. These 
analyses suggest that benefits are greatest for the full-scale project which is 
comprised of habitat improvement, contraception and electric fences. Policy 2 
(habitat improvement, contraception and land-use change) ranks below the others 
even in the most favorable situation for crop damage, but it is the cost of 
compensation that drives this option to be negative. Furthermore, the costs of 
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Policy 2 would be higher if we include the transaction costs on negotiation 
processes with farmers for crop conversion. However, the reason that Policy 3 is 
preferable because of the effectiveness of electric fences on crop saved is high 
(about 80% reduced crop damage) that make the benefits of this option more 
preferable.   
The results of NPV estimation therefore accord with the households’ 
attitudes toward crop-raiding mitigation measures. According to the household 
survey, several respondents (32%) also think that the effective method to deal 
with HEC is electric fences or un-electric fences; whereas only 1 respondent 
thinks that it should be unpalatable crops. Furthermore, if we consider another 
factor, the acceptance of households, in comparing Policy 2 (habitat improvement, 
contraception and land use change) and Policy 3, Policy 3 is still more desirable 
because it is quite difficult to persuade households to change their land use. 
Households are likely to select their crop according to the market prices of crops. 
What the results of the NPV estimation indicate is that it would be more 
worthwhile for policy-makers to make efforts to apply Policy 3.  
5.2 The Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of HEC Mitigation Strategies 
The cost-effectiveness analysis of HEC mitigation was analyzed for the 
same three policy options as the CBA. The objective of the CEA is to provide the 
unit costs of effectiveness on each policy intervention which can also assist with 
decision making as another criterion to select policy intervention before deciding 
what strategy to implement. It should be noted that the CEA focuses on the costs 
of policy intervention and ignores the residual impacts borne by households, 
which are residual costs, protection costs, and opportunity cost of time.  
The CEA compares options on the basis of the ratio of their costs but is 
not a monetized effectiveness measure. The objective of the CEA is to estimate 
the unit costs of each policy option. Therefore, the policy makers can use this 
information as supplementary data to make a decision.  It should be noted that the 
CEA focuses on the costs of policy intervention and ignores the residual impacts 
119 
 
 
borne by households, which are residual costs, protection costs, and opportunity 
cost of time. The unit of output or effectiveness measure can be derived from the 
objective of the options is trying to achieve. In this case, the effectiveness is 
number of areas of crop damage saved.  The cost effectiveness ratios can be 
calculated from the following (Broadman et al., 2001). 
    
  
  
 
where  CEi =  Cost effectiveness ratio of policy i 
 Ci = Total costs of treatment or policy intervention 
 Ei = Effectiveness of the treatments = crop damage saved 
The CE ratio can be represented as the average cost per unit of 
effectiveness. In general, the most cost-effectiveness scenario has the lowest 
average cost per unit of effectiveness. The policy options should be ranked from 
the most cost-effective (the smallest CE ratio) to the least cost-effective (the 
largest CE ratio). The sensitivity tests were conducted in CEA. The sensitivity 
parameters were discount rate, namely 3%, 5% and 8%, and growth rate of crop-
raiding damage, namely 5%, 10% and 15%. 
The assumptions under each scenario for estimation of cost effectiveness 
ratio are similar to assumptions used in the cost benefit analysis. The difference 
for cost effectiveness analysis is that the policy interventions have an effect on the 
areas of crop damage, not the costs of crop damages. The effectiveness can be 
measured in crop damage saved from crop-raiding by elephants. As mention 
earlier, the total area of the high risk zone is about 110 square kilometers or 
68,750 rai. Average damaged area is accounted for 18% of total agricultural areas. 
Therefore, the affected area is about 12,375 rai or 19.8 square kilometer.  The 
parameters for conducting sensitivity analysis for this study included discount 
rate, namely 3%, 5% and 8%, and growth rates of crop-raiding damage by 
elephants, namely 5%, 10% and 15%.   
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5.2.1 Description of Alternative Scenarios 
5.2.1.1  Habitat improvement and contraception 
Under this scenario, assumptions to calculate effectiveness can be 
described as follows: 
 The habitat improvement activities can reduce the annual growth rate of 
the areas of crop damage about 20%;  
 The contraception of female elephants will be started in the 8th year; 
therefore, the crop damage will be constant since the 9th year. 
5.2.1.2 Habitat improvement, contraception and land-use change 
Under this scenario, assumptions to calculate effectiveness can be 
described as follows: 
 No crop is damaged under this scenario because all crops in high risk 
zone will be converted to unpalatable crops. 
5.2.1.3 Habitat improvement, contraception and electric fences 
Under this scenario, assumptions to calculate effectiveness can be 
described as follows: 
 The habitat improvement activities can reduce the annual growth rate of 
the areas of crop damage about 20%;  
 The contraception of female elephants will be started in the 8th year; 
therefore, the crop damage will be constant since the 9th year; 
 The electric fences can reduce the crop damage by 80%. 
5.2.2 The Results of the Cost-Effectiveness Analysis 
The results of CE ratios can be interpreted as how much costs for policy 
intervention to save one unit of crop areas from crop-raiding by elephants. The 
results of CE ratios are illustrated in Table 5.5. The sensitivity tests on discount 
rates and growth rate of crop damages does not change the ranking of policy 
options. The results of CE ratios demonstrate that the CE ratio of Policy option 3 
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is most cost-effective option, which accords with the CBA results. Among three 
policy options, Policy 2 is the most expensive option; however, this option also 
can save all crops by raiding or no residual impacts in the expert view. As 
mentioned earlier, the costs of compensation/payment for crop conversion makes 
this policy less desirable. The CE ratios are also sensitive to the growth rate of 
crop-raiding damages. According to these sensitivity tests of the growth rate of 
crop-raiding damage, the CE estimation shows that the higher rate of crop-raiding 
damage results in the least cost-effectiveness ratio. This is because the higher rate 
of crop-raiding damage actually means the more crops saved, whereas the activity 
costs of mitigation measures are unchanged in each rate of crop-raiding damage.  
According to household survey, the total HEC cost borne by households is 
about 48,374 baht/household and average crop area is about 33.6 rai. Therefore, 
the average HEC cost borne by household is about 1,440baht/rai. By comparing 
HEC cost borne by households and the unit costs of CE estimation, the unit costs 
of Policy 3 in all scenarios, which varies between 132 and 599 baht, are lower 
than the HEC costs. This information also makes Policy 3 more cost-effective 
compared to do “nothing”.  
5.3 Conclusion 
This analysis shows that cost-benefit analysis (CBA) and cost-
effectiveness analysis (CEA) are the tools to select the correct policy intervention 
for employing a pilot KARN-PES scheme. The scenarios of CBA and CEA 
considered were: 1) habitat improvement and contraception, 2) habitat 
improvement, contraception and land-use change and 3) habitat improvement, 
contraception and electric fences. However, it should be noted that the CBA 
conducted here probably underestimates the benefits of HEC reduction because it 
did not place the values of life saved for both human and elephants. This is 
because the current techniques to value life (e.g., VSL) are still controversial, and 
while inclusion of these values may have produced higher benefits, they may not 
change the ranking of the policy options. The results of CBA demonstrates that 
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Policy option 3 (habitat improvement, contraception and electric fences) gives the 
highest net present values (NPVs), therefore option 3 is a more efficient allocation 
of resources of society compared to the other 2 options. In addition, the results of 
CEA are consistent with the results of CBA, which is that option 3 is preferable to 
the other options. Furthermore, the results of CBA and CEA accord with 
households’ attitudes from the household survey that many respondents suggest 
the use of electric fences/non-electric fences as the HEC mitigation measure.    
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Table 5.4: Net present values of the net benefits of the three policy options 
Unit: million baht (million USD) 
5% 10% 15% 5% 10% 15% 5% 10% 15%
-582.5 -786.9 -1160.2 -489.4 -646.4 -928.9 -387.6 -495.8 -685.7
(-19.4) (-26.2) (-38.7) (-16.3) (-21.5) (-30.9) (-12.9) (-16.5) (-22.9)
-32.2 97.8 373.9 -31.6 65.6 270.2 -30.0 34.0 167.0
(-1.1) (3.3) (12.5) (-1.1) (2.2) (9.0) (-1.0) (1.1) (5.6)
-915.3 -710.8 -337.6 -788.3 -631.2 -348.8 -646.2 -538.0 -348.1
(-30.5) (-23.7) (-11.1) (-26.3) (-21.0) (-11.6) (-21.5) (-17.9) (-11.6)
64.0 253.5 607.3 43.6 188.7 455.6 22.5 121.9 300.4
(2.1) (8.4) (20.2) (1.5) (6.3) (15.2) (0.7) (4.1) (10.0)
Status quo
Policy 1:Habitat improvement and 
contraception
Policy 2: Habitat improvement, 
contraception and land use change
Policy 3: Habitat improvement, 
contraception and electric fences
Scenarios
Discount rate
3% 5% 8%
Growth rate of crop-raiding cost Growth rate of crop-raiding cost Growth rate of crop-raiding cost 
 
Source: The author 
Note: USD1 = 30 baht 
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Table 5.5: Cost Effectiveness Ratios of the three Policy Options 
3% 5% 8%
Total cost of treatment (baht) 88,628,390              74,347,413              58,723,759                
Total cost of treatment (USD) 2,954,280                2,478,247                1,957,459                  
1.1 At 5% growth rate of crop-raiding damage
Total crop damage saved (rai) 40,687                       40,687                       40,687                         
Total crop damage saved (sq.km) 65                             65                             65                               
CE ratio (baht/rai) 2,178                       1,827                       1,443                         
CE ratio (USD/sq.km) 45,381                     38,068                     30,069                       
1.2 At 10% growth rate of crop-raiding damage
Total crop damage saved (rai) 282,130                     282,130                      282,130                       
Total crop damage saved (sq.km) 451                           451                            451                             
CE ratio (baht/rai) 314                          264                          208                            
CE ratio (USD/sq.km) 6,545                       5,490                       4,336                         
1.3 At 15% growth rate of crop-raiding damage
Total crop damage saved (rai) 376,090                     376,090                      376,090                       
Total crop damage saved (sq.km) 602                           602                            602                             
CE ratio (baht/rai) 236                          198                          156                            
CE ratio (USD/sq.km) 4,910                       4,118                       3,253                         
Total cost of treatment (baht) 1,497,783,885         1,277,655,527         1,033,816,161           
Total cost of treatment (USD) 49,926,130              42,588,518              34,460,539                
1.1 At 5% growth rate of crop-raiding damage
Total crop damage saved (rai) 409,191                     409,191                      409,191                       
Total crop damage saved (sq.km) 655                           655                            655                             
CE ratio (baht/rai) 3,660                       3,122                       2,526                         
CE ratio (USD/sq.km) 76,257                     65,050                     52,635                       
1.2 At 10% growth rate of crop-raiding damage
Total crop damage saved (rai) 708,778                     708,778                      708,778                       
Total crop damage saved (sq.km) 1,134                         1,134                         1,134                           
CE ratio (baht/rai) 2,113                       1,803                       1,459                         
CE ratio (USD/sq.km) 44,025                     37,555                     30,387                       
1.3 At 15% growth rate of crop-raiding damage
Total crop damage saved (rai) 1,267,739                   1,267,739                   1,267,739                     
Total crop damage saved (sq.km) 2,028                         2,028                         2,028                           
CE ratio (baht/rai) 1,181                       1,008                       815                            
CE ratio (USD/sq.km) 24,614                     20,996                     16,989                       
Total cost of treatment (baht) 195,186,181            170,123,972            142,365,545              
Total cost of treatment (USD) 6,506,206                5,670,799                4,745,518                  
3.1 At 5% growth rate of crop-raiding damage
Total crop damage saved (rai) 325,590                     325,590                      325,590                       
Total crop damage saved (sq.km) 521                           521                            521                             
CE ratio (baht/rai) 599                          523                          437                            
CE ratio (USD/sq.km) 12,489                     10,886                     9,109                         
3.2 At 10% growth rate of crop-raiding damage
Total crop damage saved (rai) 609,590                     609,590                      609,590                       
Total crop damage saved (sq.km) 975                           975                            975                             
CE ratio (baht/rai) 320                          279                          234                            
CE ratio (USD/sq.km) 6,671                       5,814                       4,865                         
3.3 At 15% growth rate of crop-raiding damage
Total crop damage saved (rai) 1,079,510                   1,079,510                   1,079,510                     
Total crop damage saved (sq.km) 1,727                         1,727                         1,727                           
CE ratio (baht/rai) 181                          158                          132                            
CE ratio (USD/sq.km) 3,767                       3,283                       2,747                         
2) Habitat improvement, contraception and landuse change
3) Habitat improvement, contraception and electirc fences
Options
Discount rate
1) Habitat improvement and contraception
 
Source: the author 
Note:  1) USD1 = 30 baht and 2) 1 square kilometer = 625 rai  
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CHAPTER 6 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR PES IN COSTA RICA, VIETNAM AND THAILAND 
A successful PES implementation requires a supportive legal framework, 
instructions, and policies to define the environmental services, beneficiaries, 
service providers, financial mechanisms (Hoang Minh Ha et al., 2008). This 
chapter reviews the legal aspects of the PES implementation in Costa Rica which 
has a long experience in PES since 1997 and Vietnam where there is an advanced 
legal framework for PES implementation. Furthermore, Vietnam is the first 
country in Southeast Asia region with a national law on Payment for 
Environmental Services (PES) (McElwee, 2011). In addition, this chapter 
discusses the challenges for the legal framework for PES implementation in 
Thailand by focusing on the KARN-PES scheme.  
6.1 The Experience in Legal and Institutional Framework from Costa Rica 
Between 1950 and 1990, Costa Rica introduced an agricultural 
development policy by promoting land titling, technology, and subsidized credits 
for monocultures; as a consequence, deforestation in Costa Rica reached one of 
the highest rates in the world between 1973 and 1989, varying between 55,000 
and 32,000ha/year (Navarro and Thiel, 2007) or about 35–40 percent of its forest 
cover (Pagiola, 2002). Payment for environmental services (PES) was not 
however the first incentive-based policy for forest protection in Costa Rica (Table 
6.1; Daniels et al., 2010). The incentive-based policy of forest protection started in 
the 1970s with tax credits to offset costs of forest plantation and management. The 
tax credits were replaced by the Forest Credit Certificate (Certificado de Abono 
Forestal, CAF) under Forestry Law No. 7032 of 1986. Participation was also 
expanded through the Forest Credit Certificate with advances (Certificado de 
Abono Forestalpor Adelantado, CAFA), where land holders received the 
payments prior to investments in reforestation. 
As can be seen in Table 6.1, the subsidy policies were applied to promote 
for the growth of forest covers in Costa Rica. However, since the financial crisis 
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in the early 1980s, the Costa Rican government was under pressure from the 
international to eliminate the subsidies, including those to the forest sector. 
Moreover, the Costa Rican government recognized that almost a half of forest 
covers that accounted for 44% of total forest covers in 2002 were private 
properties (Navarro and Thiel, 2007) (Table 6.2). If the government withdrew all 
forest subsidies, it would increase deforestation because the private land holders 
might end the conservation services to protect the forests in their lands. This 
reason explains why the PES was designed to address these externalities. 
The PES mechanism, called  Pago por Servicios Ambientales or PSA, was 
created in the fourth Forest Law No. 7575 in 1996 (Daniels et al., 2010).Forest 
Law No. 7575 changed the concept of incentives-based policy of timber 
production in plantation forestry and natural forest management, to a new concept 
of payment for environmental services, where land holders are paid for their 
sustainable conservation practices in natural forest, forest plantation and 
agroforestry systems (Navarro and Thiel, 2007). As mentioned earlier, before the 
PES was emerged, a payment system for forest reforestation and management in 
Costa Rica already was in place. However, the fourth Forest Law made two major 
changes to the payment system (Pagiola, 2008). First, the law adjusted the 
justification for payments from the subsidies for only the timber industry to the 
provision of environmental services. Second, it changed the source of finance 
from the government budget to earmarked tax and payments from the 
beneficiaries. But in practice, the PES mechanism in Costa Rica was similar in 
other aspects to the previous forest incentive-based policies. Most mechanisms of 
PES implementation, such as the payment system, were also carried over from 
previous incentive-based policies. Also, the CAF certificates were used as service 
providers in the PES scheme. 
Forestry Law No. 7575 recognized four environmental services in the 
forest sector, which are comprised of biodiversity, watershed function, scenic 
beauty, and greenhouse gas mitigation through carbon storage and sequestration, 
and land holders can participate in more than one service including (a) 
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reforestation through plantations, (b) protection of existing forest, (c) natural 
forest regeneration, and (d) agroforestry systems (Daniels et al., 2010). Such law 
provides the regulation for the government to make a contract with land holders 
for the services they provide and has established a financial mechanism for this 
transaction in the form of the National Fund for Forest Financing (Fondo Nacional 
de Financiamiento Forestal: FONAFIFO) (Pagiola, 2002).   
The PES scheme in Costa Rica is administered by FONAFIFO, a semi-
autonomous agency with independent legal status (Pagiola, 2008). To provide 
secure demand for environmental services, FONAFIFO has assured agreements 
among water users as service buyers. The government board of FONAFIFO 
includes the three representatives of the public sectors, namely the Ministry of 
Environment and Energy, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the National Banking 
System, and two representatives from the private forest sector who were assigned 
by the board of directors of the National Forestry Office. Although the status of 
FONAFIFO is an autonomous agency which can make decisions, it is still under 
government regulation. For example, the budgets of FONAFIFO have to be 
approved by the Ministry of Finance, while the levels of payments are determined 
by executive decree. Though the Forest Law No.7575 admitted that the forest 
provided hydrological services, this law does not force beneficiaries to pay for 
services. FONAFIFO has acted as an intermediary to negotiate with water users to 
pay for the water services they obtain.  
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Table 6.1: Timelines of the incentive-based policies for forest protection in 
Costa Rica 
Year Incentive –based policy Details of policies 
1979 Income tax credits Income tax credit given to the land owners 
who participate in restoration scheme to offset 
the costs of forest plantation (Decree No. 
10521-AH, September 1979) 
1983 Soft credits International funding finances low-interest 
loans with long-period for reforestation 
(COREMA-AID project) 
1986 Forest Payment Certification 
(CAF)  
Landowners were compensated later thorough 
a tradable tax voucher (Certificado de Abono 
Forestal: CAF) for reforestation (Article 82 of 
the Second Forest Law No. 7032, La Gaceta 
13: Circulo 84 – May 6, 1986) 
1988 Advanced Forest Payment 
Certificate (CAFA) 
Like CAF but compensation is given before 
reforestation investment (Decree No. 18691 – 
MIRENEM-H, December 1988) 
1993 Forest Payment Certificate 
for Management (CAMA) 
Scientifically-managed timber extraction 
could be eligible for tax vouchers (Decree No. 
22452 – MIRENEM-H, 1993) 
1995 Forest Protection Certificate 
(CBP) 
Tax vouchers would be paid for natural forest 
protection, which equal to CAF vouchers paid 
for reforestation (Decree No. 23101 – 
MIRENEM-H, 1994, La Gaceta 74) 
1996 Payments for Environmental 
Services (PSA) 
Fourth Forestry Law (No.7575, Gaceta 72, 
Alcance 21-April 16, 1996) 
- Article 22 affirms continuation of tax 
vouchers for protecting natural forest along 
with other tax benefits.  
- Article 22 provides land owners 
voluntarily allowing forest regeneration are 
eligible for the same benefits. 
- Article 29 details tax benefits for 
plantation owners 
Source: Daniels et al. (2010) 
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Table 6.2: Classification of land tenure for forest covers in Costa Rica in 2002 
Management Category 
State Property Private Property 
Total area 
(ha) 
Area (ha) % Area (ha) % 
National Parks 481,190 85 86,751 15 567,941 
Biological Reserves, 
National Monument, and 
National Absolute reserves  
12,660 54 10,640 46 23,300 
Protected Zones  37,687 24 119,410 76 157,097 
Forest Reserves  73,107 26 209,553 74 282,660 
National Wildlife Refugees  71,744 41 103,722 59 175,466 
Wetlands  67,085 88 9,092 12 76,177 
Total 743,473 56 539,168 44 1,282,641 
Source: Navarro and Thiel (2007) citing Morales and Calvo (2002) 
Figure 6.1 demonstrates the three fundamental functions of the institution 
for the PES program in Costa Rica (Pagiola, 2002). First, FONAFIFO acts as a 
mechanism with the support of other institutions, such as (Oficina Costarricense 
de Implementación Conjunta, OCIC) to collect and manage payments from 
service beneficiaries or service buyers. Second, SINAC and private professional 
foresters (e.g. FUNDECOR) are the agencies who contract service providers, pay 
them, and monitor their compliance. Third, a governing board from the three 
representatives of each three public sectors (the Ministry of Environment and 
Energy, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the national banking system) and the two 
representatives from the private sector who appointed by the board of the directors 
of the National Forestry Office. Furthermore, the PES scheme expected revenues 
from the potential for sales of carbon emission reduction credits, however, the 
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results were not as expected. Moreover, the scheme has also been assisted a grant 
from the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and a loan from the World Bank 
through the Ecomarkets project. Also, the water user such as a hydroelectric 
power (HEP) was another source of finance as a beneficiary or service buyer. 
Figure 6.1: Institutional functions for PES program in Costa Rica 
 
Note: 1. HEP = Hydroelectric power 
2. OCIC = the Costa Rican Office of Joint Implementation 
3. GIF = the Global Environment Facility 
4. FONAFIFO =the National Fund for Forest Financing (Fondo Nacional 
de Financiamiento Forestal) 
5. SINAC =Sistema Nacional de Areas de Conservación (National System 
of Conservation Areas) 
6. FUNDECOR = Fundaciónpara el Desarrollo de la Cordillera Volcánica 
Central (Foundation for the Development of the Central Volcanic Cordillera) 
Source: Pagiola (2002). 
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6.2 Experience from the Legal and Institutional Framework of Vietnam 
The National Assembly of Vietnam has legislated a legal framework for 
natural resource and environmental management since 1990, which including the 
Land Law with its multiple revisions of 1993, 1998, 2000 and 2001, the Law on 
Forest Protection and Development of 1991 and the Law on Environmental 
Protection of 1991 (Wunder et al., 2005).Vu Thu Hanh et al. (2006) analyzed the 
Vietnam legal structure for PES implementation as follows: 
1) Some environmental services are recognized in the laws but none of 
these laws describe such services in detail. In National Laws, which are the Law 
on Water Resources of 1998, the Land Law of 2003, the Law on Forest Protection 
and Development of 2004, and the Law on Environmental Protection of 2005, 
there is recognized some elements of environmental services (Table 6.3): 
biodiversity protection; landscape beauty; watershed protection; and carbon 
sequestration; 
2) Under Vietnam’s Civil Code of 2005, individuals or organizations can 
legally make contracts, but not for the communities. To make an agreement for 
PES, all stakeholders should have a legal right to enter into contracts. Vietnam’s 
Civil Code of 2005 allows individuals or organizations to make contracts. 
However, communities have limited rights legally to enter into the contracts or 
civil legal relationship. The Civil Code specifies the four conditions that must be 
met for a legal entity to enter into a civil legal relationship (Article 84). First, it 
should be legally established. Second, it should have assets independently of other 
organizations and individuals. Third, it should responsible for those assets. Last, it 
should participate in legal relations independently and in its own name. 
Nevertheless, communities do not meet all of these conditions; therefore, they 
must enter into a civil legal relationship; 
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Table 6.3: Environmental Services in National Laws in Vietnam 
Laws 
Environmental 
Service 
Details 
The Law on 
Environmental 
Protection of 
2005 
Biodiversity Biodiversity protection must be implemented 
based on the assurance of the rights and 
legitimate benefits of local communities 
(Article 30.1) 
The Land Law 
of 2003 
Coastal resources 
and landscapes 
Coastal and “famous” landscapes are to be 
protected and managed (Articles 79, 98), while 
the Law on Environmental Protection of 2005 
provides that natural landscapes are to be 
protected (Articles 6, 29, 31) 
The Law on 
Water 
Resources of 
1998 
Water resources Call for preventing the deterioration of water 
sources (Article 11). The Law on Environmental 
Protection of 2005 goes further, providing that 
river water and river basins must be protected and 
managed and benefits to communities ensured 
(Article 59), while the Law on Forest Protection 
and Development of 2004 stipulates that 
watershed protection is one of the purposes of 
protection forests (Article 4). 
The Law on 
Forest 
Protection and 
Development of 
2004 
Carbon 
sequestration 
Climate regulation is one of the purposes of 
protection forests (Article 4). The Law on 
Environmental Protection of 2005 does not 
specifically enable carbon sequestration, but does 
enable other economic and financial measures 
that would contribute to mitigating climate 
change, including international trading in 
greenhouse gas emissions (Article 84.2) and 
financial incentives for the development and use 
of clean and renewable energy sources (Article 
33.2). 
Source: Vu Thu Hanh et al., 2006 
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3) Rights and benefits of environmental services are defined in the laws. 
The Land Law of 2003 and the Law on Forest Protection and Development of 
2004 recognized the rights of land users to manage lands. In addition, the Law on 
Forest Protection and Development of 2004 assures the rights of communities to 
manage forest land and to use forest products for both domestic and public 
reasons. Furthermore, the Land Law of 2003 also allows land users have rights to 
benefits from their management and use of resources. The land users have rights 
to enjoy the yield of their labor and investment in land; 
4) The legal framework encourages using economic instruments or 
market-based mechanisms to support natural resources and environment 
conservation. The three main legal documents, Decision No. 256/2003.QD.TTg, 
Politburo Resolution No.41/NQ-TW; Decree 175-CP, 1994, allow and endorse to 
use market-based instruments for conservation. Even if the Law on Forest 
Protection and Development of 2004 allows setting the price only for forest 
products, this provision should include the pricing of environmental services, and 
fees and charges from environmental services. Moreover, under provisions of 
current laws, only the State can set rates, fees and charges, and all revenue is 
budgetary revenue of the State. Hence, it is still unclear whether communities or 
individuals can receive payment. However, individuals or communities may 
obtain the benefits from the sales of certain environmental products gained from 
their land where the State has allowed them. Moreover, the laws would be 
sufficient if the payments are based on market values and have the right to sell 
based on their market value. If the payments are considered as a charge, fee or tax, 
additional provisions must be appended to allow service providers receive the 
payment from the government agencies.  
In 2010, The Vietnam Government introduced a Decree on Payment for 
Forest Environmental Services (PFES). No: 99 /2010/ND-CP was put into effect 
on September 24, 2010. This PES law is the first National legislation on PES 
implementation in Southeast Asia (McElwee, 2011). The Decree defined forest 
environmental services clearly, unlike the previous legislation discussed above, 
and included 1) soil protection, reduction of erosion and sedimentation, 2) 
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regulation and maintenance of water sources, 3) forest carbon sequestration and 
retention, prevention of forest degradation, 4) protection of natural landscape and 
conservation of biodiversity of forest ecosystems for tourism services, 5) 
provision of spawning grounds, sources of feeds, and natural seeds or use of water 
from forest for aquaculture (Article 4). The publication People and Nature 
Reconciliation (2011) discusses four new issues with the Decree as follows: 
1) This is the first time that individuals and organizations that benefit 
from forest environmental services have to pay forest owners who are 
forest service providers (Article 5); 
2) The Decree includes all special-use, protection and production forests 
as forest environmental service such as maintenance of water sources 
for clean water production, soil protection, reduction of erosion and 
services for regulation and maintenance of water sources for 
hydropower production, conservation of biodiversity of forest 
environmental services serving the tourism (Article 7); 
3) The Decree give the owners of forest the right to be forest service 
providers (Article 8); 
4) The Decree allows the beneficiaries from forest environmental service 
to pay directly through voluntary negotiated agreements between the 
service providers and beneficiaries or service buyers. In case the 
beneficiaries cannot make a payment directly, the beneficiaries can 
pay service providers indirectly through the Vietnam Forest Protection 
and Development Fund or through the provincial Forest Protection 
and Development Funds (Article 6). 
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6.3 Challenges of the legal framework for KARN-PES implementation in 
Thailand 
The above discussion showed how comparable national systems have 
produced a legislative framework for PES. In this section the situation in Thailand 
is briefly compared and discussed. As proposed, environmental services for the 
KARN-PES scheme in Thailand are 1) increasing water supplies by building new 
water ponds, 2) converting alien species into grassland area, 3) creating mineral 
licks, 4) planting food for elephants, 5) contraception of female elephants and 6) 
fencing part of the sanctuary. The details of these environmental services for the 
KARN-PES scheme are described in Chapter 7. These environmental services 
need to be performed in the sanctuary. However, the scheme was designed that 
local villagers would serve as the service providers to gain two advantages. First, 
it is hoped that villagers would change their attitude that elephants will be a 
resource for them, not a pest as is the current situation. Second, the PES would be 
supplementary income for villagers.  
This area has no irrigated land; agricultural practices depend on the level 
of rainfall every year so villagers can harvest their products only once a year. 
Furthermore, the private PES scheme as proposed here does not require a specific 
law beyond basic contract law (Greiber, 2009). However, to evaluate the KARN-
PES scheme’ position in the legal framework, any supporting laws should be 
considered thoroughly; from the Master Plans to subordinate legislation. 
Furthermore, after reviewing the related Thai laws, there are some legal 
frameworks to support the PES implementation (Table 6.4), whereas some current 
laws related to natural resources conservation also restrict a PES scheme’s 
implementation, especially for the KARN-PES scheme (Table 6.5).   
6.3.1 Supporting laws/Master plans for PES implementation 
Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, B.E. 2550 (2007) 
The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, B.E. 2550 (2007) legislated 
about community, local community and traditional local community’s rights in 
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collaborative management, preserving and the use of natural resources and 
environment topic, including State land policy, in section 66 and 85. 
“Section 66 Persons assembling as to be a community, local community or 
traditional local community shall have the right to conserve or restore their 
customs, local wisdom, arts or good culture of their community and of the nation 
and participate in the management, maintenance and exploitation of natural 
resources, the environment and biological diversity in a balanced and sustainable 
fashion.” 
“Section 85 The State shall act in compliance with the land use, natural 
resources and environment policies as follows: 
(1) preparing and applying the rule on the use of land throughout the 
country with due regard to the compliance with environmental condition, nature 
of land and water and the way of life of local communities, the efficient measures 
for preservation of natural resources, the sustainable standard for land use and 
opinion of the people in the area who may be affected by the rule on the use of 
land; 
(2) distributing the right to hold land fairly, enabling farmers to be entitled 
to the ownership or the right in land for agriculture thoroughly by means of land 
reform or by other means, and providing water resources for the distribution of 
water to farmers for use in agriculture adequately and appropriately; 
(3) preparing town and country planning, and developing and carrying out 
the plan effectively and efficiently for the purpose of sustainable preservation of 
natural resources; 
(4) preparing systematic management plan for water and other natural 
resources for the common interests of the nation, and encouraging the public to 
participate in the preservation, conservation and exploitation of natural resources 
and biological diversity appropriately;  
(5) conducting the promotion, conservation and protection of the quality of 
the environment under the sustainable development principle, and controlling and 
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eliminate pollution which may affect health and sanitary, welfare and quality of 
life of the public by encouraging the public, the local communities and the local 
governments to have participation in the determination of the measures.” 
It can be concluded from this that the Constitution of the Kingdom of 
Thailand has legislated to support natural resources and collaborative 
management of the environment between people, communities and government 
agencies, including balancing and sustaining use of natural resources, 
environment and biological diversity. These provisions agree with the implement 
of a PES project where people and communities manage natural resources and 
biological diversity as a service provider.  
The Eleventh National Economic and Social Development Plan (2012-2016) 
Regarding a strategy for environmental resource management under the 
eleventh National Economic and Social Development Plan (2012 – 2016) 
(NESDB, 2011b), the payment for ecosystem/environmental services (PES) is 
identified as the one mechanism to generate revenue from natural resources and 
biodiversity conservation. It shows that the PES approach has come to attention at 
the national level.   
“5.8.6 To generate revenue from natural resource and biodiversity 
conservation…. by creating the new mechanisms such as Payment for ecosystem 
services (PES) and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).” 
The Draft Environmental Management Plan (2012 – 2016) 
According to the Draft Environmental Management Plan (2012 – 2016) of 
Office of Natural Resources and Environmental Policy and Planning (ONEP, 
2012), under Strategy No. 2 (the sustainable natural resource restoration and 
conservation) indicates that it should support the studies of the payment for 
environmental services (PES) and the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation 
and Degradation-Plus (REDD+) to develop mechanisms for forest bonds as a 
source of revenue for forest protection. Even this Master plan focuses only PES 
mechanism on forest protection; however, it is a good sign that PES approach is 
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receiving attention from the governmental agencies who are working for the 
natural resources and environmental management. 
Enhancement and Conservation of National Environmental Quality Act, 
B.E. 2535(1992) 
Chapter 2 Part 2 (Environmental Quality Management Planning) of the 
Enhancement and Conservation of National Environmental Quality Act, B.E. 
2535 (1992) or the ECNEQ Act of 1992 also supports PES implementation as 
follows:  
“Section 36 The Environmental Quality Management Plan pursuant to 
section 35 may be a short, intermediate or long-term plan, as appropriate, and 
should contain work plans and guidance for action in the following matters; 
(1) Management of air, water and environmental quality in any other 
area of concerns. 
(2) Pollution control from point sources. 
(3) Conservation of natural environment, natural resources or cultural 
environment pertaining to aesthetic values. 
(4) Estimation of financing to be appropriated from government budget 
and allocated from the Fund which is necessary for implementation of the Plan. 
(5) Scheme for institutional arrangements and administrative orders by 
which co-operation and co-ordination among government agencies concerned 
and between the public service and private sector could be further promoted and 
strengthened, including the determination of a manpower allocation scheme 
which is required for implementation of the Plan. 
(6) Enactment of laws and issuance of regulations, local ordinances, 
rules, orders and notifications necessary for implementation of the Plan. 
(7) Scheme for inspection, monitoring and assessment of environmental 
quality by which the results of implementation of the Plan and enforcement of law 
related thereto can be evaluated objectively.” 
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 “Section 37  After the Environmental Quality Management Plan has been 
published in the Government Gazette, it shall be the duty of the Governor of the 
Province, in which there is a locality designated as environmentally protected 
area according to section 43, or as pollution control area according to section 59, 
to formulate an action plan for environmental quality management at Province 
level and submit it to the National Environment Board for approval within one 
hundred and twenty days from the date on which the Governor of that Province is 
directed by the National Environment Board to prepare the Province action plan 
for environmental quality management. If, however, there is a reasonable ground, 
the said duration may be extended as appropriate by the National Environment 
Board.  
In preparing a Province Action Plan for the pollution control area 
according to section 59, the Governor shall incorporate into it the action plan for 
mitigation and elimination of pollution prepared by the local authority pursuant 
to section 60 and the local action plan shall form an integral part of the Province 
Action Plan. 
In case there is any Province, in which no locality is designated as an 
environmentally protected area according to section 43, or as pollution control 
area according to section 59, that is nevertheless desirous to enhance and 
conserve the environmental quality within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction, 
the Governor of that Province may prepare a Province may prepare a Province 
Action Plan, within the framework of and in conformity with the requirements of 
the Environmental Quality Management Plan, and submit it to the National 
Environment Board for approval.” 
The ECNEQ Act of 1992 thus supports PES Implementation; section 36 
(3) prescribes that it is the duty of all government agencies concerned to take 
actions within their powers and functions that are necessary for effective 
implementation of the Environmental Quality Management Plan. These are the 
conservation of natural environments, natural resources or cultural environments 
in a plan that maybe short, intermediate or long-term, as appropriate. In addition, 
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after the Environmental Quality Management Plan has been published in the 
Government Gazette, it shall be the duty of the Governor of the Province, in 
which there is a locality designated as environmentally protected area, to 
formulate an action plan for environmental quality management at Province level. 
Therefore, it is possible that a PES scheme will be a part of the Environmental 
Quality Management Plan as the Province action plan for environmental quality 
management. If a PES scheme can be a part of the Province action plan, the 
scheme will be legally implemented according to the Province action plan. The 
period of the action plan can be 1 year, 3-5 years or over 5 years, depending on 
the types of the action plan. If it is a long-term plan, the PES scheme will have 
much time for cultivating knowledge and understanding of its associates and to 
broaden the plan’s collaboration with others agencies, and the benefit of the plan 
will be obvious and the PES scheme will be sustained. 
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Table 6.4: The current supporting law and Master plan for PES implementation 
Related Laws/Master 
plans 
Objective of Laws/Master 
plan 
Supporting issues for PES 
implementation 
1. Section 66 in the 
Constitution of the 
Kingdom of 
Thailand, B.E. 2550 
(2007) 
To protect the community 
rights 
Local community shall have 
the right to conserve by 
participating in natural 
resources management 
2. Section 85 in the 
Constitutions of the 
Kingdom of 
Thailand, B.E. 2550 
(2007) 
The proper land use, natural 
resources and environment 
policies 
Local communities would be 
encouraged to participate in 
the conservation of natural 
resource appropriately  
3. The strategy for 
environmental 
resource 
management under 
the Eleventh 
National Economic 
and Social 
Development Plan 
(2012-2016) 
A mechanism for revenue 
generation from natural 
resource management 
Supporting the PES scheme as 
one of mechanisms to generate 
revenues for natural resource 
management 
4. Strategy No. 2: the 
sustainable natural 
resource restoration 
and conservation 
under the Draft 
Environmental 
Management Plan 
(2012 – 2016) 
A mechanism for revenue 
generation from forest 
bonds as a source of 
revenue for forest 
protection 
Supporting the PES scheme as 
one of mechanisms to generate 
revenues for forest protection 
5. Chapter 2 Part 2 
under the ECNEQ 
act of 1992  
The responsibilities of all 
government agencies to 
take action within their 
powers and functions for 
the effective 
implementation of an 
Environmental Quality 
Management Plan 
Supporting the PES scheme as 
one of mechanisms for 
Environmental Quality 
Management Plan 
Source: the author 
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6.3.2 Legal constraints to implement the PES scheme in the case of the KARN-
PES scheme 
1) Restricted access to the KARN sanctuary to work for habitat 
improvement activities 
 The National Park Act, B.E.2504 (1961) and the Wildlife Preservation 
and Protection Act, B.E. 2535 (1992) 
The National Park Act, B.E.2504 (1961) is strict; the use of land for 
education and entertainment purposes is allowed by approval of the Director-
General. But it is not allowed to hold or possess lands, including building, 
clearing or burning, collecting, taking out or doing by any means whatsoever 
things endangering or deteriorating plant, mineral or natural resources. It is also 
not allowed to take out animals or do by any means whatsoever things 
endangering the animals or deteriorating soil, rock, gravel or sand etc. However, 
an official can carry out any works for protection and maintenance of the national 
park for education or technical research, or for facilitating tourism or for public 
education.  
Likewise for Wildlife Sanctuaries the Wildlife Preservation and Protection 
Act, B.E. 2535 (1992) legislated that no person shall, within a Wildlife Sanctuary, 
hunt wildlife, either preserved or protected wildlife, or collect or endanger any 
nest, except for educational purposes or scientific research and written permission 
must be obtained from the Director-General with the approval of the committee. 
During the meeting of the legal framework for PES implementation in 
Thailand on 26th July 2011 at the Biodiversity-Based Economy Development 
Office (Public organization) or BEDO, the conclusion that the existing laws to run 
the pilot KARN- PES scheme in Thailand might be sufficient was reached and 
that a new specific law for allowing villagers to work in the sanctuary might not 
be required. Currently, Department of National Parks Wildlife and Plant 
Conservation (DNP) and BEDO jointly signed an agreement under the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of collaboration for undertaking of the 
natural resource and wildlife conservation. The reason for this effort is because 
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DNP is in charge of the conservation areas, whereas one of the mandates of 
BEDO is to support investments on the development of biodiversity-based 
economy. This MOU is supported and encouraged at institutional level of the two 
organizations to collaboration for natural resources and wildlife conservation in 
Thailand.   Though the current laws do not authorize people to participate in 
natural resources preservation in a national park or the wildlife sanctuary, it can 
be performed by approval of the Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Environmental or Council of Ministers, in order that the Department of National 
Parks, Wildlife and Plant Conservation and villagers can collaborate and run the 
PES scheme. However, when the approval is granted at the beginning of the 
scheme for this pilot area, it would not necessary to ask for the approval every 
year because the approval would be granted based on the scheme period. 
Furthermore, the MOU between BEDO and DNP would encourage running the 
PES pilot scheme. In addition, it needs to indicate in the contract that the scheme 
will be started if only villagers involve in the PES pilot scheme in term of labor 
provision on habitat improvement activities to make sure that affected villagers 
will be involved in the scheme.  
It might be concluded that KARN-PES implementation in National Parks 
and Wildlife Sanctuaries has some restrictions that acquire Ministry of National 
Resources and Environment’s policy, or approval from the Council of Ministers, 
in order that the Department of National Parks, Wildlife and Plant Conservation 
can collaborate with villagers to run the KARN-PES scheme. In regard to legal 
impediment, as mentioned previously, the National Park Act, B.E.2504 (1961) 
and the Wildlife Sanctuaries, Wildlife Preservation and Protection Act, B.E. 2535 
(1992) are the restriction but can find the solution as mentioned earlier. Other 
laws validate the process; PES implementation is possible under the present laws. 
In addition, none of the specific laws is required for the private PES scheme as a 
KARN-PES scheme except the basic contract law. 
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2) No supporting laws for a habitat credit trading system  
An interesting development in terms of PES can be seen in the case of 
Australia, which has a Biobanking scheme resulting from the fact that most of the 
demand for biodiversity credits come from developers who are required (by law) 
to offset the negative impact of their development. The BioBanking system of 
NSW can work well because of strict enforcement of the laws. The framework for 
the scheme was established under Part 7A of the Threatened Species 
Conservation Act 1995.  It is supported by the Threatened Species Conservation 
(Biodiversity Banking) Regulation 2008, which outlines the BioBanking 
Assessment Methodology and Compliance Assurance Strategy.    However, while 
Thailand has parallel conservation laws, e.g. the Wild Animal Reservation and 
Protection Act of 1992 and the Enhancement and Conservation of National 
Environmental Quality Act of 1992. The difference is that the Thai law focuses on 
the command and control approach, not on a market-based approach and there is 
therefore no effort to create incentives for compliance and impose sufficient 
penalties for non-compliance. However, regarding this pilot project, developers 
can voluntarily create their own habitat credit system to offset their impacts on the 
environment or even to do “good” for conservation by participating on habitat 
credit system. The details of this system are described in Chapter 7 (Section 7.3.7).  
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Table 6.5: Legal constraints and their solutions for the PES scheme in 
KARN sanctuary 
Related Thai Laws Objective of laws Restriction 
Solution for this 
pilot project 
1. Restricted access to the KARN sanctuary to work for habitat improvement activities 
1.1National Park 
Act of B.E.2504 
(1992) 
Protection and 
Maintenance of the 
National Park 
Restrict access of 
villagers to work for 
habitat improvement 
activities in KARN 
sanctuary 
Villagers would 
access the sanctuary 
if these activities are 
proposed as an 
education and 
technical research 
by coordination 
with Wildlife 
Sanctuary staff 
1.2 Wildlife 
Preservation and 
Protection Act of 
B.E. 2535 (1992) 
Wildlife protection 
2.No supporting laws for habitat credit trading system 
2.1National Park 
Act of B.E.2504 
(1992) 
Protection and 
Maintenance of the 
National Park 
No channel by laws 
for developers to 
offset the negative 
impact of their 
development 
But developers can 
voluntarily create 
their own habitat 
credit system 
2.2 Wildlife 
Preservation and 
Protection Act of 
B.E. 2535 (1992) 
Wildlife protection 
Source: the author 
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the experiences of PES implementation from Costa 
Rica, where the PES scheme has emerged since 1997, from Vietnam which is the 
first country in Southeast Asia that introduced a PES law for the forest sector, and 
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related these in part to the  KARN-PES Scheme. The PES scheme in Costa Rica 
did not begin from nothing; there were a number of prior incentive-based policies 
for forest conservation (Pagiola, 2008). The PES scheme of Costa Rica is one of 
the pioneering and well-known PES schemes. The Fourth Forest Law No. 7575 
changed the concept of incentives-based policy (e.g. subsidies) of timber 
production in plantation forestry and natural forest management, to the concept of 
PES. This law allows the land holders to be paid for their sustainable 
managements in natural forest, forest plantation and agroforestry systems 
(Navarro and Thiel, 2007). The Vietnamese Government introduced a Decree on a 
policy for Payment for Forest Environmental Services (PFES) (No: 99 /2010/ND-
CP), which was enforced on September 24, 2010. This law supports PES 
implementation in several aspects such as describing the environmental services 
from forest sustainable management clearly; making beneficiaries from forest 
environmental services contribute either direct or indirect payment to forest 
owners who are forest service providers.  
Regarding environmental services for the KARN-PES scheme, the 
existing Thai laws are sufficient to perform the environmental services in the 
scheme (e.g. water supply, mineral licks, converting alien species into grassland 
area etc.). Even though the existing laws (the National Park Act, B.E. 2504 (1961) 
and the Wildlife Sanctuaries, Wildlife Preservation and Protection Act, B.E. 2535 
(1992)) are strict about the access of villagers in the sanctuary, this can be 
managed by asking for approval from the Council of Ministers, in order that the 
Department of National Parks, Wildlife and Plant Conservation can collaborate 
with villagers to run the KARN-PES scheme together. But the Thai laws focus on 
a command and control approach; therefore, there is no channel by laws for 
developers to offset the negative impacts from their development as in the case of 
BioBanking scheme in Australia. However, developers also can voluntarily create 
a habitat credit system for doing “good” for conservation.  
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CHAPTER 7 
DESIGN OF A PES SCHEME FOR HUMAN-ELEPHANT-CONFLICT MITIGATION 
This chapter is comprised of four main components. First, the introduction 
on the background of the HEC problem and how the PES scheme can be a 
potential solution is presented in brief. Second, there is reference to the debate on 
why the PES scheme is a promising idea compared to other tools (e.g. command-
and-control and subsidy). Third, the design of the PES scheme for HEC mitigation 
measures in the KARN sanctuary is outlined with respect to proposed 
environmental services, the potential service providers and buyers, the 
intermediaries and monitoring and evaluation. The fourth section discusses the 
potential limitations of PES implementation, which are demand for environmental 
services, legal issues, transaction costs, leakage and the permanence of the 
scheme. The last section is the conclusion. 
7.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the human-elephant conflict (HEC) in 
Thailand has been reported since the late twentieth century when the export-
oriented policy was promoted (Srikrachang, 2008). This policy created an 
incentive for farmers to encroach into the forests where the elephant habitats 
were. The HEC events have occurred more frequently with higher intensity 
among 24 protected areas (Wanghongsa et al. 2008a). The impacts of HEC in 
Thailand are not only crop raiding and property damage but also loss of life and 
injuries for both human and elephants. Using the death rate of human and elephant 
as criteria, three protected areas, namely Salakphra Wildlife Sanctuary, Huai Kha 
Khaeng Wildlife Sanctuary, and Khao Ang Rue Nai (KARN) Wildlife Sanctuary, 
are ranked as the most severe areas of HEC in Thailand (Wanghongsa et al., 
2006a).  
This study explores the opportunity to establish a PES scheme in Khao 
Ang Rue Nai Wildlife Sanctuary (KARN) in the Eastern Region of Thailand, 
where villagers who are living in the areas surrounding KARN have been affected 
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by the human-elephant conflict problem. The growth rate of the wild elephant 
population in KARN is about 9.83% per annum, but only 36.61% of the sanctuary 
is appropriate as elephant habitat resulted in the shortage of food and water in the 
sanctuary (Wanghongsa et al., 2008b). Hence, this is a reason why wild elephants 
often come out of the sanctuary to raid cropland. While the related government 
agencies have made investments to revive the degraded ecosystem and to make an 
elephant barrier, investments are not adequate for the required scale. This is why 
the idea of PES was considered as a potential solution. 
The main objective of the PES scheme is to alleviate Human-Elephant-
Conflict by reviving the ecosystem in the sanctuary and performing the HEC 
mitigation measures, not as an elephant conservation project itself. To revive the 
ecosystem in the sanctuary will mitigate the conflict by reducing the incidents of 
crop raiding, reduced damage costs to crops and property and reduction of risks 
and fear. Furthermore, the HEC mitigation measures proposed here are not new 
approaches but rather current mitigation activities. The idea of PES was proposed 
to be a solution to solve the problem of budget constraints which is an important 
barrier to implement the mitigation measures.  
7.2 Why is PES thought to be a promising solution? 
The advantages of a PES system over current conservation measures are 
discussed in the literature. For example, PES can be considered for both demand-
side and supply-side innovation as suggested by Wunder et al. (2008). According 
to a demand-side innovation, conservation is often viewed as a responsibility of 
governments which most people do not want to pay for. However, governments 
are frequently not aware that environmental services are important. Even if 
governments realize how important environmental services are, budgets for 
conservation need to fight with other demands with limited resources, especially 
politically important demands. Furthermore, PES can be seen as a supply-side 
innovation of directly buying conservation. Because conservation activities that 
are desirable for the society often are viewed as unattractive to the service 
149 
 
 
providers such as farmers who act as direct ecosystem managers, PES can deal 
directly with this different view between the society and service providers. In 
addition, one important feature that makes PES different from other conservation 
approaches is the quid pro quo feature: those who can provide environmental 
service should be compensated only if they do provide those environmental 
services.  
It might be argued that the command-and-control approach or protected 
area establishment surrounding the sanctuary would have much lower transaction 
costs than a PES scheme but their implementation costs may be higher because 
they require asking people to relocate and buying land from current owners. The 
payment needs to compensate the land owners for their loss from the total flows 
of the benefits that can generate from their lands, as shown in the costs of land-use 
change scenario in Chapter 5. Furthermore, buying land may not be politically 
possible or may not be desirable for land owners because of the need to relocate to 
somewhere else (Pagiola et al., 2004). In addition, the PES approach is considered 
as more efficient than the command-and-control approach (Engle et al., 2010). A 
command-and-control approach (e.g. protected area establishment) requires 
conserving the whole forest area regardless of the level of benefits they provide or 
the costs of conserving them, whereas PES would more flexible which trying to 
find out the higher value of environmental services and lower costs of 
conservation implementation. 
Even though PES acts like an environmental subsidy, there are some 
characteristics of PES that make it different (Engle et al., 2010). First, it is more 
difficult to design a subsidy that achieves the additionalities and avoids paying on 
what would happen without the subsidy, whereas PES needs to assess carefully 
the baseline for activities before payment. While a subsidy could establish a 
baseline, they do not tend to be designed that way because the subsidies typically 
apply to whole classes of activities rather than the one-for-one trade that occurs 
under PES. However a PES system must still be carefully designed to ensure there 
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is additionality. Second, a subsidy may create perverse incentive to expand the 
destructive activities to get higher subsidies. 
There is an argument from the behavioral economics view that conditional 
monetary PES (pay if the service is actually delivered) may have the opposite 
effects by “crowding out” the intrinsic motivation to do the good thing for society 
or people receive a monetary payment for doing something that they would have 
done anyway, their motivation for doing it without payment will decline, and they 
might stop doing it if payment halts (Frey and Jegen, 2001; Vatn, 2010). 
However, Farley and Costanza (2010) argued that the service providers who 
receive the payment might feel an intrinsic obligation of “reciprocity” if they 
thought that payments was fair compared to the costs of undertaking the desired 
activities. There was an evidence for this argument by Bolton and Katok (1998). 
They found the evidence that people receive some value motivated from the act of 
voluntary gift-giving (or called impure altruism). Therefore, the presence of 
impure altruism prevents complete crowding out the intrinsic motivation to do the 
good thing for society. This is an empirical issue and suggests careful study of the 
cultural and value systems of the communities is important in establishing a PES 
system. 
However, it does not mean that other conservation policies (e.g. 
command-and-control regulation) will be replaced by PES but it means where the 
market failure exists, a combination of policies is needed. PES can be proposed to 
be another form of market-based policy to internalize positive externalities by 
creation of a parallel environmental-service market with other conservation 
policies such as command-and-control and educational approaches. Without the 
PES mechanism for this case, it seems unlikely that there can be policy 
intervention at limited scale. Public resources would only support some measures, 
and the local inhabitants would only be able to prevent and protect their crops, 
their property within limited means they have. On the other hand, by combining 
natural resources restoration and mitigation measures for the HEC reduction under 
the PES framework, it may be possible to reach the dual objectives of natural 
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resources management and HEC alleviation without having to make these trade-
offs. 
7.3 How to Design PES for HEC Mitigation 
The PES scheme for HEC mitigation is designed under a 20-year project 
period. To design the PES scheme, there are several components that need to be 
concerned. These include defining the environmental services, service providers, 
service sellers, baselines, additionalities, monitoring and enforcement. The details 
of each issue can be described as follow: 
7.3.1 What are the proposed environmental services (ES) for a PES scheme? 
According to scientific information, the KARN sanctuary is clearly 
degraded which only 36.61% of the total area or approximately 374 square 
kilometers (the green area in Figure 7.1) is an optimal forest habitat for elephants 
(Wanghongsa et al., 2004). The rehabilitation measures (e.g. increasing water 
resources and conversion of invasive species into grassland) are not only the HEC 
reduction
13
, but also flow of services, particular water service. 
  
                                               
13 To improve degraded forest habitat, which is about 63.29% of total area, can increase carrying 
capacity of KARN to support 332-498 elephants (Wanghongsa et al., 2008b). 
152 
 
 
Figure 7.1: The optimal forest habitat for elephants in KARN 
Note: the green area is the optimal forest habitat for elephant which accounted 
for 36.61% of total area in the KARN wildlife sanctuary 
Source:  Wanghongsa (2004). 
In addition, the improvement of habitat in KARN sanctuary can also 
generate the potential use value of eco-tourism activities. There are also the 
intangible benefits in the form of the indirect use value from the rehabilitation of 
the ecosystem as well as the non-use value of wild elephants, which has symbolic, 
historical and cultural significance in the Thai society. Through consultation with 
the wildlife experts, the staff of the KARN wildlife sanctuary and the results of 
cost-benefit analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis that suggested the policy 
option 3 (habitat improvement, contraception and fence) was more desirable to 
society than other options, therefore, the following number of environmental 
services have been proposed (the details of each activities are described in the 
later section):  
1) Increasing water supply available within the sanctuary to reduce the 
need for elephants to exit the sanctuary to search for water.  
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2) Converting alien species into grassland area within the sanctuary. A 
substantial part of the sanctuary faces problem of rapid expansion of 
invasive species. 
3) Creating mineral saltlicks within the sanctuary as a source of food for 
wildlife such as elephants and deer. 
4) Planting food for elephants (e.g. banana plantation) within the sanctuary 
to reduce elephants exit the sanctuary. 
5) Contraception of female elephants to control birth rate of elephants not 
exceeds 500 elephants in total which is the maximum capacity of the 
KARN. According to wildlife expert interview, the 50 female 
elephants need to do the contraception each year. 
6) Fencing part of the sanctuary that erected on the edge of the KARN at 
the risky areas of crop raiding or about 220 km from the 460-km total 
boundary of the KARN. 
From these environmental services, the expected benefits include (i) 
positive effect on stream flow from restoration of the habitats, (ii) reduction of 
damage costs from HEC, (iii) a job creation for local people, particular affected 
households from HEC can work on habitat improvement activities in sanctuary 
and (iv) the possibility of creating revenue from wildlife eco-tourism in the long 
run. In addition, the environmental services of PES scheme and PES mechanism 
can be explained as positive externalities and a Pigouvian subsidy respectively as 
one can encourage the generators of positive externalities by subsidizing them as 
marginal benefits they provide (Baumol and Oates, 1998). The details are as 
follows: 
Environmental Services as Positive Externalities 
In the classical PES case for a watershed protection, farmers in the 
upstream watershed conserve the forest habitat for their own agricultural benefits; 
however, their activities also create the external benefits or positive externalities 
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for downstream water users (e.g. water purification). Also, above environmental 
services create the positive externalities. For example, clearing invasive alien 
plants into grassland area could not only increase the grassland which is a source 
of food for elephants to reduce them to exit the sanctuary, but also address the 
effect of invasive alien plants to water resource. A number of studies reported that 
invasive alien plants have a negative impact on stream flow that the level of 
stream flow reduction can be quantifiable linked with the types and density of 
invasive alien species (Turpie et al., 2008).Therefore, the conversion of invasive 
alien species as one of HEC mitigation activities would have positive effect on 
stream flow or may increase the level of stream flow compared to the current 
situation.  As mentioned in Chapter 1, the study area, namely KARN, is also the 
watershed of Bang Pakong River and Prasae River, which are the main sources of 
surface water supply for residential areas, industries and agricultural production in 
the downstream area. Hence, the conversion of invasive alien species in KARN 
can be called as positive externalities for downstream water users.  
Furthermore, KARN wildlife sanctuary has a rich biodiversity which 
includes 132 mammal species (e.g. gaur, banteng and elephant), 395 bird species, 
107 reptile species (e.g. freshwater crocodile) and 32 amphibian species
14
. Hence, 
other habitat improvement measures for HEC mitigation (e.g. increasing water 
ponds and mineral licks) are not only provide foods for elephants, but also for 
other wildlife such gaur, banteng, wild boar and deer. In addition, other HEC 
mitigation strategies such as fences can reduce the confrontation between villagers 
and elephants that may lead to reduction of loss of human and elephant lives due 
to HEC. These HEC mitigation measures provide the positive externality as 
environmental services associated with non-use values of elephant conservation 
for the general public who value wildlife, particular elephants.  
                                               
14 http://www.5provincesforest.com/index.php?lay=show&ac=article&Id=538728119&Ntype=1 
(2 January 2012) 
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Payment for Environmental Services as a Pigouvian Subsidy 
Payment for environmental service (PES) is an incentive-based policy 
intervention as a Pigouvian subsidy to internalize positive externalities through 
creation of an environmental-service market. The PES classical case, Upstream-
Service Providers and Downstream-Service Buyers, provides an economic 
incentive to service providers or farmers in the upstream watershed for this case to 
adopt the beneficial management practices to watershed conservation. The 
payment from the scheme financed voluntarily by the beneficiaries of the 
environmental services or the downstream water users. The downstream water 
users can encourage the service providers in the upstream watershed for positive 
externalities by subsidizing them as marginal social benefits they provide 
(conditionality criterion defined by Wunder (2005)). Such subsidy can be called 
as a Pigouvian subsidy. The Pigouvian subsidy internalizes the positive 
externalities or social benefits to the service providers’ utility functions by 
providing them incentives to better maintain of watershed conservation compared 
to the current situation. 
This theoretical framework can also applied to the payment scheme for 
HEC mitigation measures. Under PES scheme, the service providers of the HEC 
mitigation measures will be rewarded as marginal external benefits from 
environmental services (e.g. labor provision for habitat improvement activities in 
KARN) they provide. For example, HEC affected villagers can be the service 
providers for habitat improvement activities. In household survey of affected 
households from HEC, the respondents were asked whether they are willing to 
volunteer to work for habitat improvement in KARN. The result indicated that 93 
percent of respondents are willing to volunteer to work for habitat improvement 
activities in KARN because they thought that they had to pay for their own HEC 
mitigation costs anyway. If these measures can mitigate the impacts, they are 
willing to do so. In this case, even though the villagers are willing to work for 
habitat improvement activities for their own indirect benefits, they also create the 
external benefits for ecosystem in KARN. Another external benefit is the hope 
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that villagers may change their attitude toward elephants that do not think 
elephants as a pest but as a resource for their income instead. The beneficiaries 
who receive benefits from HEC mitigation measures can help to make the PES 
scheme be more attractive for service providers by subsidizing them. In the 
presence of positive externalities, service providers would produce undersupplied 
levels compared to the social optimal level, however, this Pigouvian subsidy 
would provide an incentive for service providers to produce more.  
7.3.2 What are the proposed activities for HEC mitigation? 
Increasing water supply available within the sanctuary 
Figure 7.2 shows that water resources for wildlife in the KARN sanctuary 
are drying up in the dry season. In addition, Figure 7.3 illustrates the location of 
artificial water ponds constructed by villagers near the sanctuary boundary. When 
water resource in sanctuary is scarce, elephants try to search for water outside the 
sanctuary. The water ponds constructed by villagers near the sanctuary are another 
factor to attract elephants out of the sanctuary. These explain why the HEC 
incidents likely were occurred in the area near the artificial water ponds 
constructed by villagers. Therefore, to increase the water supply in the sanctuary 
is needed. Figure 7.4 shows the locations of the proposed artificial water-ponds.  
Figure 7.2: The condition of water resources in KARN sanctuary in a dry season 
Source: The Chachoengsao Wildlife Research Station 
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Figure 7.3: the location of artificial water ponds constructed by villagers 
 
Note: 1. The red plot shows the artificial water ponds constructed by local 
 villagers 
 2. the survey was conducted in 2005 
Source: The Chachoengsao Wildlife Research Station 
 
Figure 7.4: Location of proposed artificial water-ponds 
  
Note:   1. The brown plots indicate the locations of natural water ponds 
 2. The red plots indicate the locations of existing artificial water-ponds 
 3. The blue plots indicate the locations of proposed artificial water-ponds 
Source: The Chachoengsao Wildlife Research Station 
158 
 
 
Converting invasive alien species into grassland area within the sanctuary 
In fact, the appropriate habitat for elephants should be grassland, not dense 
forest. The expansion of invasive alien species in sanctuary, such as Catechu tree 
and Kra Thin Saba, has negative impacts on grassland area which is a source of 
wildlife’s foods. As shown in Figure 7.5, the expansion of invasive alien species 
replaced native species and also grassland. This activity is to clear the invasive 
species and replace them with species of grass (e.g. wild sugarcane). Figure 7.6 
illustrates the locations of the proposed new grassland area. The total area to 
convert invasive alien species into grass species is approximately 112 square 
kilometers or accounted for 11 percent of total area of the sanctuary. 
Figure 7.5: The expansion of invasive alien species in KARN sanctuary 
 
Source: The Chachoengsao Wildlife Research Station 
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Figure 7.6: Location of proposed new grassland 
 
Source: The Chachoengsao Wildlife Research Station 
Creating artificial mineral licks within the sanctuary 
A mineral lick or salt lick is not only a source of food for elephants, but 
also for other wildlife such as deer, boar, gaur and banteng. The 260 mineral licks 
(Figure 7.7) are needed to be created in the first year because we do not know 
where wildlife will utilize the mineral licks. However, only 130-mineral licks will 
be developed to be the permanent mineral licks. Besides costs for construction, to 
create a mineral lick also needs to maintenance costs to deposit a mineral every 
year.  
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Figure 7.7: Locations of proposed mineral licks 
 
 
Note: 1. The brown plots indicates the current mineral licks 
 2. The yellow plots indicates the proposed new mineral licks 
Source: The Chachoengsao Wildlife Research Station 
Planting food for elephants within the sanctuary 
Supplementary feeding plantation for elephants in the sanctuary such as 
banana plantation will be planted near the proposed location of new mineral licks. 
Then, elephants can eat mineral and food and do not need to walk further to 
search food outside the sanctuary. 
Contraception of female elephants 
As mentioned earlier, the growth rate of elephants in KARN sanctuary is 
approximately 10 percent per annum. Currently, only 36.61 percent of KARN 
sanctuary is optimal forest habitat for elephants. If KARN sanctuary can be 
improved to be 100-percent optimal forest habitat for elephant, the carrying 
capacity of elephants in KARN sanctuary will be 500. Without contraception, the 
elephant population will be exceeded 500 elephants in the next eight years. 
Therefore, the contraception of female elephants should be introduced in the next 
eight years. The wildlife expert, Mr. Sawai Wanghongsa, suggested that the 
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contraception of the 50 female elephants would be needed each year after the next 
eight years. The contraception is effective only 10 years; therefore, it needs to be 
introduced every 10 years. 
Fencing part of the sanctuary 
The objective of fencing is to restrict elephants in the sanctuary. The 
electric fences will be proposed in the risky area (the red line in Figure 7.8) which 
is about 220-kilometer from the 460-kilometer total boundary of KARN 
sanctuary. Electric fences do not cause physical harm to elephants but gives an 
unpleasant electric shock when elephants contact them (Fernando et al., 2008). 
Electric fences have been tried to against elephants in Thailand, for example, 
electric fences in the Salakpra Wildlife Sanctuary in Kanchanaburi province, Sap 
Langka Wildlife Sanctuary in Lopburi province and Kui Buri National Park in 
Prachuap Kiri Khan province.  
Figure 7.8 illustrates the locations of proposed habitat improvement 
activities (mineral licks, water supplies, grassland, supplementary planting) and 
electric fences in KARN sanctuary. These all measures will be proposed as a 
package of mitigation measures. Only electric fences without habitat improvement 
activities would not restrict elephants in the sanctuary because they would try to 
break the fences into the villages for searching the food. 
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Figure 7.8: Locations of proposed habitat improvement activities and 
electric fences 
Source: the author 
7.3.3 What are the Baselines and Additionalities? 
To measure the benefits and risks of the scheme, the “baseline” or “current 
situation” of environmental services needs to be defined to track the delivery of 
environmental services to beneficiaries or service sellers (Forest Trends et al., 
2008). This baseline must be established carefully because we may pay for the 
activities that happened anyway (Smith et al., 2006; Wunder, 2005). The payment 
scheme has to make a difference compared to business as usual situation (status 
quo) or the scheme must provide “additionalities” relative to a baseline (Forest 
Trends et al., 2008). Ideally, payments would be made as the marginal benefits 
service providers provide as defined by Wunder (2005) or called “output-based 
payment”. In the case of watershed services, the output-based payments are hardly 
possible because the level of environmental service provision cannot be observed 
by land users that prevent them to manage land properly, whereas most payment 
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schemes in practice adopt the “input-based payments” by paying as the amount of 
input such as number of tree planted or working hours spent for clearing exotic 
species (Engel et al., 2010) or based on the costs of environmental service 
provision rather than the values of environmental services (Wunder et al., 2008).   
In the case of the payment scheme for habitat improvement activities that 
can alleviate the HEC problem afterward, the baseline scenario as adapted by 
Wunder (2005) can be illustrated in Figure 7.9. The current situation of ecosystem 
quality in KARN sanctuary has been declined. To revive ecosystem would then 
qualify for additionalities. The choice of baseline is important for PES efficiency 
because the scheme might pay for conservation that would have happened anyway 
(Wunder, 2005). 
Figure 7.9: The baseline scenario for habitat improvement activities 
 
Note:           = additionalities 
Source:  Adapted from Wunder (2005) 
Additionalities can be evaluated in each activity as shown in Table 7.1. 
The indicators of the baseline and additionalities can be classified in 2 categories, 
which are 1) a short-run indicator and 2) a medium or long-run indicator. The 
short-run indicator, a change of wildlife population that come to utilize mineral 
licks, water ponds, and food represents the short-run output of each habitat 
improvement activity that can evaluate immediately after each activity is 
implemented, whereas the medium-term indicator, a change of HEC impacts, can 
 
Ecosystem  Quality 
With payment 
Without payment 
 
 
 
Time 
164 
 
 
be evaluated after PES implementation at least 1 year afterward. According to 
short-run indicators (a change of wildlife population that come to utilize the food 
and water), the baselines of these indicators need to be collected before 
implementing PES scheme as follows: 
1) Number of wildlife population that come to utilize the new grassland 
before PES implementation 
2) Number of elephant population that come to consume food at the 
targeted areas 
3) Number of wildlife population that come to utilize the new mineral 
licks before PES implementation 
4) Number of wildlife population that come to utilize the new water 
ponds before PES implementation 
However, the baselines for the medium indicator (a change in HEC 
impacts) can be obtained from household survey in 2011. The baselines of each 
activity as follows: 
1) A baseline of HEC incidents: 180 incidents/year. 
2) A baseline of HEC damage costs: 34,825 baht or USD1161/household/year. 
3) A baseline of HEC protection costs: 5,917 baht or USD197/household/year. 
  
165 
 
 
Table 7.1: Baselines and additionalities of each mitigation measures 
Activities Baselines Additionalities 
1. Converting alien 
species into 
grassland area 
within the 
sanctuary 
1) A short-run indicator: Number 
of wildlife population that 
come to the targeted areas to 
utilize mineral licks, water 
ponds, grassland and 
supplementary food without 
PES implementation  
 
2) A medium-term indicator: 
Number of HEC impacts 
without PES implementation 
which can be obtained from 
household survey in 2011 
1. A baseline of HEC 
incidents: the average 
incident is 180 
incidents/year. 
2. A baseline of HEC damage 
costs: 34,825 baht or 
USD1161/household/year. 
3. A baseline of HEC 
protection costs: 5,917 baht 
or 
USD197/household/year. 
1) A short-run indicator: 
Additional number of 
wildlife population to 
utilize mineral licks, 
water ponds, grassland 
and supplementary 
food in the targeted 
areas with PES 
implementation 
 
2) A medium-term 
indicator: A change in 
HEC impacts with PES 
implementation 
1. A change in number of 
HEC incidents with 
PES implementation 
2. A changes in damage 
costs due to HEC with 
PES implementation 
3. A change in protection 
costs due to HEC with 
PES implementation 
2. Planting food for 
elephants within 
the sanctuary 
3. Creating artificial 
mineral licks 
within the 
sanctuary 
4. Increasing water 
supply available 
within the 
sanctuary 
5. Fencing part of 
the sanctuary 
Medium or long-run indicator: 
Number of HEC impacts without 
PES implementation which is the 
same indicator as above. 
Medium or long-run 
indicator: Number of HEC 
impacts with PES 
implementation which is 
the same indicators as 
above. 
Source: the author 
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7.3.4 How much cost for proposed HEC mitigation activities? 
The costs for proposed HEC mitigation activities can be categorized to be 
two main categories, which are the investment cost (fixed cost) and the 
maintenance cost. The fixed costs and maintenance costs of each activity can be 
shown in Table 7.2 and 7.3 respectively. In addition, Table 7.2 also indicated the 
additional amount of activities required or target needed to be achieved in each 
activity. Furthermore, the costs for monitoring whether wildlife comes to utilize 
the activities are also presented, which are handheld GPS receivers, monitoring 
cameras, computers, and monitoring staff (details of monitoring activities are 
described in the next section). The estimated total costs of mitigation measures 
(habitat improvement activities, contraception and electric fences) for 20-year 
period range from 142 million baht or USD4.7 million to 195 million baht or 
USD6.5 million according to the discount rate. 
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Table 7.2: The fixed costs and amount required of each HEC mitigation 
activity 
Activities (unit) Costs per unit 
Additional amount of 
activities required 
(Targets) 
Habitat improvement, contraception and electric fences 
Water pond (pond) 50,000 baht (USD1667) 5 ponds 
Mineral lick (mineral 
lick) 
2,500 baht (USD83) 260 mineral licks 
Conversion of invasive 
alien plants to grasslands 
(rai) 
1,060 baht (or 
USD22083/km
2
) 
30,000 rai or 48 km
2 
Planting supplementary 
feeding for elephants (rai) 
2,500 baht (or 
USD52083/km
2
) 
500 rai or 0.8 km
2 
Contraception or birth 
control process (elephant) 
50,000 baht (USD1667) 
50 female elephants for every 
10 years 
Installation of electric 
fence (kilometer) 
150,000 baht (USD5000) 220 kilometers 
Monitoring activities after implementation 
Handheld GPS receiver 
(piece) 
20,000 baht (USD667) 5 pieces 
Monitoring camera at 
water ponds and mineral 
licks 
12,500 baht (USD417) 10 cameras 
Notebook computer (unit) 30,000 baht (USD1000) 2 units 
Staff for monitoring 
activities 
(baht/staff/month) 
10,000 baht (USD333) 2 staff 
Note: USD1 = 30 baht 
Source: an interview with Mr. Sawai Wanghongsa, the former head of 
Chachoengsao wildlife research station, 19 January 2011. 
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Table 7.3: The maintenance costs of each HEC mitigation activity 
Activities Unit cost 
1. Water ponds 
No maintenance cost 
2. Mineral licks 
2,500 baht or USD83/unit/year 
3. Conversion of invasive alien plants to 
grasslands 
1,060 baht/rai/year or 
USD22083/km
2
/year 
4. Planting supplementary feeding for 
elephants 
1,250 baht/rai/year or 
USD26042/km
2
/year 
5. Electric fences 
15,000 baht or USD500/km/year 
Note: USD1 = 30 baht 
Source: an interview with Mr. Sawai Wanghongsa, the former head of 
Chachoengsao wildlife research station, 19 January 2011. 
 
Table 7.4: Estimated total costs of HEC mitigation at different discount 
rates 
Options 
Discount rate 
3% 5% 8% 
Habitat improvement, contraception and electric fences 
Total cost of treatment (baht) 
195,186,181 170,123,972 142,365,545 
Total cost of treatment (USD) 
6,506,206 5,670,799 4,745,518 
Note: USD 1 = 30 baht 
Source: the author 
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7.3.5 Who are the potential service providers? 
Apart from identifying the habitat improvement activities, information on 
quantities required and the unit costs, the service providers for the pilot project 
have been identified, these being the six villages where HEC is high, namely Na 
Yao, Na Isan, Lum Tha Sang, Tha Ten, Na Ngam, and Klong Toey. If PES 
scheme in this six pilot villages succeed, the scheme will be developed to cover 
all villagers where are affected from HEC. In this situation, the concept of 
Payment for Environmental Services which attempts to provide economic 
incentives to villagers maybe the win-win solution by providing employment and 
income for the poor and at the same time more sustainable conservation. 
According to the household survey, for these households the HEC costs 
which is comprised of damage costs from crops and property damage and medical 
expenses, protection costs, opportunity costs of time to guard crops at night was 
approximately 23 percent of their average household income. The evidence to 
confirm that villagers would be interested to be service providers is from the 
results of household survey when asked them whether they will be interested in 
participating in the activities to revive the ecosystem in KARN sanctuary. The 93 
percent of the 200-respondents said that they would be volunteer the labor even if 
there was no payment. However, this result was not beyond expectations because 
these villagers were already spending money to protect their crops and property; 
therefore, any measures that would reduce crop raiding incidences would reduce 
their current expenses.  
For that reason, the villagers are beneficiaries as well as service providers. 
However, a free riding might occur if some villagers do not want to work in the 
sanctuary but still get the benefits from mitigation measures in term of less 
damage from crop-raiding. Nevertheless, since most villagers (93% of 200-
respondents) agree to volunteer labor without payment, it is expected that most 
villagers would participate in the scheme and this free-riding problem would be 
slim. In addition, the service providers from the six villages will also be involved 
in monitoring activities. This is essential for PES project which is to provide an 
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evidence of the improvement of the ecosystems and especially for HEC mitigation 
in this pilot site, the reduction in the incidences of crop raiding, reduced damage 
costs to crops and properties. Villagers will be involved in data collection of HEC 
impacts (more details in section 7.3.10).   
7.3.6 What are the opportunity costs of the service providers? 
At the first stage of this project, the auction method was chosen to be a 
technique to search for willingness-to-accept (WTC) of service providers, or 
affected villagers for this case, for their opportunity costs. However, there was an 
argument during the focus group discussion that an auction would lead to a 
conflict between villagers because they would receive the payment unequally. 
This evidence also shows that villagers value equity and there is cultural norm 
that they do not want to see someone get more benefits of pay more than others. 
Therefore, the cultural norm in the villages would pressure people to work for 
habitat improvement activities and the free-riding problem would be less relevant 
for this case. In case of Upstream-Service Providers and Downstream-Service 
Buyers, the opportunity costs of service providers, or Up-stream-Service 
Providers, are not only the opportunity cost of time for their labor contribution, 
but also the opportunity cost of their land-use change. The auction method would 
be proper methodology to value the WTC of the case of the Up-stream-Service 
Providers. Unlike the case of Upstream-Service Providers and Downstream-
Service Buyers, the opportunity cost of service providers in this case is only the 
opportunity cost of time to contribute their labor for habitat improvement 
activities because all activities will be implemented in the sanctuary. Therefore, 
villagers have no opportunity cost of land-use change.  
Someone may argue that it should apply the total economics value (TEV) 
of ecosystem services flows. Wunder (2005) argues that if we pay for the full 
economic valuation, the funding may be wasted on something that would have 
happened anyway and opportunity cost would be helpful for this concern. 
Furthermore, Farley and Costanza (2010) argue that ecosystem resources are 
immeasurably valuable resources; therefore the level of the PES payment should 
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be considered by costs of supply, not monetary estimate of benefits. Hence, it is 
reasonable to use the opportunity cost of time of villagers’ incomes from a 
household survey, which was approximately 120 baht per day or USD4 per day
15
, 
as a proxy of a lower bound of their opportunity cost of the service providers. 
However, the payment rate may depend on the difficulty of each activity and also 
whether all stakeholders can make an agreement. Furthermore, the service 
providers, which are affected villagers in this case, would obtain another long-run 
benefit of crop damage saved if the mitigation measures function effectively. It 
means that their crop damages will be reduced or they will have more income due 
to lower crop damage level. Table 7.5 illustrates the benefits (or crop damage 
saved) from HEC mitigation measures (habitat improvement, contraception and 
electric fences) in different assumption of growth rates of crop-raiding damages. 
According to household survey, the average crop return is about 7,431 baht per rai 
or USD 154,812 per square kilometer. The total benefit or crop damage saved 
from mitigation measure to affected households for the 20-year project period of 
3% discount rate ranges from 2,410 million baht or USD80 million to 8,022 
million baht or USD267 million, which depend on the assumption of growth rate 
of crop-raiding damages.  
  
                                               
15 USD1 = 30 baht 
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Table 7.5: Benefits (or avoid damage costs) from HEC mitigation measures 
at 3% discount rate in different assumption of the growth rate of 
crop-raiding damages 
1.1 At 5% growth rate of crop-raiding damages
Total crop damage saved (rai) 325,590                        
Total crop damage saved (sq.km) 521                              
Total crop damage saved (baht) 2,419,462,541            
Total crop damage saved (USD) 80,648,751                    
1.2 At 10% growth rate of crop-raiding damages
Total crop damage saved (rai) 609,590                        
Total crop damage saved (sq.km) 975                              
Total crop damage saved (baht) 4,529,866,879            
Total crop damage saved (USD) 150,995,563                  
1.3 At 15% growth rate of crop-raiding damages
Total crop damage saved (rai) 1,079,510                      
Total crop damage saved (sq.km) 1,727                            
Total crop damage saved (baht) 8,021,835,391            
Total crop damage saved (USD) 267,394,513                  
Options
Habitat improvement, contraception and electirc fences
Crop damage saved
 
Note: 1) USD1 = 30 baht and 2) 1 km2 = 625 rai 
 2) All values are in 2010 prices 
Source: the author 
7.3.7 Who are the potential service buyers? 
The service buyers refer to the stakeholders who obtain benefit from 
environmental service that service providers (service sellers) provide. Perhaps the 
most challenging part of launching the PES project, especially for this case, is to 
identify the buyers because there are several beneficiaries from restoration 
activities for both direct and indirect beneficiaries. Some potential service buyers 
for this case can be shown in Table 7.6. Apart from the service providers or 
villagers who also directly benefit from the ecosystem restoration that will be 
implemented, the beneficiaries of the ecosystems service are also for those who 
rely on water supply from the Bangpakong River and Prasae River. The major 
user is the East Water Company, a private company that showed an interest in 
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being a service buyer.  In a meeting organized to discuss the objectives of the 
KARN-PES Pilot project, the representative of the East Water company pointed 
out that there was a need to know the on-going development projects being 
funded both by government agencies and private companies as part of their CSR 
investments within KARN sanctuary.   Such information would be helpful in 
planning processes to identify overlaps and gaps of investments. 
However, only one single buyer may not be adequate for the initial 
investment and maintenance costs. During the initial period, there was high 
expectation that it would be possible to mobilize contributions from the private 
sector in a part of CSR budget as the KARN-PES Pilot Project offers an 
opportunity that they could do ‘good’ for conservation and earn CSR publicity. 
However, private companies may pay attention only on quick and tangible effects. 
Hence, there is essential for a formal institutional framework to create tangible 
incentives for the private sectors to be involved.   
Experiences from other country’s initiatives, such as habitat credits for 
federal governments or private companies in United States who want to offset 
impacts on habitat and gopher tortoise populations (Gartner, 2010) and the New 
South Wales Biodiversity Banking and Offsets Scheme (BioBanking Scheme) for 
developers who want to offset the negative impact of their development (DECC, 
2007), can be lessons to create markets or tangible incentives for private 
companies to conserve natural resources. Voluntary habitat credit system can be 
created for habitat improvement activities. Each credit is a unit of trade on habitat 
improvement and can be voluntarily bought by the private sectors to offset 
impacts on their development. Habitat credit assessment is required to determine 
either the number of habitat credits that can be created at KARN sanctuary or 
required at a development site. All habitat improvement activities will be 
converted to habitat credits for trade. The price of biodiversity credits may be 
based the cost of each activity. For example, one water pond and one mineral lick 
can be converted to be 1,000 and 50 credits, respectively. Developers can 
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voluntarily use this habitat credit system to offset their impacts on the 
environment or even to do “good” for conservation. 
Other capacities of service buyers can be the general public who receive 
the external positive benefits from the use and non-use values of the biodiversity 
resources in the sanctuary where the elephant is the umbrella species, for example, 
people may be willing to pay for a visit the sanctuary in the future (option value) 
or to pay for maintain a good in existence (existence value) or to pay for the next 
or future generations to make use of these biodiversity services (bequest value).  
In the medium-term or long-term solution, eco-tourism can be another 
capacity source of contribution into the scheme after ecosystem restoration. By 
installation of the wildlife viewing tower outside the KARN sanctuary (e.g. at the 
community forest near the boundary of KARN sanctuary located in Tha Ten 
village), tourists can watch wildlife from the tower when wildlife come to eat food 
or water at the water ponds or mineral licks. The reason to install the tower 
outside the KARN sanctuary is to make sure that local villagers would be the ones 
who organize the wildlife viewing. Furthermore, without special permission, 
villagers are not allowed to enter the sanctuary to do any activity. The wildlife 
viewing will generate supplementary income for local villagers. When villagers 
obtain the benefits from wildlife, particularly elephants, this kind of benefits for 
villagers might change their attitudes toward elephants that an elephant is a 
resource for them, not as a pest. Apart from benefits of wildlife viewing revenues, 
changing attitudes towards elephants of affected villagers would be another 
external benefit that may lead to HEC reduction in the future.  
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Table 7.6: Potential service buyers and their expected benefits 
Potential service buyers Benefits they will obtain 
1. The water user (the EAST Water 
company) 
Direct benefits from ecosystem 
restoration that leads to increase water 
runoffs and the company would get their 
reputation for biodiversity conservation 
2. Private companies who want to buy the 
biodiversity offsets (e.g. BioBanking or 
Market-based habitat credit trading 
system as in the USA or Australia) 
Direct benefits from biodiversity offsets  
3. The general public Use and non-use values of the 
biodiversity resources(e.g. option, 
existence and bequest values) 
4. Tourists (medium-term or long-term 
solution) 
Wildlife viewing (a recreational value) 
Source: the author 
7.3.8 Are intermediates needed? 
The scheme is efficient if the net benefit of the scheme is positive or 
environmental services conserved in the long term are greater than the usage costs 
of resources. Generally speaking, a transaction cost is one of significant costs of 
the PES scheme: the more stakeholders there will be, the higher the costs of 
negotiating and implementing an agreement. It would be more efficient to 
negotiate with one intermediary than with many stakeholders. The intermediary 
can be an institution to help reduce transaction costs of the PES scheme and 
connect between service buyers and service providers (The Forest Trend et al., 
2008). The objective of intermediary is to bridge the gap between the service 
buyers who benefit from the ecosystem services and service providers who 
176 
 
 
provides the ecosystem services to achieve the optimum level by reducing 
transaction costs with less number of stakeholders involved (Pirard et al., 2010b). 
The Biodiversity-Based Economy Development Office (BEDO) was 
proposed as the main intermediary for the PES scheme. The BEDO is the public 
organization founded by Royal Decree on (B.E. 2550) on July 17, 2007, and 
received funds allocated by the government to start this operation. The budget of 
the organization has been provided by the government and some part of it has 
been subsidized from donation by private sectors. The roles of BEDO16 can be 
described as follows: 
1. To promote, support and implement measures for the development of 
biodiversity-based economy; 
2. To promote and support the conservation of biodiversity resources and 
the traditional knowledge of communities and local communities; 
3. To collate information, conduct studies, analyze data and assess needs 
for the development of biodiversity-based economy in order to make 
policy recommendations and propose measures to the Cabinet; 
4. To compile information and develop an inventory of plants, animals 
and micro-organisms which originate from, or which can be found in 
the country as well as local and community knowledge; such database 
will be used for monitoring the utilization of biodiversity resources and 
the traditional knowledge of communities and local communities for 
economic uses; 
5. To promote and support research which makes use of the existing 
knowledge on utilization of biodiversity resources and the traditional 
knowledge of communities and local communities for commercial 
purposes; 
6. To promote and support investments on the development of 
biodiversity-based economy; 
                                               
16
http://www.bedo.or.th/bd05_History.aspx (20 June 2012). 
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7. To promote and support dissemination of knowledge, provide access to 
utilize biodiversity resources and the traditional knowledge of 
communities and local communities; 
8. To promote, support and take initiatives on registration for biodiversity 
resources and the traditional knowledge of communities and local 
communities in order to protect such resources under relevant pieces of 
legislation; protect and address problems concerning violation of those 
rights; 
9. To operate as the Center for monitoring and coordinating with 
government offices and private agencies both in and outside the 
country to ensure that there are linkages and consistency with the 
prevailing Cabinet policies; 
10. To undertake any other tasks as required by the Cabinet and 
Committees appointed by the Cabinet that concern the development of 
biodiversity-based economy. 
There are three reasons to support the idea that BEDO would be an 
appropriate intermediary in the beginning stage of the PES scheme. The first 
reason is the credibility of the intermediary of the scheme. From the service 
buyer’s point of view, BEDO would have more credibility compared to an 
organization managed solely by villagers. The second reason is the networking of 
ability of BEDO. According to its roles, the BEDO has been working with the 
conservation organizations for both government agencies and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs). Regarding its network, it would be easier for BEDO to 
work with related government agencies, NGOs and local government units 
compared to other government conservation agencies which focus on command 
and control measures. The third reason is the administrative cost. In the beginning 
stage of the scheme, administrative costs can be reduced because some staff of 
BEDO can work on it. When the scheme is settled down, the new independent 
organization might be a better option to implement the scheme in the long term. 
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The establishment of the KARN Ecosystem Restoration Fund was 
operated by BEDO in the beginning, as a channel of payment from service buyers. 
Regarding the possibility of corruption, there are some independent organizations 
who work on auditing and controlling public finance of government agencies and 
public organizations including BEDO (e.g.  Office of the Auditor General of 
Thailand (OAG) and Office of the National Anti-Corruption Commission 
(ONACC)), and this should lower these concerns. 
In this case, the three main roles of intermediaries are identified (Table 
7.7). First, a negotiation and contact process is needed between service providers 
and service buyers. The BEDO and local government units can act as an 
intermediary to negotiate and make an agreement. The contracts would be two 
types of contract (Figure 7.10). Both types of the contracts do not require a 
specific law beyond existing contract law.The first one is the contract between the 
service providers and BEDO where BEDO and villagers act as the service buyer 
and service providers for habitat restoration activities in KARN, respectively. 
However, this type of the contract may be the group contract between BEDO and 
villagers in the same village; therefore, it may reduce the transaction costs and 
complicated process. Even though the existing laws (the National Park Act, B.E. 
2504 (1961) and the Wildlife Sanctuaries, Wildlife Preservation and Protection 
Act, B.E. 2535 (1992)) limit villagers’ access to the sanctuary, this can be 
managed by asking for approval from the Council of Ministers, in order that the 
Department of National Parks, Wildlife and Plant Conservation can collaborate 
with villagers to run the KARN-PES scheme together. Therefore, the existing 
laws are sufficient to facilitate the PES scheme without a new law being required. 
Another type of the contract is an agreement between the service buyers 
and BEDO where BEDO and private companies act as the service provider and 
service buyers, respectively. What are being purchased are the habitat 
improvement activities (e.g. water ponds, mineral licks, grasslands) which will be 
converted to be a habitat credit. The reason that the arrangement needs two types 
of contract is to reduce the transaction costs and make it less complicated in 
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practice. Second, BEDO acts as the clearing house or an intermediary between 
service providers and service buyers. The role of the clearing house is to provide 
clearing and settlement services for financial and commodities transactions. 
However, the clearing house may be changed to run by a new independent 
organization in the future when everything is settled down and BEDO may turn 
their role to monitor instead. In this pilot project, the contract period of the first 
type of the contract between BEDO and villagers can be 20-year period as 
corresponded to the cost estimation of habitat improvement activities in the cost-
benefit analysis. 
Third, the performance of service providers who are the villagers for this 
case needs to be monitored every year by the KARN Wildlife Sanctuary and the 
Chachoengsao Wildlife Research Station. If service providers fail to meet their 
commitments under the scheme, penalties can be applied, or even contract can be 
withdrawn by BEDO. For example, the contract can be an agreement on what 
activities villagers will provide, how to monitor, what penalty if the villagers 
failed to meet the commitments, when payment will provide, how much price of 
each activity and contract period, and so on. Regarding the second type of the 
contract between BEDO and private companies, the contract can be on how to 
assess habitat credit for both habitat improvement activities in the KARN 
sanctuary and development sites, how many habitat credits being bought, what 
payment system is, how much price of each habitat credit and contract period, and 
so on. 
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Table 7.7: Roles of the intermediaries 
Roles Intermediaries 
1. Negotiation and contract BEDO, local government unit (LGU) 
2. Clearing house BEDO 
3. Monitoring of compliance 
the KARN Wildlife Sanctuary and the 
Chachoengsao Wildlife Research Station 
Note: BEDO = the Biodiversity-Based Economy Development Office 
Source: the author 
 
Figure 7.10: Types of the contract 
 
Source: the author 
  
Contract
BEDO and 
villagers
- Service buyer: BEDO
- Service providers:
villagers
BEDO and 
private 
companies
- Service provider: BEDO
- Service buyers: private
companies
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7.3.9 How can the PES scheme be monitored and evaluated? 
It should be clear who performs monitoring and evaluating activities 
thorough the whole period of a PES agreement (Forest Trends et al., 2008). The 
monitoring and evaluating activities are assessed by the performance indicators as 
mentioned earlier. The monitoring and evaluating activities can be conducted 
through two methods (Smith et al., 2006): 
 Field inspections: the monitoring cameras will be installed near the 
targeted new water ponds and mineral licks to make sure elephants and 
other wildlife come to utilize them. Monitoring wildlife activities has 
been done before in this sanctuary by the staff of the Chachoengsao 
Wildlife Research Station; therefore, these monitoring tasks can be 
cooperation works between staff of the Chachoengsao Wildlife 
Research Station and the KARN Wildlife Sanctuary.  Figure 7.11 
shows the example of a monitoring camera at the water ponds in 
Salakpra Wildlife Sanctuary. By installing cameras at the locations of 
the water ponds and the mineral licks and the use of GPS systems, it 
can collect data on the number, timing and type of wildlife that benefit 
from the water and mineral licks provided. The camera can record 
pictures of animals that come to utilize water ponds or mineral licks; 
therefore, we can have data on how many animals get benefit from 
them. Figure 7.12 illustrates the frequency of animals came to utilize an 
artificial mineral licks in KARN sanctuary. These kind of data provides 
information whether locations of water ponds and mineral lick is 
workable or not. Also, such data can be used as short-run indicators of 
additionalities compared to the baseline. 
 Desk reviews: the reviews of the report on HEC impacts recorded by 
villagers are required to make sure the scheme pay for additionalities 
but not for activities that would have happened anyway. The reviewers 
can be intermediaries as mentioned earlier, staff of the Chachoengsao 
Wildlife Research Station and KARN wildlife sanctuary. Villagers will 
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be trained by the HEC experts such as staff from the Elephant 
Conservation Network (ECN) or the Wildlife Conservation Society 
(WCS) in Thailand on how to record the HEC data, for example, 
location of each incident, the area of crop damaged, the quality and age 
of the crops, and the severity of the damages; therefore, they will be 
able to undertake these routine but very important tasks. The form of 
HEC impact assessment should be provided as a standardized format. It 
is important to collect the same kind of data each time; therefore, it can 
be compared how changes of the HEC impacts are in different areas. 
The example of crop-damage report form from the IUCN Species 
Survival Commission’s African Elephant Specialist Group (AfESG) 
(Parker, et al., 2007) is shown in Figure 7.13. The collected data will be 
compared to the baselines of these data that obtained from household 
survey in 2011 to measure additionalities.  
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Figure 7.11: A monitoring camera in Salakpra Wildlife Sanctuary 
 
 
Source: the author 
 
Figure 7.12: Frequency of animals that come to utilize an artificial mineral lick 
 
Note:     = elephants,     = deer,    = baking deer,    = gaurs,    = bantengs,    = wild boars 
Source: Chachoengsao Wildlife Research Station  
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Figure 7.13: Standard AfESG Crop Damage Report Form 
WILDLIFE DAMAGE REPORT FORM FORM No.   /   
DISTRICT   WARD   VILLAGE    
Date of Damage     Date of Report      
Exact Location Reference (MAP)    or (GPS)     
Complainant(s)          
Enumerator Name           
CROP DAMAGE ASSESSMENT: USE PACES – MEASURE LENGTH X WIDTH 
 
 APPROXIMATE LENGTH X WIDTH (PACES) 
CROP 
TYPE 
Quality* 
G/M/P 
Stage** 
S/I/M 
Area 
Grown 
Damage 
Area 1 
Damage 
Area 2 
Damage 
Area 3 
Damage 
Area 4 
        
        
        
        
        
* Good /Medium /Poor ** Seedling / Intermediate / Mature 
 
OTHER TYPES OF DAMAGE (tick and give brief detail) 
Food store           
Water supply           
Direct threat to human life         
Human injury/ death           
Livestock injured / killed         
Other (specify)          
 
PROBLEM ANIMAL SPECIES (1)   (2)   (3)    
Number Tracks seen or Animals seen (tick one) 
Estimated Group Size Total        
Males (if known)        
Females & young (if known)        
 
YOUR COMMENTS 
         (continue on back) 
 
WAS THIS REPORT FORWARDED FOR ACTION? YES / NO 
To Whom? 
           
Where?   When?    How ?     
Source: Parker, et al., 2007  
185 
 
 
7.3.10 Does each Party agree with the proposed HEC measures and PES scheme?  
The key informant (KI) interviews, focus group discussion (FGD) and 
workshops were arranged in order to get information for both proposed HEC 
measures and pilot PES scheme (Table 7.8). The results from KI, FGD and 
workshops can be useful information to categorize the key parties on the pilot 
PES scheme to alleviate HEC problem into three main groups according to the 
role of the PES scheme (Table 7.9): 1) affected villagers as service providers; 2) 
private sectors, general public and tourists as service buyers; 3) BEDO, LGUs and 
conservation organizations for both government agencies and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) as intermediaries. Each party has their own interests. 
Affected villagers pay attention to any measure can reduce their impacts from 
HEC, whereas the private sector, which is the East Water company in this case, is 
interested in their benefits on stream flow. The general public might interest in 
wildlife conservation or recreation values of the sanctuary. Conservation 
organizations for both government agencies and NGOs and LGUs focus on the 
HEC reduction and wildlife conservation.  
However, all parties agreed that no measure could eliminate HEC, but 
rather that it was only possible to reduce the conflict and damage. The wildlife 
experts from the three areas (KARN sanctuary, Kui Buri National Park in 
Prachuap Khiri Khan Province and the Elephant Conservation Network (ECN) in 
Kanchanaburi province) suggested that the habitat improvement activities are the 
first priority. In addition, the wildlife experts and villagers also agreed that an 
elephant barrier such as an electric fence was the preferable option for HEC 
reduction. The proposed measure that the wildlife expert concerned was the 
contraception of elephants. It seems that this idea is unacceptable to the Thai 
people. It would require the dissemination of information on the HEC situation to 
help the Thai people to understand the problem.  
Furthermore, more than 90% of 200 villagers interviewed in the household 
survey said that they would be willing to volunteer their labor to work for habitat 
improvement activities in the sanctuary even if there was no payment as 
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mentioned in Chapter 4. Besides, during the focus-group discussion with affected 
villagers in Tha Ten village which is one of the study areas, villagers agreed that 
the electric fences would be effective but they suggested that they should be built 
in the sanctuary because they do not want to lose any of their farmland. This 
evidence proves the acceptance by the affected villagers of the proposed 
mitigation measures. 
Regarding the legal constraint that does not allow the local villagers to 
access the sanctuary, the legal expert and staff of the Department of National 
Parks, Wildlife and Plants (DNP) suggested during the workshop that exemption 
could be allowed either at the Departmental or Ministerial level as mentioned in 
Chapter 6. In addition, the legal expert suggested that the new laws might not be 
required and that the existing laws would be sufficient, but it might need some 
special permission within this framework. Also, the expert said that the contract 
between the service buyers and providers did not require a specific law beyond 
existing contract law. In the context of Thailand, it would be more appropriate to 
try to perform a pilot PES scheme under the existing laws since the PES scheme 
would not be carried out in Thailand if the people have to wait for the new law 
since implementation always takes a long time.  
During the workshops, conservation organizations for both government 
agencies and NGOs paid attention to the PES concept and thought that it could be 
a new source of funding for conservation. However, the most challenging part of 
launching the PES project is the identification of the buyers. Regarding the KI 
with the private sector, the East Water company, who rely on water supply from 
the River originating from the KARN sanctuary, showed considerable interest in 
being a service buyer. Furthermore, the staff of the KARN sanctuary suggested 
that there was a demand for wildlife viewing in the sanctuary, therefore, tourists 
could be another service buyer. Currently, a video that is 8 minutes long that tells 
the story of the KARN-PES scheme has been posted in You-Tube to raise 
awareness of the public who want to be a part of this pilot scheme. Additionally, 
the LGUs in the study areas also agreed with this concept because HEC is also 
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their problem. This evidence reveals that all parties do agree with the PES concept 
and HEC measures, except only in the case of the contraception requirement, 
which needs to be understood by the people in the HEC situation.  
Table 7.8: Key Informant Interviews and Workshops for the Pilot KARN-PES 
 scheme 
Date Location  Objectives of 
interviews/workshops 
Participants 
August 11, 
2010 
KARN 
sanctuary 
An interview with the 
wildlife expert on the 
appropriate measures for 
HEC reduction in KARN 
sanctuary 
The wildlife expert, 
representatives of BEDO 
and a research team 
September 
2, 2010 
Kui Buri 
National 
Park 
An interview with the 
wildlife expert on their 
experience on HEC in Kui 
Buri National Park  
The wildlife expert, 
representatives of BEDO 
and a research team 
February 
21, 2011 
Petroleum 
Authority of 
Thailand 
(PTT) 
An interview with the PTT 
for their interest on a service 
buyer 
The PTT representatives 
and a research team 
March 3, 
2011 
EAST 
WATER 
company 
An interview with EAST 
WATER company  for their 
interest on a service buyer 
The EAST WATER 
representatives and a 
research team 
February 
25, 2011 
BEDO A workshop to discuss the 
potential service buyers from 
a private sector 
The wildlife experts, 
representatives of BEDO, 
related government 
agencies, ECN, private 
sectors   and a research 
team 
March 24-
25, 2011 
ECN An interview with the 
wildlife expert on their 
experience on HEC in 
Salakpra wildlife sanctuary  
The wildlife expert, 
representatives of BEDO 
and a research team 
July 28, 
2011 
Chachoensao 
province 
A workshop to disseminate 
the idea of PES on HEC 
reduction for public and 
related government staff and 
to get information on their 
opinions 
The wildlife experts, 
representatives of BEDO, 
related government 
agencies, villagers, local 
NGOs, private sectors, 
LGUs and a research team 
Note: 1. BEDO = Biodiversity-based Economy Development Office 
 2. ECN = Elephant Conservation Network 
 3. LGUs = Local Government Units 
 4. IUCN =  International Union for Conservation of Nature 
 5. NGOs = Non-governmental Organizations 
Source: the author 
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Table 7.9: the key parties and their interests in the pilot KARN-PES scheme 
Roles in the 
PES scheme 
The key parties Their interests 
Service 
providers 
Affected villagers HEC reduction on crops and 
property damages 
Service buyers 1)  Private sector (EAST 
WATER company) 
1) Positive effects on stream flow 
2) General public 2) Non-use value on wildlife 
conservation 
3) Tourists 3) Recreation values 
Intermediaries 1) BEDO and LGUs 
(negotiation and contracting) 
2) Conservation organizations 
for both government 
agencies and NGOs 
(monitoring of compliance) 
- HEC reduction 
- Wildlife conservation 
Note:  1. BEDO = Biodiversity-based Economy Development Office 
 2. LGUs = Local Government Units 
 3. NGOs = Non-governmental Organizations 
Source: the author 
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7.4 Potential Limitations of PES implementation 
In this section, the key limitations to PES implementation are discussed, 
which are difficulties for limited demand for environmental services, legal issues, 
transaction costs, leakage and permanence. The details of each issue can be 
described as follow 
7.4.1 Limited Demand of Environmental Services 
The biggest challenge for the PES concept to work for the KARN case 
study may be how to create effective demand for ecosystem services. This will be 
easier where there are direct users of environmental services and also if those 
direct users recognize the link between the actions undertaken by the service 
providers and incremental tangible benefits as the case of Upstream-Service 
Providers and Downstream-Service Buyers of watershed protection. In reality, in 
most cases, such direct links may be technically difficult to establish. Without 
such clarity, it will be challenging to convince buyers of the expected benefits and 
hence their reasons for paying. Additionally, many private sectors are unwilling to 
pay for environmental services because they believe that the public sector should 
do it (Farley and Costanza, 2010). For example, during the visit with one of the 
petroleum companies in Thailand to seek for potential buyers of the PES scheme, 
it was found that they were not interested to contribute their CSR (Corporate 
Social Responsibility) budget to the PES-KARN scheme. They may have no 
connection to the region and therefore do not want to pay for the habitat 
restoration and reduction of HEC. However, the single water user, the East Water 
Company, that relies on water supply from the Bangpakong River and Prasae 
River in the KARN sanctuary, showed an interest in being a service buyer. This 
evidence showed it would be more difficult to convince a private company to 
contribute such scheme if they do not realize any tangible benefits they would 
receive.   
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7.4.2 Legal issues for PES implementation 
The private PES scheme as proposed here (between an intermediary and 
private companies and an intermediary and local villagers) does not require a 
specific law beyond basic contract law (Greiber, 2009). Furthermore, after 
reviewing the related Thai laws as described in Chapter 6, there are some legal 
frameworks to support the PES implementation, whereas some current laws 
related to natural resources conservation also restrict the PES scheme to 
implement, especially for KARN-PES scheme. 
Though Thailand has no the specific PES law as Vietnam and Costa Rica, 
there are some laws and Master plans that support the PES implementation that 
make the PES approach a potential mechanism for conservation, which are the 
Constitutions of the Kingdom of Thailand, B.E. 2550 (2007), the Eleventh 
National Economic and Social Development Plan (2012-2016), the National 
Environmental Quality Act, B.E. 2535 (1992) or the ECNEQ Act of 1992 and the 
Draft Environmental Management Plan (2012 – 2016). All these laws and Master 
plan support the PES implementation as a mechanism for natural resources 
management. On the other hand, some laws (the National Park Act, B.E. 2504 
(1961) and the Wildlife Sanctuaries, Wildlife Preservation and Protection Act, 
B.E. 2535 (1992)) are strict about the access of villagers in the sanctuary but it 
can be dealt by asking for approval from the Council of Ministers, in order that 
the Department of National Park, Wildlife and Plant Conservation can cooperate 
with villagers to perform the KARN-PES scheme together. The approval will be 
granted based on the scheme period; therefore, the approval is not necessary to 
ask for approval every year. In addition, the Thai conservation laws focus on the 
command and control approach and no effort to create incentives for compliance 
as the case of BioBanking scheme in Australia. However, in this pilot scheme, the 
Thai developers can voluntarily participate in the habitat credit system to offset 
their negative impacts on the environment where they can do “good” and earn 
CSR publicity. 
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7.4.3 Transaction Costs 
Apart from the actual payment for investments of mitigation measures, 
there is another cost to set up the scheme called transaction costs. The transaction 
costs are frequently high when many parties involve (Smith et al., 2006; Wunder, 
2008; Jindal and Kerr, 2007b). For example of transaction costs in the case of the 
ScolelTe in Mexico, a community carbon sequestration project, was greater than 
USD1.3 million and accounted for 33% of the total budget (Jindal and Kerr, 
2007b). Therefore, the PES scheme that contracts with a few stakeholders would 
have lower transaction costs than those that deal with a large number of service 
providers. In this situation, to create the intermediaries as mention earlier can help 
to facilitate transaction and reduce transaction costs (Smith et al., 2006; Pirard et 
al., 2010b; Forest Trend et al., 2008). Transaction costs can be classified into two 
types: 1) ex ante or initial costs of reaching an agreement, and 2) ex post or costs 
of implementing after an agreement is in place (Jindal and Kerr, 2007b). The 
examples of transaction costs are persuading service buyers and service providers 
to involve the scheme, negotiations, contracting and monitoring.  
The monitoring cost is also a significant element. The design of the 
KARN-PES scheme tries to reduce the transaction cost by proposing the village-
based volunteers from affected villages to be trained to take field measurements of 
HEC incidents. Also, the wildlife monitor at water ponds/mineral licks will be 
cooperate with staff of the Chachoengsao Wildlife Research Station and the 
KARN Wildlife Sanctuary that would be lower cost than rely on the external 
expert. Economies of scale can lower the transaction cost; therefore, working in 
the groups of service providers rather than individuals for negotiation and contract 
processes would reduce the transaction cost. It might be a single contract with one 
representative of one village. In addition, the scheme also must ensure that the 
poor members gain equally from group-based contract (Jindal and Kerr, 2007b). 
However, this concern may not be a problem for KARN-PES case because the 
payment rate for each habitat improvement activity would be equally in term of 
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fixed payment for each habitat improvement activity (e.g. uniform payment of 
wage rate).  
7.4.4 Leakage 
One way to ensure that the PES scheme will be efficient is to prevent 
“leakage” where environmental damages reduced are displaced elsewhere (Smith 
et al., 2006; Forest Trends et al., 2008; Wunder et al., 2008). In the beginning of 
the pilot scheme, it may create the leakage of HEC impacts because the habitat 
improvement activities and electric fences will start in the area near the study 
areas (Figure 7.14). Elephants may go to raid crops somewhere else surrounding 
the KARN sanctuary; however, after the whole planned electric fence (220 km) is 
completed, there should be no leakage because food and water would be sufficient 
for 500-elephants as controlled by contraception. Electric fences would keep 
elephants in the sanctuary because this scheme plans to erect the fences all risky 
areas, which is approximately 220 km surrounding the KARN sanctuary. 
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Figure 7.14: Location of the electric fences in the beginning of the pilot PES 
scheme 
 
Source: the author  
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7.4.5 Permanence 
A PES scheme should try to establish a long-term basis or called 
“permanence” (Smith et al., 2006; Wunder et al., 2008). Permanence is a concern 
in PES implementation because most PES schemes are under a contract period. 
Service provision would be ended when the payments are terminated. Regarding 
user-financed programs, the scheme period depends on the satisfaction of users 
for environmental services that they are receiving, whereas the government-
financed programs, it depends on continued budget allocations (Wunder et al., 
2008). Moreover, permanence is not guaranteed. However, the KARN-PES 
scheme as a user-financed program was designed to prevent an unsecured scheme. 
In the KARN-PES scheme, the contribution of the EAST Water company as a part 
of their CSR budget would create the financial resources for the upfront costs for 
mitigation measure investment. Contributions from a voluntary habitat trading 
system and the general public would provide contributions for a medium-term 
period of the scheme. The idea of voluntary habitat trading system was proposed 
in the belief that the system would be carried on as long as there will be 
development activities to offset their negative impacts. However, to strengthen the 
habitat trading system, it would require improving related legal tools which 
already exist to create effective demand for conservation services in the same way 
that the BioBanking scheme has established for New South Wales. In addition, 
wildlife-viewing tourism could be launched after proposed habitat improvement 
activities are completed. This source of contribution would be a potential source 
of fund to implement the KARN-PES scheme on a long-term basis.  
7.5 Conclusion 
This chapter described the design of the KARN-PES scheme in four main 
areas. First, the background of the HEC problem was provided briefly again. 
Second, comparison between the PES scheme and other approaches was 
discussed. Third, the design of the KARN-PES scheme on its core components, 
which are environmental services, service providers, service sellers, baselines, 
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additionalities, intermediates, monitoring and compliance was described. Lastly, 
the potential limitations of PES implementation and their solutions were presented 
(limited demand for environmental services, legal constraints, transaction costs, 
leakages and permanence).  
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CHAPTER 8 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter is comprised of two main sections. First, discussion of two 
issues is presented; 1) the critiques of the conventional definition of PES by 
Wunder (2005); and 2) the logic of the KARN-PES scheme. Second, the 
conclusion and some lessons learned from this KARN-PES study are described. 
Last, recommendations for further research are also presented. 
8.1 Discussion 
8.1.1 The Critiques of the Conventional Definition of PES 
When the environmental services are private goods or club goods (as in 
the case of watershed conservation), it is possible to identify the direct 
beneficiaries and service providers (Engel et al., 2010). However there are many 
PES schemes that are not unidimensional but have a range of environmental 
services they provide as in the case of the Vittel (Nestlé Waters) program in north-
eastern France. This scheme are not linked to water quality but based on new farm 
investment and the cost of adoption of new farming practices (Perrot-Maître, 
2006). Therefore, from the example of the Vittel case, it may be argued that the 
conventional definition of the PES by Wunder (2005) that agents who benefit 
from a service should pay as the value of that service may be too strictly defined. 
If the scheme lacks conditionality, it would be fail to deliver the environmental 
service provision. Consequently, the resources allocated in the scheme also would 
have useless. However, the strict conditionality often requires high costs of 
enforcement and monitoring. Conditionality is a required condition for the PES 
scheme but it might not need to be a strict conditionality (Tocconi, 2012). 
Furthermore, there are very few PES schemes accomplished the conventional 
definition of PES by Wunder (2005) (Pirard and Billé, 2010; Farley and Costanza, 
2010; Muradian et al., 2010). Moreover, Farley and Costanza (2010) even argued 
that the five criteria of PES definition by Wunder may be not only 
unaccomplished, but also is improper because generating sufficient financial 
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resources may need non-voluntary schemes such as compulsory services charges 
or taxes. They also suggested that payment levels would be considered by costs of 
supply for the case of immeasurably valuable resources, not by monetary estimate 
of benefits. In addition, Pirard et al. (2010) explained that the economic valuation 
may not be appropriate to value the ecosystem because it is difficult to create the 
scenario where the service buyer and provider make an agreement on estimated 
value because the ecosystem is regularly highly uncertain. The current ecological 
understanding is still inadequate to classify environmental services in most PES 
scheme (Muradian et al., 2010). Hence, Pirard et al. (2010) proposed that the 
payment level would be as opportunity costs of service providers for not 
exploiting a resource, or to exploit it less, or reserve/restore an environmental 
service.  
8.1.2 Logic of the KARN-PES scheme 
The logic of PES scheme to revive ecosystem and initiate mitigation 
measures for Human-Elephant-Conflict (HEC) reduction in the KARN wildlife 
sanctuary can be described in Figure 8.1. At the current situation (business as 
usual), only 36.61 percent of the sanctuary is appropriate as elephant habitat 
resulted in the shortage of the food and water for elephant, this reason explains 
why elephants often come out of the sanctuary to raid the crops. The related 
government agencies have tried to apply some mitigation measures to alleviate the 
impacts of HEC including the habitat improvement activities, however, the level 
of these measures fall short of the scope and scale of measures to reduce the HEC. 
The scales of these measures have been limited by the availability of financial 
resources. As the current conservation level, there are three groups of people even 
now affected from HEC impacts and ecosystem degradation of the sanctuary. 
Firstly, the affected HEC households are confronted with direct HEC costs (crop 
losses, protection costs for mitigation measures and opportunity costs of time to 
guard crops at night). Secondly, the water users (e.g. the EAST Water company) 
also face up to the watershed degradation that would reduce water supply in the 
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future. Lastly, the losses of human and elephant lives would cost the welfare of 
Thai society.  
To perform the conservation at the necessary scale would benefit affected 
households, water users and general public in terms of HEC reduction, water 
security and human and elephant saved respectively. A payment from 
beneficiaries (e.g. water users and general public) who receive advantage from 
mitigation measures can increase the scale of conservation measures. Even though 
the affected households are beneficiaries of the scheme who should act as service 
buyers, they are poor and would not afford to pay for these environment services. 
Therefore, the KARN-PES scheme is proposed as the asset-building scheme 
defined by Wunder (2005), which identifies affected villagers payment to work in 
for habitat improvement activities in the sanctuary as service providers. 
Furthermore, when households obtain the benefits from elephants in form of 
payment for habitat improvement activities, they might change their attitudes 
towards elephants as the resources for them and not as a pest. This may lead to 
HEC reduction in the future.  
The KARN-PES scheme is also considered as “Potential Pareto 
Improvement (PPI)”. Figure 8.2 shows utility levels of the two groups of people 
in the society: 1) the service buyers which are the water users and general public 
and 2) the service provider which is affected HEC households. Because resources 
are limited, and then only the resources inside of the DOU area are available. At 
E, C and P represent the allocations of the scenario of current situation (business 
as usual), the scenario of ecosystem restoration without PES and the scenario of 
PES scheme respectively. Moving from point E (business as usual) to C 
(ecosystem restoration), the water users and general public saves their external 
costs of environment degradation in terms of water security (for water users) and 
human and elephants saved (for general public) equal to “B” level, whereas the 
affected HEC households are confronted with their opportunity costs of time (or 
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income forgone by not working in their crop field) to perform the habitat 
improvement activities for ecosystem restoration equal to “A” level.
17
 
The PES scenario is the second-best option where the water users and 
general public, who act as the beneficiaries or service buyers, can compensate a 
part of their welfare gain as: 1) a payment (equal to “A” level) to affected 
households for their labor contribution as the service provider who losses in 
welfare from income forgone by not working in their crop field and 2) investment 
costs for habitat improvement activities and mitigation measures through PES 
mechanism. However, the payments for both investment costs and compensation 
for households should not higher than “B” level which is the benefits from 
ecosystem restoration. As a result, a movement from point E to P represents a 
Potential Pareto Improvement (PPI) or increase in economic welfare for all actors.  
  
                                               
17 The conditionality of the payment from service providers relates to working the specified 
contractual activities that would be expected to contribute to environmental service provision 
as the case of the South African Working for Water program (Turpie et al., 2008). 
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Figure 8.1: The Logic of PES for Human-Elephant-Conflict Mitigation and 
Habitat Improvement Activities 
 
Note: HEC = Human Elephant Conflict  
Source: Adapted from Georgieva et al. (2003) 
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Figure 8.2: Potential Pareto Improvement of a PES scheme for Human-
Elephant-Conflict Mitigation and Habitat Improvement 
Activities 
 
Note:  
 A = opportunity costs of time of affected HEC households to perform  
   habitat improvement activities or income forgone by not working  
   in their crop field 
 B = the external benefits of water users and general public from HEC  
   mitigation measures and ecosystem restoration 
Source: Adapted from FAME (2011).  
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8.1.3 Analysis of the efficiency of the KARN-PES scheme 
To achieve efficiency the scheme needs to make the privately unprofitable 
returns but socially-desirable activities into profitable returns for the service 
providers (Engel et al., 2008). In addition, the efficiency of the PES scheme is not 
considered only by the incremental environmental services provided, but also by 
the cost of the scheme including (1) the opportunity cost of the benefits forgone 
from alternative land-use; (b) the implementing and maintaining costs of the 
scheme and (3) the transaction costs of the scheme (Wunder et al., 2008). In Cost-
Benefit Analysis (CBA) on HEC mitigation measures that is used to propose 
mitigation measures on the KARN-PES scheme, the analysis excluded the 
transaction costs because of the limitation of available data. However, the PES 
mechanism is designed to reduce the transaction costs which were explained in 
Section 7.4.3 above. For example, a uniform rate of the payment for working in 
each habitat improvement activity in the sanctuary would help to reduce the 
transaction costs and the Biodiversity-Based Economy Development Office 
(BEDO) and local government units can act as intermediaries to bridge the gaps 
between service buyers and providers for negotiation and making an agreement as 
a bundled contract to reduce number of the stakeholders which would also 
decrease transaction cost.  
Therefore, if we assume that the transaction costs are low, we can use the 
results of the CBA on HEC mitigation measures as the CBA of the KARN-PES 
scheme. In this case the scheme is efficient when the costs of proposed mitigation 
measures are lower than the benefits of such measures. The results of CBA in 
Chapter 5 show that the HEC mitigation measures on policy option 3 (habitat 
improvement activities, contraception of female elephants and electric fences), 
which is the proposed option in the KARN-PES scheme, generate the highest net 
benefits at different discount rates as shown again for convenience in Table 8.1. 
Thus this option produces positive externalities for society. Therefore, the KARN-
PES scheme would be the case A in Figure 2.3 (Chapter 2) as suggested by Engel 
et al. (2008) that the scheme tries to generate privately unprofitable but socially 
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positive externalities, become profitable to individual service providers. Hence, it 
would be an incentive for them to perform the mitigation measures.  
Table 8.1: Net present values of the net benefits of the proposed mitigation 
option (habitat improvement activities, contraception of female 
elephants and electric fences) 
Unit: million baht (million USD) 
Growth rates of crop-raiding 
by elephants 
Discount rate 
3% 5% 8% 
5% 64.0 
(2.1) 
43.6 
(1.5) 
22.5 
(0.7) 
10% 253 
(8.4) 
118.7 
(6.3) 
121.9 
(4.1) 
15% 607 
(20.2) 
455.6 
(15.2) 
300.4 
(10.0) 
Note: USD1 = 30 baht 
Source: the author 
In addition, the distributional issue is also another key concern for the 
feasibility of the PES scheme. Even though the PES scheme is advocated as an 
efficiency scheme, if the scheme has an unfair distribution of benefits and costs 
for stakeholders, there is less chance that it would be accepted and feasible to 
implement (Muradian et al., 2010). For example, the PES scheme in Cambodia 
demonstrated that villagers were not motivated enough to conserve the key 
wildlife, although the payment level was high (Clements et al., 2010). This is 
because only a few individuals get benefits; therefore, they felt as the scheme was 
unfair. The KARN-PES scheme also takes the fairness consideration in PES 
design, the uniform payment for the labor contribution of service providers to 
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work for habitat improvement activities was proposed to avoid social conflicts. In 
fact, the payment for working on habitat improvement activities is not only 
economic incentive for HEC affected villagers, but also the additional crop due to 
HEC mitigation are another motivation for villagers. Therefore, affected villagers 
act as the service providers and beneficiaries simultaneously. Furthermore, the 
KARN-PES scheme can be considered a rural development as a part of the 
scheme proposes eco-tourism (wildlife viewing), which may be a sustainable 
source in the long run. This may be seen as the win-win situation because with the 
revenues from tourism, affected villagers might change their attitude towards wild 
elephants to see that they are a resource, not a pest. This may lead to HEC 
reduction in the future.   
Furthermore, Wunder (2005) suggests that PES efficiency also depends on 
establishing the baselines of counterfactual environmental service and ensuring 
the scheme provides additionalities. He also suggested that to apply the wrong 
baseline might lower PES efficiency or waste all money if no additional 
environmental service is provided beyond what would occur without the PES. The 
baselines of the scheme on HEC mitigation measures were set carefully based on 
the status quo scenario of the CBA. The baseline choice would be the 
deteriorating baseline scenario as classified by Wunder (2005) because the 
impacts of HEC would be increasing over time as estimated in status quo scenario 
of the CBA in Chapter 5. Figure 8.3 demonstrates the baselines of the scheme on 
the indicators of HEC impacts under assumption of the growth rates of the crop-
raiding by elephants over 20-years period. 
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Figure 8.3: The baselines of the scheme on HEC impacts at different growth 
rates of crop-raiding cost, namely 5%, 10% and 15% 
 
Note:  1. Damage costs due to HEC are comprised of 1) crop loss, 2) protection 
 cost and 3) opportunity costs of time to guard crop at night 
2. Damage costs due to HEC are calculated under the assumption of the 
 growth rate of crop-raiding are 5%, 10% and 15%.  
Source: the author 
8.2 Conclusions 
Sustainable development is essential to human well-being and relies on 
sound policy intervention in ecosystem management in response to the dynamic 
interaction between humans and ecosystems. But we are faced with the 
degradation of ecosystems and falling ecosystem services due to rising 
consumption, demographic changes, and failure of our economic systems to 
incorporate ecosystem services into our choices (Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment, 2005). Governments have been unable to allocate large enough 
amounts of their budgets to protect ecosystems and because of externalities people 
acting alone cannot ensure enough conservation. Payment for environmental 
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services (PES) is an incentive-based mechanism for conservation that has promise 
in helping to sustain our ecosystem and human wellbeing. PES is as a type of 
Pigouvian subsidy to internalize positive externalities through creation of a 
parallel environmental-service market with non-market policies such as 
command-and-control measures. The idea of PES is based on the Beneficiary-
Pay-Principle (BPP), the reverse of Polluter-Pay-Principle (PPP), that subsidies 
are financed directly and voluntarily by beneficiaries of environmental services. 
The logic of the PES approach is that those who provide environmental services 
should be compensated or rewarded for their services and that those who obtain 
the services should pay for their benefits. 
Figure 8.4 outlines the PES mechanism for HEC mitigation in the KARN 
Wildlife Sanctuary. The ultimate environmental services from the activities
18
 in 
scheme are 1) ecosystem restoration; 2) reduction of HEC impacts and 3) water 
supply available. The potential service buyers can be 1) the main water user of 
watershed in KARN sanctuary which is the EAST Water company; 2) the private 
companies who would like to do “good” for conservation and earn CSR publicity 
on conservation by offsetting their development with voluntary habitat credits; 3) 
the general public who obtain the external positive benefits from both use and 
non-use values of ecosystem restoration and wildlife conservation, especially 
elephants; and 4) tourists who would like to enjoy wildlife viewing, which 
administered by villagers. Furthermore, the selected six villagers who affected 
from HEC were identified as service providers to work on habitat improvement 
activities in sanctuary. This might change the attitudes of affected villagers 
towards elephants as a resource, not a pest, and it is a job creation for local 
villagers. The Biodiversity-Based Economy Development Office (BEDO) and 
local government units can act as an intermediary to negotiate and make a 
contract between service buyers and providers. The indicators for baselines and 
                                               
18 The proposed activities in the scheme are 1) increasing water supply; 2) converting 
alien species; 3) creating mineral licks; 4) planting food for elephants; 5) 
contraception of female elephants and 6) fencing part of the sanctuary. 
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additionalities can be compared between with and without a PES scheme. The 
indicators for the medium-term or long-term periods are the data indicating the 
reduction of HEC impacts, which are 1) HEC incidents; 2) HEC damage costs and 
3) HEC protection costs by households. However, the indicators on habitat 
improvement for the short-term period can be number of wildlife that comes to 
utilize the new grassland, water supply and mineral licks. Regarding monitoring 
of compliance, the staff of the KARN wildlife sanctuary and the Chachoengsao 
wildlife research station can monitor the number of wildlife that comes to utilize 
the new grassland/water supply/mineral licks compared to the baselines data 
without PES scheme. In addition, the local villagers who are affected from HEC 
will be trained to record the HEC data by staff from the Elephant Conservation 
Network (ECN) or the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) in Thailand.  
The potential limitations on PES implementation can be summarized as 
five issues; 1) limited demand for environmental services, a major challenge to 
establishing the PES scheme; 2) legal constraints: for example, villagers are not 
allowed to access in the sanctuary, however, it would be the special permission in 
the case of educational purposes or scientific research by coordination with the 
Wildlife Sanctuary staff; 3) transaction costs: the bundled contracts or group-
based contracts between service providers and buyers were proposed and it was 
expected it would be lower transaction costs; 4) leakage: the scheme will be 
implemented for the whole area of the KARN wildlife sanctuary and it expected 
there would be no leakage of HEC to somewhere else; and 5) permanence: the 
habitat trading system was expected to be the long-term basis for financial 
resources as in the belief that the system would be carried on as long as there will 
be development activities to offset their negative impacts.  
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It should be noted that this study does not suggest that the PES scheme 
proposed replace other conservation measures (e.g. command-and-control or 
education approaches). This mechanism is rather proposed as a parallel 
environmental market with other conservation policies. However, this study can 
draw some lesson learned of the pilot PES study as follows: 
1) Even though Thailand has several natural resources and wildlife 
protection laws (e.g. the National Park Act of 1961 and the Wild Animal 
Reservation and Protection Act of 1960), these only focus on command and 
control measures. Moreover, there is an effort to push the economic instrument 
approach on pollution controls into the Thai law. If this Act was passed, it would 
be the first Environmental Tax Act in Thailand. In 2007, the Fiscal Policy Office 
at the Ministry of Finance prepared a draft of the Financial Measures for 
Environment Act
19
 which allows the environmental protection agencies to use the 
proper economic instruments for environmental management (Kaosa‐ard et al., 
2008). In October 2010, Abhisit Vejjajiva’s government accepted the principle of 
the draft but required to made amendment of the Act in details (THUPP, 2010) 
However, this effort to implement the Financial Measures for Environment Act 
did not succeed because the Cabinet of Yingluck Shinawatra’s government 
rejected it in August 2011. Though legislating a new specific law for the proposed 
PES scheme in this study is unnecessary, it would be more effective if Thailand 
would have a law using the economic instruments as tools to preserve natural 
resources and environment as the case of BioBanking system in Australia because 
it was proved that only command-and-control measures could not be an effective 
measure for sustainable managements for both pollution control and natural 
resource conservation; 
2) It would be more attractive for general public or private sectors if the 
government can provide incentives for their contribution on the scheme. One of 
the fundraising methods is to sell services widely to people at the price they can 
afford (e.g. 2,500 baht or USD83 for one mineral lick) and not limit only to a few 
                                               
19 http://www.tuhpp.net/files/E6.pdf, 18 February 2012. 
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buyers or people in that province, but try to expand the selling widely through the 
country. The idea is no matter where the buyers are, they can be a part of natural 
resources and biological diversity preservation as wildlife, especially elephants, 
and biodiversity are the resources for the country and even for the world. It would 
increase the incentive to participate if some measures could be added; such as a 
tax deduction for the value of bought service. This kind of measure helps people 
who do not have time or resources but are interested in natural resources and 
biological diversity preservation to collaborate with the government and support 
the program. At this moment, a video that is 8 minutes long that talks about the 
KARN-PES scheme has been produced and has been posted on You-Tube to 
deliver information of this study to the general public. It is hoped that this video 
can increase awareness and willingness of public who want to be a part of this 
pilot scheme; 
3) The identification of the service buyers may be the greatest challenge 
to establish the PES scheme as mentioned earlier. In the early stage of the study, 
there was high expectation that it would be possible to mobilize the contribution 
from private sectors via their CSR budgets, since the KARN-PES scheme 
provides the opportunity for private sectors could do “good” and earn CSR 
publicity. But the private companies may place more weight on quick-tangible 
results. There is therefore the need for a formal institutional framework to create 
tangible incentives for private sectors to participate.  The formal network could be 
through institutions such as the Federation of Thai Industries and the Thai 
Chamber of Commerce rather than individual private companies; 
4) This pilot PES scheme proposed here may be slightly different from 
the other PES schemes in term of the role of the actor. The affected villagers in the 
KARN-PES scheme are the beneficiaries as well as service providers. However, 
this situation would provide at least two advantages in that the scheme creates job 
for low-income households and reduces HEC simultaneously. The PES system has 
the potential to turn the human-elephant-conflict into human-elephant-harmony as 
it helps turn elephants from a pest to a valuable resource to be protected; 
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5) Since 93 percent of the 200-repondents agreed to volunteer to work for 
habitat improvement activities for free but we would like to pay villagers for their 
opportunity costs of time. Therefore, it is possible to propose an additional 
strategy to be an incentive compatible and cost saving of the KARN-PES scheme 
simultaneously. For example, the villagers will get paid for one hour under the 
condition that they have to work voluntarily one more hour or the working hours 
are double what they will get paid. Therefore, if the villagers would like to get 
paid for 10 hours, they have to work for 20 hours in total.  
In summary, the HEC mitigation measures in the KARN sanctuary that 
provides the highest net-benefit option is the policy option 3 (habitat 
improvement, female elephant contraception, and electric fences). In addition, the 
policy option 3 also provides the most cost-effective option, which the unit cost of 
this policy option varies between 2,747 and 12,489 US dollar per square 
kilometre. The PES mechanism to reduce HEC in the KARN sanctuary was 
designed as in Figure 8.4. Furthermore, the opportunity cost of service providers 
and costs of proposed mitigation measures were estimated to be used as 
information of financial needs for PES scheme. Also, a private sector, general 
public and tourists were anticipated to contribute as service buyers. This study 
finds that there are some potential limitations of PES implementation which are 
limited demand of environmental services, legal constraints, transaction costs, 
potential leakage and permanence of the PES scheme. Lastly, this research has 
provided information and analysis that can be used as the PES model in similar 
HEC situation in the future.  
8.3 Recommendations for Further Research 
This research covers the design of a pilot PES scheme. When the scheme 
is begun the research on monitoring and compliance would be pursued to make 
sure that service providers comply with their contracts. In addition, the proposed 
activities (e.g. water resources and mineral licks etc.) need to be monitored for use 
by wild animals. If they do not, research on the reasons why they do not use these 
facilities needs to be undertaken (e.g. the ingredients of the mineral licks may be 
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proper for animals). In addition, the present study did not estimate the transaction 
costs of a PES scheme due to data availability. Therefore, when the scheme is 
implemented, a transaction cost estimation of the scheme will be needed. This 
information is not only to create an example for a future PES scheme, but for the 
KARN-PES scheme itself to adjust or adapt its procedures in order to reduce 
transaction costs during the period of the scheme.  
Further, the study of distributional aspects on the impacts of the KARN-
PES scheme would provide useful information on which groups of participants 
obtain positive impacts (benefits) or negative impacts (costs) from the scheme, 
which could then be used to adjust the procedure of the scheme. Additionally, a 
study on who the actual participants are and what barriers prevent some of them to 
participate in the KARN-PES scheme would be useful information to adjust the 
scheme or even to design a new PES scheme in the future. 
Furthermore, the proposed HEC mitigation measures here are a medium-
term solution. In the future, even though the habitat in the sanctuary will be 
enhanced to its full capacity, the sanctuary will still be unable to maintain the 
increasing elephant population according to the current growth rate. The 
translocation of the entire herd has been suggested by wildlife experts. The 
research on the cost-benefit analysis of the appropriate area for elephant 
translocation will thus be needed to look at what might be the negative impacts 
(costs) and positive impact (benefits) of this measure for alternative locations. 
Also, research on public attitudes to elephant translocation will be needed because 
translocation is not currently acceptable for Thai people.  
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